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13 
1 Introducing the study 
1.1 Setting the scene 
Up until the late 1980s, almost all elder care in Sweden was publicly 
provided. From the 1990s onwards, reforms of the welfare system guided by 
New Public Management (NPM) ideas introduced the combination of public 
financing and private delivery to the sector. The Swedish elder care sector 
increasingly came to involve a system of public procurement whereby private 
actors compete on price for a contract to deliver services. A 1993 amendment 
to the Social Services Act, which regulates elder care as well as social 
services more broadly, aimed to stimulate competition in the provision of 
care by the municipalities. The objective was to increase efficiency and drive 
down costs.1 The focus on price competition was found to have negative 
effects on quality, and public authorities began to shift to quality competition. 
From the late 1980s onwards, some municipalities sought to introduce user 
choice, which competed with traditional public procurement (i.e. awarding 
the contract to the bidder offering the lowest price) as the way to privatize 
services. However, as late as 2005, 226 out of 290 municipalities still 
provided all home care publicly,2 and in 2006 as few as 27 municipalities had 
choice systems for elder care.3   
The 2008–2009 ‘freedom of choice’ reforms to the Swedish health and social 
care sector gave further impetus to this development. These reforms were a 
key part of the agenda of the right-wing Reinfeldt government (2006–2014). 
A new piece of legislation – lag (2008:962) om valfrihetssystem (the Act on 
Care Choice Systems) – allowed municipalities to introduce care choice 
                                                 
1 Prop. 1992/93:43 Ökad konkurrens i kommunal verksamhet. 
2 Marta Szebehely and Gun-Britt Trydegård, ‘Generell Välfärd Och Lokalt Självstyre: Ett 
Dilemma i Den Svenska Äldreomsorgen?’ in Håkan Jönson and Marta Szebehely (eds), 
Äldreomsorger i Sverige : Lokala variationer och generella trender (Gleerup 2018) 35. 
3 Marta Szebehely, ‘Insatser För Äldre Och Funktionshindrade i Privat Regi’ in Laura Hartman 
(ed), Konkurrensens konsekvenser: vad händer med svensk välfärd? (SNS förlag 2011) 
221. 
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systems in certain service areas. The main aim of this reform was to encourage 
private companies to provide welfare services, to allow users to choose among 
different care providers, and more generally to encourage a move away from 
traditional public procurement (i.e. contracting with a single private company 
to provide a particular service) and towards care choice systems (i.e. giving 
users a choice of several different providers) as a means of privatizing services. 
The act applies to all areas of social services, most of the healthcare sector, and 
employment agencies. However, care choice systems are most commonly 
introduced in the area of home care for older persons in need of assistance. 
This is the topic of this dissertation. 
This study takes as its point of departure the idea that the legal regulation of 
welfare services is a battleground where ongoing conflicts between different 
ways of organizing socially necessary reproductive functions are played out. 
Care choice systems in elder care are at the centre of a conflict about the 
broader principles of the welfare state, and studying them is therefore a way of 
revealing the outlines of this conflict. Another starting point is the claim that 
the welfare state has not been ‘deregulated’ but rather ‘reconfigured’ through 
new forms of public–private partnership and through the importation of the 
methods and instruments of the market into the public sphere. Trust is now 
placed in the market, rather than in the public sphere and public professionals, 
to solve problems within the system. At the same time, welfare has come to be 
seen less as a means of equalizing social conditions and more as a service that 
aims to satisfy citizens’ needs. 
The thesis is an empirical study focusing on how care choice systems function 
at the municipal level. I aim to show how the introduction of care choice 
systems in the area of home care for older people changes the nature of public 
administration, the strategies officials deploy, and the tools officials use. I 
provide an analysis of the practices connected to the contracting out of welfare 
services and of how these practices change public administration, welfare 
rationalities, and ways of governing. At the centre of the analysis will be 
questions about how the legal system provides a framework within which 
political interests can be pursued and how certain legal structures make 
possible certain kinds of activity. Inspired by governmentality studies and 
Michel Foucault, I aim to reveal the nuances and complexities of the 
development of neoliberal reforms in Sweden. 
Elder care is a significant but often overlooked part of the Swedish welfare 
system and social infrastructure, and it is an area where the trend towards 
increasing privatization has had a major impact. Just like many other OECD 
countries, Sweden faces the significant demographic challenge of an ageing 
15 
population, which means that the provision of elder care under the auspices of 
the public welfare system will be an issue of increasing importance in the 
future. 
1.1.1 The background to the study 
Following the care choice systems reforms of 2008–2009, many municipalities 
decided to marketize their services. As part of the policy implementation 
process, the government offered an incentive, in the form of additional 
funding, to municipalities that wanted to investigate the introduction of a care 
choice system. Out of a total of 290 municipalities, 248 applied for and 
received this extra funding. Even though not all of the municipalities that 
received the payment ultimately decided to implement a care choice system, 
the incentive certainly had the desired effect. By May 2020, 151 out of the 290 
Swedish municipalities had introduced care choice systems for certain home 
care services (such as cleaning, laundry, and shopping), and 127 had a care 
choice system for home care (i.e. the provision of care activities and healthcare 
in the user’s home).4 The introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems in 
2009 has thus radically increased the importance of choice systems as a model 
in Swedish elder care.  
The introduction of care choice is part of an international trend towards market-
oriented reforms in the welfare sector that started in the US and UK and has 
been promoted by international organizations such as the OECD.5 In the 
Nordic countries, marketization has primarily been introduced ‘within’ 
publicly funded welfare systems rather than in parallel to or instead of such 
systems, and it has mostly taken the form of the privatization of service 
delivery rather than of funding.6 The idea of choice has been central to the 
development of marketization in the Swedish welfare system. Different choice 
systems have also been introduced in the school and healthcare sectors. These 
                                                 
4 ‘The Care Choice Website’, https://www.valfrihetswebben.se/statistik/, accessed 11 May 
2020. 
5 Hildegard Theobald, ‘Marketization and Managerialization of Long-Term Care Policies in a 
Comparative Perspective’ in Tanja Klenk and Emmanuele Pavolini (eds), Restructuring 
Welfare Governance : Marketization, Managerialism and Welfare State Professionalism 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 32. 
6 Anneli Anttonen and Olli Karsio, ‘How Marketisation Is Changing the Nordic Model of Care 
for Older People’ in Flavia Martinelli, Anneli Anttonen and Margitta Mätzke (eds), Social 
Services Disrupted: Changes, Challenges and Policy Implications for Europe in times of 
austerity (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 222. 
16 
choice systems are based on vouchers, publicly funded benefits with which the 
care user can make choices on a market for care services. Voucher systems are 
based on an idea developed by Milton Friedman at the Chicago School of 
Economics in 1955. Friedman was looking for a way of increasing the role of 
the private sector in education while retaining public control over the system. 
Based on neo-classical economic ideas about competition as an efficient 
resource-allocating mechanism, the basic idea of voucher systems is to 
separate government financing and regulation from the delivery of services and 
to introduce consumer choice and quality competition.7 Unlike traditional 
public procurement, voucher systems focus on quality competition and user 
choice. 
A voucher-based market regulated and monitored by a municipality is referred 
to as a quasi-market. Quasi-markets may take different forms, but the use of 
the term implies that the market is at least partly regulated and is ‘quasi’ in that 
it differs from a conventional market in key ways.8 Reforms in the late 1980s 
involved different experiments with quasi-markets which aimed to maintain 
the public financing of services but alter the means by which services were 
provided. Central to these reforms was a decentralization of decision-making 
and an introduction of competition in welfare provision, with the public sector 
becoming the purchaser, the providers independent units, and the users 
consumers.9 In a voucher system, a recipient – that is, a service user – has the 
ability to ‘exit’: to stop using the services of one provider and instead use the 
services of another, rather than using their ‘voice’ to improve the quality of the 
services of the provider. The concepts of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ are derived from 
Albert O Hirschman10 and describe different ways in which a dissatisfied 
service user can seek to change an institution. The kind of quasi-market 
established through the care choice system is based on ‘supply side’ 
marketization; as prices are fixed, the market mechanism of competition 
applies only to the suppliers, and the consumer’s purchasing power is not 
understood in monetary terms.11 In the Swedish model, the difference between 
a municipality with a care choice system and one without a care choice system 
lies in the fact that the user may choose which provider should deliver the 
                                                 
7 Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (Rutgers University Press 1955). 
8 Julian Le Grand and Will Bartlett, Quasi-Markets and Social Policy (Macmillan 1993) 10. 
9 Le Grand and Bartlett (n 8) 3. 
10 Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty : Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States (Harvard Univ Press 1970). 
11 Viola Burau and others, ‘The Political Construction of Elder Care Markets: Comparing 
Denmark, Finland and Italy’ (2017) 21 Social Policy & Administration 2. 
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services that the municipality has determined the user is eligible for. A user 
eligible to receive care can choose between the approved providers that have 
contracts with the municipality. If they are dissatisfied with the service, a care 
recipient also has the possibility to ‘exit’ a care provider and choose another.  
In general, the reason for introducing a voucher system is often expressed in 
terms of a wish to increase diversity in a sector that has previously been more 
homogeneous. The systems are based on the conviction that giving care 
recipients an ‘exit’ option will stimulate innovation and improvement through 
competition.12 In introducing the Act on Care Choice Systems, the Swedish 
government had a number of motives. In the preparatory works, there are three 
main lines of argument in favour of the reform. First of all, it is argued that 
freedom of choice has an intrinsic value; it empowers the care user, shifting 
power and influence away from politicians and administrators. The second line 
of argument is based on the explicit presumption that, through the operation of 
market forces, a choice system will increase the quality of elder care, 
stimulating competition, innovation, and diversity. The third line of argument 
is that the reforms will develop the market for services, creating jobs and giving 
care workers the opportunity to start their own businesses, and thus having 
positive effects for small businesses and women’s entrepreneurship. 
Competition between employers is believed to lead to better conditions for 
employees.13 The Act on Care Choice Systems is also thought to clarify the 
legal situation in the area of public procurement.14 Finally, the government 
investigator claims that the municipalities’ own services will also benefit from 
competition and highlights the importance of bench-marking, particularly in 
light of the need for increased efficiency in the sector as a result of the ageing 
population.15  
To achieve the aims of the Act on Care Choice Systems, the municipalities 
have to create the preconditions for private providers to operate and for users 
to choose. At the same time, the municipalities are still responsible, under the 
Social Services Act, for securing high-quality services for users in need. The 
Act on Care Choice Systems is not meant to lower the ambitions of the elder 
care system as a whole, and it ultimately remains a public responsibility to 
ensure that the objectives of the act are achieved. What has changed, however, 
                                                 
12 Jane R Gingrich, Making Markets in the Welfare State : The Politics of Varying Market 
Reforms (Cambridge University Press 2011) 15. 
13 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem 18. 
14 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 54–55. 
15 SOU 2014:2 Framtidens valfrihetssystem – i socialtjänsten 156. 
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are the tools of governing and of securing quality services. Through tender 
documents, the municipality determines the requirements that a private 
provider must live up to in order to be approved as a supplier. The Act on Care 
Choice Systems states that a municipality cannot refuse to sign a contract with 
a private provider if the provider meets the quality requirements in the act and 
in the tender. If a supplier meets these requirements, the application is 
approved, and the private provider is given the right to enter into a contract 
with the municipality. The contract creates an obligation to deliver services to 
users who choose the provider and a right to get paid according to a 
compensation scheme set out in the contract. The contracts also set out 
procedures for conflict resolution, sanctions, and amendment or termination of 
contract.  
In seeking to govern private providers, the municipalities may make use of 
different mechanisms. They may alter the requirements in the tender 
document, monitor the providers, make use of the sanctions and grounds for 
termination provided in the contract, and engage in dialogue and more indirect 
approaches. The criteria set out in the tender documents, the clauses in the 
contracts, and the monitoring of the contracts become central to public 
administration at the municipal level. Formal – but also, as will be shown in 
this study, informal – aspects of the relationship with the private providers 
create a framework that determines what the municipality is able to achieve in 
seeking to realize the aims of the Act on Care Choice Systems on the one hand 
and the Social Services Act on the other.  
The municipalities are not obliged to introduce care choice systems. In 
accordance with the principle of local self-governance, the municipalities have 
a great deal of leeway in organizing services, allowing them to take into 
account their own systems, budgets, and knowledge of local needs. The Act on 
Care Choice Systems thus provides a procedural framework but leaves it to the 
municipalities to determine the details of the regulation of the system. Many 
municipalities start by introducing care choice systems in the area of home care 
services for older people, as this sector has low barriers to entry: that is, it is 
relatively easy for new companies to establish themselves in the market.16 The 
municipalities may have contracts with as many private providers as will apply 
and be granted entry into the system, but most care choice systems have very 
few established providers (or even no private providers at all, if no eligible 
provider applies). However, there are some larger care choice systems, such as 
16 Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Kommunernas Valfrihetssystem - Med Fokus På 
Hemtjänst: Slutrapport’ (Konkurrensverket 2013) 36. 
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the one in Stockholm, which for a time had over 100 providers for users to 
choose between. A provider may seek to distinguish itself from other providers 
by catering for those who speak certain languages or are from a particular 
cultural or religious background, by having special knowledge or expertise, or 
by being oriented towards particular conditions such as dementia, psychiatric 
diagnoses, or diabetes.17 Each municipality develops its own tender dossier and 
contract. It therefore makes sense to focus a study of the organization and 
regulation of Swedish elder care services on what happens in the 
municipalities, for this is the level at which most elder care is provided in 
Sweden.  
From a legal perspective, there is no relationship between the provider and the 
user in the Swedish care choice systems.18 There is a rights-based, public-law 
relationship between the user and the municipality, and a private-law 
relationship – a contract – between the municipality and the provider. The 
agreement between the municipality and the provider and the actual 
relationship between the user and the provider reconfigures the relations 
between the citizen and the municipality, inserting the private provider as an 
intermediary between the two. The responsibility the municipality has towards 
the user is transferred, becoming the contractual responsibility of the private 
provider. However, because the municipality remains, legally, the principal 
with regard to all elder care services, including privately delivered services, 
the municipality is responsible for any errors or defects in the service provided 
by the private companies. The problem with the complicated relationships 
involved in the contracting out of welfare services is that public-law 
obligations end up having to be enforced by private legal subjects.  
The type of privatization that results in private actors providing publicly 
funded services may be seen as involving the meeting of two legal metaphors. 
One legal paradigm, the rule of law and the relationship between the citizen 
and the public (vertical), is mixed with another legal paradigm, the contract 
(horizontal). Public-law relationships are traditionally seen as hierarchical 
power relations, whereas private-law relationships are seen as equal, voluntary 
relations between legal entities on the same level. This is a meeting between 
two legal paradigms: a traditional, hierarchical, and bureaucratic welfare 
                                                 
17 Katarina Andersson, ‘Valfrihet Och Mångfald: Ett Dilemma För Hemtjänsten’ (2010) 17 
Socialvetenskaplig tidskrift 308, 310. 
18 In the case Länsrätten i Stockholm, 2007-11-19, no. 105017-07 and 10527-07, the court 
ruled that it is not possible for a municipality to construct a care choice system in which 
users enter into contracts with suppliers to provide services for which the municipality later 
pays. Rather, the municipality has to establish a contract with the provider first. 
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system and a more libertarian contract-law system. The bureaucratic system 
tends to be rigid because it is based on general and abstract legal rules, which 
work to promote legal safeguards and security.19 The classical Weberian-style 
bureaucracy, with hierarchical chains of command, distinct jurisdiction, 
concerns for impartiality, etc., has not vanished, but it has been challenged, 
and this challenge has informed a wide range of reform measures and 
techniques, which in turn have given rise to internal conflicts within the 
system.20 Care choice systems have thus altered the regulatory powers of local 
governments.  
1.1.2 Swedish exceptionalism, past and present 
In recent months, because of the coronavirus pandemic, Swedish elder care has 
received a lot of international attention.21 As Carl-Johan Karlsson points out in 
an analysis for Foreign Policy magazine, Sweden has traditionally been looked 
to as a model society, known for its robust welfare state and extensive and 
generous social services, including elder care. However, the coronavirus crisis 
has led to that image being questioned, not least because of the country’s 
failure to protect the elderly within the elder care system.22 An analysis of the 
longer-term changes to social services in Sweden, and to elder care in 
particular, complicates the image of Sweden as an exemplary advanced welfare 
state. 
When looked at in an international context, the Swedish elder care system, with 
its combination of generous funding for welfare services and a large share of 
19 See, e.g., Eberhard Eichenhofer and Mies Westerveld, ‘Contractualism : A Legal 
Perspective’ in Els Sol, Mies Westerweld and Maria Westerweld (eds), Contractualism in 
employment services : a new form of welfare state governance (Kluwer Law International 
2005) 29. 
20 Peter Triantafillou, New Forms of Governing : A Foucauldian Inspired Analysis (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012) 170. 
21 See e.g. Richard Orange, ‘The Treatment of Sweden’s Old and Vulnerable Is a 
“Catastrophe”’ The Telegraph (7 May 2020) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/05/07/treatment-swedens-old-vulnerable-
catastrophe/> accessed 7 July 2020; Maddy Savage, ‘What’s Going Wrong in Sweden’s 
Care Homes?’ BBC News (19 May 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
52704836> accessed 7 July 2020; Carl-Johan Karlsson, ‘Sweden’s Coronavirus Failure 
Started Long Before the Pandemic’ Foreign Policy (23 June 2020) 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/sweden-Coronavirus-failure-anders-tegnell-started-
long-before-the-pandemic/> accessed 7 July 2020. 
22 Karlsson (n 21). 
21 
for-profit private provision of public services, appears somewhat unique. 
Swedish elder care is based on the idea of the universal provision of high-
quality care for everyone in need, financed by tax revenues. The system is one 
of the most generous structures of publicly provided care for older persons in 
the world.23 From an international perspective, Sweden still has a well-
developed elder care system, and the quality of home care in Sweden has been 
found to be among the highest in Europe.24 
Developments in the organization of the Swedish welfare state, with the move 
towards market-based competition and the limited regulation of the amount of 
profit that can be made by companies providing welfare services, have thus 
been viewed from the outside with a certain astonishment.25 However, as 
Stefan Svallfors and Anna Tyllström note, the latest privatization surge in the 
Swedish welfare system has received surprisingly little attention in the 
international welfare and social policy literature. The authors argue that the 
traditional image the world has of the Swedish welfare state needs to be 
updated in light of the developments towards privatization in recent decades.26  
The way in which Swedish care choice systems are regulated is not particularly 
unusual in an international context; it is the combination of these systems with 
the universalist ambitions of the elder care system that makes the Swedish case 
remarkable. To highlight the specificities of the Swedish welfare and elder care 
systems, it is useful briefly to compare Sweden with the other Nordic countries, 
for these countries generally have very similar systems to Sweden. While a 
thorough analysis of all the similarities and differences between these systems 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is fruitful to highlight some differences 
which demonstrate why Sweden is a particularly interesting case. In 
international comparisons, the Nordic, or Scandinavian, welfare states are 
often lumped together, characterized as they are by a relevant shared feature: 
                                                 
23 Sara Erlandsson and others, ‘Marketising Trends in Swedish Eldercare: Competition, Choice 
and Calls for Stricter Regulation’ in Gabrielle Meagher and Marta Szebehely (eds), 
Marketisation in Nordic eldercare: a research report on legislation, oversight, extent and 
consequences (Department of Social Work, Stockholm University 2013) 24. 
24 Nadine Genet and others, ‘Home Care in Europe : A Systematic Literature Review’ (2011) 
11 BMC Health Services Research 1, 9. 
25 Paula Blomqvist, ‘NPM i välfärdsstaten: hotas universalismen?’ (2016) 118 
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 40. 
26 Stefan Svallfors and Anna Tyllström, ‘Resilient Privatization: The Puzzling Case of for-
Profit Welfare Providers in Sweden’ (2019) 17 Socio-Economic Review 2. 
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generously funded public services.27 However, the Nordic countries also 
regulate and organize public service provision in a variety of different ways – 
and these differences are growing.28  
The development towards the private provision of social services began in all 
Nordic countries 15–20 years ago. In Sweden, policy-makers had an explicit 
aim of decreasing public sector dominance, and this led to the use of 
commercial incentives.29 Sweden, like the other Scandinavian countries, 
implemented NPM reforms in the welfare system, bringing governing models 
from the private sector into the provision of services. As early as the 1990s, 
however, Sweden was going a step further than the other Nordic countries by 
encouraging competition between public and private welfare providers.30 
According to a 2013 study by the Swedish Competition Agency, less than 10 
per cent of private welfare providers were non-profit associations, foundations, 
and cooperatives. Compared with other countries with similar welfare systems, 
Sweden has a large share of for-profit companies among private providers of 
welfare services.31 
In Finland, a voucher system similar to Sweden’s care choice system has been 
in place since 2004, but on a small scale, but there are ongoing, and extensively 
debated, plans to develop and expand this system.32 Just as in Sweden, 
municipalities in Finland are not obliged to adopt the system, and they are free 
to organize their elder care services according to different models. Three out 
of four municipalities have some sort of voucher system, but it is still the case 
that only a small portion of the municipalities’ budgets for elder care is spent 
via voucher systems.33 In Norway, local authorities provide services in the 
                                                 
27 In much social policy literature, the Nordic countries are discussed as a group. I will 
therefore adopt this practice when the authors to whom I am referring do the same. 
28 Signe Bock Segaard and Jo Saglie, ‘Education and Elderly Care in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden: National Policies and Legal Frameworks for Private Providers’ in Karl Henrik 
Sivesind and Jo Saglie (eds), Promoting Active Citizenship: Markets and Choice in 
Scandinavian Welfare (Springer International Publishing 2017) 76. 
29 Karl Henrik Sivesind, ‘The Changing Roles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Welfare Provision 
in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark’ in Karl Henrik Sivesind and Jo Saglie (eds), Promoting 
Active Citizenship: Markets and Choice in Scandinavian Welfare (Springer International 
Publishing 2017) 59. 
30 Sivesind (n 29) 62. 
31 Swedish Competition Authority (n 16) 77–78. 
32 Mats Brandt, Valfrihet inom social- och hälsovården : Myndigheters syn på valfrihetens 
inverkan i Finland och Sverige ur olika strategiska synvinklar (Vaasan Yliopisto 2019) 3–
4. 
33 Brandt (n 32) 39–40. 
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traditional manner, and there are no voucher systems in place. Outsourcing is 
also less common in Norway than in Sweden and Finland, and because of the 
special protections the Norwegian non-profit sector enjoys it is significantly 
larger than Sweden’s comparatively small non-profit sector.34 Denmark’s 
home care system is more generous than Sweden’s, and home care for older 
persons in need is provided free of charge.35 Danish municipalities must 
provide their citizens with a care choice system, but there is national regulation 
of the private providers within the system.36 The Danish non-profit sector is 
also larger than Sweden’s, and has been from the start.37  
According to a comparative study from 2017, public-sector employment has 
decreased more in Sweden than in other Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, 
there has also been a decline, but it has not proceeded at the same pace as the 
decline in Sweden. Norway has not seen the same declines in the extent of 
public sector employment that the other countries have seen. In Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway, the for-profit share of the elder care market is 
increasing, while the non-profit sector is basically at a standstill. The gap is 
growing fastest in Sweden.38 Despite common welfare ideals and similar recent 
changes in regulation, there are significant differences between the 
Scandinavian countries, and Sweden stands out from the pack when it comes 
to the downsizing of elder care, the degree of marketization, and the size of the 
for-profit sector. 
From a broader European perspective, there has been a trend towards the 
increasing private delivery of elder care in several countries during the last 
decade, with private providers either replacing public provision or 
compensating for its absence.39 Less stringently regulated ‘cash for care’ 
schemes are more common elsewhere in Europe than in the Nordic countries. 
In these systems, older persons in need for care are offered cash payments or 
vouchers instead of services, and they can then use these more or less freely 
on a private market for services. In these schemes, the contractual relationship 
                                                 
34 Anttonen and Karsio (n 6) 223–224. 
35 Tine Rostgaard and Marta Szebehely, ‘Changing Policies, Changing Patterns of Care: 
Danish and Swedish Home Care at the Crossroads’ (2012) 9 European Journal of Ageing 
103. 
36 Tine Rostgaard, ‘Revisiting the Public Care Model : The Danish Case of Free Choice in 
Home Care’ in Karen Christensen and Doria Pilling (eds), The Routledge Handbook of 
Social Care Work Around the World (Routledge 2017). 
37 Sivesind (n 29) 61. 
38 Sivesind (n 29) 41. 
39 Genet and others (n 24) 8. 
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is a direct one between the user and the provider, and the state is merely the 
funder of the care. It has been shown that the level of funding in many such 
schemes is significantly less than the cost of the required service.40 These 
schemes have different roles in different countries. In some national welfare 
regimes, for instance the UK and the Netherlands, they are alternatives to 
services provided directly by the state. In others, for instance Ireland, the cash-
for-care scheme is the only form of publicly financed elder care, and is the first 
step towards a public responsibility for the welfare of older persons.41 In this 
way, the marketization reforms in Sweden are part of an international trend.  
1.2 Frame of the study 
1.2.1 Aim and research questions 
This study provides an account of the introduction of care choice systems into 
the provision of home care by the Swedish municipalities. This account aims 
to deepen the understanding of how quasi-market reforms such as the 
introduction of care choice systems can transform public administration at the 
municipal level and the legal strategies used by public authorities in governing 
welfare. An additional aim is to analyse the outcomes of the care choice 
systems with regard to how they govern and secure quality services and how 
they deploy quality-assessment practices. The study provides an empirically 
based investigation of the roles ‘public law’ and ‘private law’ play in realizing 
and shaping new forms of governing.  
As it is a study in law, this thesis aims to provide a detailed discussion of how 
the dichotomy between public law and private law relates to entities defined as 
‘public’ and ‘private’, and to show how different instruments connected to 
each of these spheres are put to use within a privatized welfare sector. In this 
context, I will explain how the different rationalities and technologies 
connected with public and private law actually play out and highlight the 
40 Virpi Timonen, Janet Convery and Suzanne Cahill, ‘Care Revolutions in the Making? A 
Comparison of Cash-for-Care Programmes in Four European Countries’ (2006) 26 Ageing 
& Society 455–461. 
41 Timonen, Convery and Cahill (n 40) 470–471. 
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conflicts they create. This thesis will also provide a picture of the strategies 
actors use ‘on the ground’ in order to tackle these conflicts.  
In seeking to understand the governing of care choice systems, this thesis will 
answer the following research questions: 
- How, and according to which rationalities, do the municipalities 
govern care choice systems in the provision of home care for older 
people in Sweden? How do these rationalities conflict, and what are 
the roles of public administration within them? 
- How does the introduction of care choice systems affect the definition 
of quality within home care, and how do the changes in the 
municipalities’ governing structures and tools affect practices of 
quality assessment? 
- How are public- and private-law tools and logics used in the governing 
of the public and private delivery of home care within care choice 
systems? 
A central contribution of my study to the existing interdisciplinary work on 
Swedish care choice systems is that it provides a systematic analysis, from a 
legal perspective, of the role of public- and private-law instruments in general, 
and tenders and contracts specifically, in the governing of care choice systems. 
A study in law can bring something new to the table in our understanding of 
how care choice systems have been introduced in the municipalities. The role 
of law in structuring the organization and governing of welfare is generally 
undertheorized, and this thesis will demonstrate the importance of an 
understanding of this dimension to any account of the outcomes, risks, values, 
and problems of new ways of governing welfare. In making this contribution, 
I pursue a ‘law in practice’ approach alongside a theoretical discussion of the 
divide between public law and private law.  
Furthermore, this thesis will contribute to an understanding of the development 
of the Swedish welfare system. Even though the system remains largely 
publicly financed, significant changes within the system mean that the 
provision of welfare has been reorganized. This merits study in its own right, 
but it may also be studied as a means of deepening our understanding of the 
different forms the relation between state and market can take. This thesis will, 
in this way, provide new insights into how parts of the Swedish model have 
evolved during the last decade.  
This thesis foregrounds practices, and in doing so is informed by an approach 
inspired by the theories of French philosopher Michel Foucault. This approach, 
26 
which has been developed under the umbrella of what is called 
‘governmentality studies’, emphasizes the importance of attending to the 
‘how’ of governing. Making use of this perspective in legal studies means 
focusing on the practices, techniques, and institutions set up for governing. 
This implies a descriptive rather than a normative approach, but it is descriptive 
on a meta-level. In Foucault’s words, it is a scientific approach that aims ‘not 
to discover what is concealed, but rather to make visible what precisely is 
visible’,42 to reveal the contingency of what is taken for granted in the current 
order and to bring to light the structures of power which are at play in the 
processes being studied.43 This approach is driven by a critical ethos: it 
involves an attempt to understand the limitations and conditions of the social 
order as it is, and thereby to enable us to examine these critically and to imagine 
other ways in which this order might be arranged.44 On this basis, one may then 
also develop normative counter-strategies within and outside the law. This 
study will not, however, come up with suggestions for alternative ways of 
governing. 
My analysis of the construction of quasi-markets in welfare is inspired by 
social theorist Karl Polanyi, who stated in his influential work The Great 
Transformation that a laissez-faire market economy can only function through 
societal, legal, and institutional structures. A market economy is not realized 
by simply allowing matters to take their own course; it has to be enforced by 
the state through laws that change regulation and at the same time expand the 
administrative functions of the state in order to protect the market.45 To 
‘marketize’ an aspect of the public sector thus does not mean to allow it to 
leave the sphere of regulation but rather to subject it to different legal and 
institutional structures. 
1.2.2 Research design 
In answering my research questions, I use a variety of materials and methods. 
One starting point is a study of legal texts: the legal regulations and the 
preparatory works (documents which count as important legal sources in the 
                                                 
42 Michel Foucault, ‘The Analytic Philosophy of Politics’ (2018) 24 Foucault Studies 192. 
43 Michel Foucault, Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, ‘Society Must Be Defended’ : 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76 (Picador 2003) 25–30. 
44 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (SAGE Publications 
2010) 14. 
45 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(Beacon Press 2001) 145. 
27 
Swedish legal system), national policy documents, and municipal tender 
documents and contracts. But my main conclusions are drawn from the face-
to-face interviews I have conducted with officials from three municipalities. I 
have also included a questionnaire I sent to all municipalities.  
The thesis consists of a critical analysis of the governing rationalities of the 
care choice systems, with a focus on the function of public- and private-law 
logics and instruments, and it concludes with a discussion of possible ways of 
understanding these rationalities in a system of welfare capitalism. To achieve 
the aims of the study, I will describe how the care choice systems are 
constructed, regulated, supported, and monitored. My choices of methods and 
material will be discussed in chapter 2, but here I want to explain some central 
points of departure for my study. 
The study of the legal sources aims to provide an overview of the regulations 
through an analysis of concepts, principles, and decision-making structures. 
However, many aspects of the way law functions in society are invisible in 
legal documents: how different instruments are used, how ambiguities are 
interpreted in practice, what gets prioritized by actors interpreting law in 
situations of conflict, which strategies are adopted in order to achieve the aims 
of the law, etc. An analysis of legal documents can therefore only go some way 
to answering my research questions. As Reza Banakar and Max Travers argue, 
the formal vocabulary of law almost by definition excludes extra-legal factors, 
which implies that a study concerned with the social function of law must 
complement the study of legal documents with data gathered through other 
methods of enquiry.46 This study therefore combines a textual analysis of legal 
sources with an empirical case study of law in practice.  
As I stated above, this thesis is inspired by the methods of Michel Foucault. 
These require that one adopt an ‘intense scepticism’ towards universal models 
and that one favour, instead, the close study of actual practices. A Foucauldian 
governmentality approach therefore starts from the assumption that practices 
and power must be studied with an open mind, without prior 
conceptualizations. However, Foucault’s own diagnosis of the relationship 
between liberalism, the state, the economy, and the modern subject has 
generated its own tradition of thought about what is often termed 
‘neoliberalism’.47 Scholars working in this tradition have developed a 
                                                 
46 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2005) 135. 
47 See e.g. Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos : Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone 
Books 2015); Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (n 44); Suzan 
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methodological understanding of the connection between governing structures 
and rationalities, which I will make use of in my study. But they have also 
formed a description of current formations of governing rationalities under the 
headline ‘the neoliberal state’ (or ‘advanced liberal state’48). One risk with 
these projects in governmentality studies is that they tend to conceptualize 
rationalities and technologies as operating within a coherent apparatus and fail 
to engage with difference, hybridity, contradiction, and politics. As Michelle 
Brady concludes in an article on the study of ‘neoliberalism’, this concept is 
so popular in social science that it appears in a third of all articles published 
within the fields of sociology and cultural anthropology, and with that kind of 
popularity the risk is that the use of the term ‘obfuscates more than it 
enlightens’ and leads to monolithic assessments of change.49 Similarly, Loïc 
Wacquant argues that, for an empirical study of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ to succeed, it would be necessary to study what actually 
happens in the state formation and how the project of creating markets takes 
place in practice.50 
If we are to avoid the risk Brady identifies, and if we are to follow Wacquant’s 
advice, it is important to design any study of a ‘neoliberal’ order in such a way 
that the study does not end up simply proving what is already implicit in the 
very use of the term itself. For this reason, I am inspired by Brady’s approach 
to the study of neoliberalism. She states that the point of such research is  
to understand the relative importance of neoliberal rationalities within any 
particular context, and to uncover how neoliberal rationalities and practices link 
up and combine with other rationalities and practices … [thus] showing how 
distinct forms of power both recombine in different ways within different 
historical periods and co-exist (rather than simply replacing each other).51 
[Emphasis added] 
Ilcan, ‘Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government’ 
(2009) 46 Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie. 
48 A term used first by Rose. Nicolas Rose, ‘Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies’ in 
Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds), The anthropology of the state: a reader 
(Blackwell 2006). 
49 Michelle Brady, ‘Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities: From the Neoliberal 
Apparatus to Neoliberalism and Governmental Assemblages’ (2014) 18 Foucault Studies 
11, 12. 
50 Loïc Wacquant, ‘Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism’ (2012) 20 Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 76. 
51 Brady (n 49) 32. 
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Being open to what the empirical material might show complicates a study 
because it allows the researcher to see more clearly how different rationalities 
meet and enter into dialogue, and allows for greater attention to be paid to 
processes and complexities. Whereas studies relying only on the legislation 
and policy documents relating to the reform would have highlighted the new 
and emerging rationality while bracketing other rationalities in play, this more 
open approach allows the researcher to showcase multiple and co-existing 
rationalities.52 One point of departure for such an approach is the assumption 
that historical development is not deterministic but is a dynamic result of a 
political struggle between different interests which plays out in the legal arena 
and in the medium of law, as well as in other areas. These conflicts are not 
arbitrary; they are connected to power structures. It is for this reason that, in 
the concluding chapter, I relate the results of my open-ended empirical study 
to theoretical discussions of broader developments in capitalism. In this way it 
is also possible to bridge the divide between empirical work, which by itself 
can be mundane, and meta-theory, which, as Alan Hunt puts it, has a tendency 
to be arcane.53 Through this dialectic between the micro and macro, it is 
possible to achieve an understanding of broader changes in society, with 
insights gained at the micro level enriching the account of structural 
developments at the macro level. On this model, instead of just viewing 
phenomena in terms of a predetermined theoretical framework, there is an 
interplay between the micro and macro levels. 
My ambition is thus to combine an analysis of legal sources with observations 
of how the reforms under investigation play out on the ground, that is, in 
practice, before providing a theoretical discussion of how the results might be 
understood. In this way, I aim to link the study of governing rationalities, 
regulatory techniques, and actual practices. The ambition of adopting this 
dialectic approach to the relationship between critical questions and empirical 
material has led me to choose a variety of methods (described in more detail in 
chapter 2). This study is guided by a conviction that law is most usefully 
studied in practice, in the sites where it is enacted. This, in turn, is related to a 
belief that the implementation of any reform is most meaningfully studied 
close to where it actually plays out. After a particular set of rules and legislation 
is produced at the national level, it is handed down to local municipalities for 
implementation, at which point new possibilities open up. Seeing the world of 
law in terms of this topography of high-level law making and lower-level 
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53 Alan Hunt, ‘The Problematisation of Law in Classical Social Theory’ in Reza Banakar and 
Max Travers (eds), An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Hart Publishing 2002) 29. 
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policy implementation has the effect of debunking the idea that there is a divide 
between ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in practice’. Law is in part made, and 
completed, through the various ways in which it is implemented. No piece of 
paper or action is legal by nature; it becomes legal by being incorporated in a 
network of procedures. Legality is thus the quality of a network, not of an 
entity.54 It is therefore not possible to draw a clear distinction between a reform 
and its implementation. What happens ‘on the ground’ is what the legal reform 
both does and is. A study that takes its cue from these assumptions requires a 
closer proximity to the practices than an analysis of texts alone can provide. 
This explains the way in which I have approached my material. 
With regard to the time period under investigation in this study, I have chosen 
to begin with the introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems (which 
started with a government inquiry in 2008, the act coming into force in 2009) 
and end in April 2019, when I collected the last of my empirical material. The 
interviews were conducted between May 2017 and January 2018. As I 
mentioned earlier, care choice systems existed in some municipalities before 
the introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems, and therefore there are 
occasional references to the period before 2008–2009 in the study of the 
municipalities.  
1.2.3 Contribution to existing research 
Care choice systems in the provision of home care and in other areas of care 
services in Sweden have mostly been studied by researchers in the fields of 
social work, economics, and political science. Much of this research has been 
centred on users’ experiences of the systems and users’ ability to make active 
choices on the market;55 on the functioning, effectiveness, and structure of the 
54 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (Routledge 
2015) 61, which in turn refers to Bruno Latour. 
55 See e.g. Per Gunnar Edebalk and Marianne Svensson, Kundval För Äldre Och 
Funktionshindrade i Norden: Konsumentperspektivet (Nordiska ministerrådet 2005); Linda 
Moberg, Marketization in Swedish Eldercare : Implications for Users, Professionals, and 
the State (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis 2017); Erlandsson and others (n 23). 
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quasi-market;56 and on questions of accountability within the market.57 The 
reforms brought about by the Act on Care Choice Systems have also been the 
subject of several government agency reports, mostly focusing on the market, 
the users, and the effects of the care choice systems.58 I will draw on several of 
these studies in order to add detail to my picture of practices within care choice 
systems.  
I aim to contribute to this body of literature by focusing on the municipal 
administrations and the relationship between the administrations and the 
providers, an area which has not yet been the subject of much research. One 
exception is a recent dissertation by Mats Brandt. He studied care choice 
systems in healthcare and social services in Sweden and Finland, focusing on 
the strategies of municipal administrations. He created a questionnaire, which 
he gave to 178 municipal administrators in Swedish and Finnish municipalities 
with care choice systems.59 There are important differences between our 
studies in terms of material, methodology, and perspective. His questions 
mainly regard the administrators’ experiences and their opinions about 
competition and the degree to which users can make self-determined choices. 
With regard to methods, his digital questionnaire was mainly quantitative, 
while my face-to-face interviews are qualitative and have the aim of analysing 
municipal administrators’ experiences of certain practices. 
Another important body of literature in the field focuses on care choice systems 
as an example of marketization as governance and discourse, and on the 
overarching changes in governing logics involved in the implementation of 
                                                 
56 See e.g. Helene Brodin and Elin Peterson, ‘Omsorgsföretag i Med- Eller Motvind? 
Genusperspektiv På Småföretagande i Hemtjänsten i Stockholm’ in Håkan Jönson and 
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57 See e.g. Anna H Glenngård, Objectives, Actors and Accountability in Quasi-Markets : 
Studies of Swedish Primary Care (Media-Tryck 2013). 
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Befolknings- Och Patientperspektiv: Slutredovisning’ (Socialstyrelsen 2012) and; Swedish 
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Valfrihetssystem. Hur Påverkar Den Kostnader Och Effektivitet i Kommunerna?’ 
(Statskontoret 2012) 15. 
59 Brandt (n 32) 53–54. 
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these systems.60 Relatedly, there are theoretical studies of how welfare law 
operates.61 These have informed my theoretical understanding of the field of 
study. What I aim to contribute to this field is a bottom-up investigation that 
stays close to the empirical material. Through my choice of material and my 
starting points in the methodology of governmentality studies, I seek to add 
nuance and concrete detail to the theoretical discussions of neoliberalism and 
rationalities of governing in the field of welfare. 
Within Swedish legal studies, scholars have investigated the contracting out of 
welfare services and the possible conflict between public and private law this 
involves;62 however, none of this research has focused specifically on care 
choice systems in the municipalities. This literature is mostly theoretical, and 
focuses on the analysis of legal sources. One exception from the Nordic 
literature is the work of Ole Hansen, who has studied the contracts used in the 
contracting out of welfare services in the Nordic countries through a 
combination of theory and empirical investigation. His work is relevant to the 
topic of this thesis, and will be referred to in what follows. However, his work 
does not employ quantitative methods or interviews, and, unlike this thesis, 
does not focus on how contracts are actually used, instead centring on the 
contracting strategies public authorities use when trying to regulate the private 
providers in their areas.63  
                                                 
60 See e.g. Katarina Andersson and Elin Kvist, ‘The Neoliberal Turn and the Marketization of 
Care: The Transformation of Eldercare in Sweden’ (2015) 22 European Journal of 
Women’s Studies; Anneli Anttonen, Liisa Häikiö and Stefánsson Kolbeinn, Welfare State, 
Universalism and Diversity (Edward Elgar 2012); Paula Blomqvist, ‘The Choice 
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61 Gunther Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (de Gruyter 1986). 
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1.2.4 Delimitations 
Care choice systems raise a number of questions, not all of which can be 
addressed in this thesis. During the last decade, the concept of ‘active 
citizenship’ has been widely used in the welfare literature to discuss the 
responsibilization of members of society, meaning the institutional and policy 
changes introduced in order to make private individuals more responsible for 
their own welfare.64 These issues are highly relevant to a study focusing on the 
topic of choice in welfare. However, my contribution focuses not on the users 
and their subjectivities, a topic others have examined thoroughly, but on the 
administrations and their practices. Consequently, I will not be discussing 
social rights or access to justice, for these would imply a focus on older 
persons’ positions and actions, which are only of secondary importance in my 
study. 
In the governing of elder care, tensions may arise between the national and 
municipal levels. These tensions are, however, outside of the scope of my 
study. The municipalities furthermore seem to have been influenced by the 
national agencies’ definition of what counts as ‘quality’ within home care. It 
would therefore be interesting to know how these policies have been developed 
and which groups have influenced this process, but this is, again, outside of the 
scope of my own study. Although I will analyse some national policy 
documents, mostly to understand their relevance for the municipal 
administrations, the national authorities generally play a limited role in this 
thesis. 
EU public procurement regulations are relevant to the construction of the Act 
on Care Choice Systems, and they also constrain the municipalities’ actions in 
this area. However, in order to answer my research questions, it will not be 
necessary to give an in-depth account of EU regulations, and therefore I 
mention EU regulation when necessary but without going into detail. I will 
primarily account for the strategies deployed by the administrations in light of 
their knowledge of EU public procurement regulations. 
At the beginning of 2019, as I was finishing the collection of my empirical 
material and had already conducted all the interviews, two amendments were 
made to the Social Services Act that are relevant to this thesis. The first makes 
it possible for municipalities to issue home care decisions without prior needs-
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testing, and the second requires providers of home care to be authorized by a 
national agency, the Health and Care inspectorate. How these amendments 
might affect the governing of home care in the municipalities is not discussed 
widely in the interviews, but they are mentioned when I deem them relevant to 
my research questions. Because of timing, developments in Swedish elder care 
that have taken place since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic will not be 
discussed.65 
Lastly, I want to underline that, even though I am placing care choice systems 
in an historical context, this dissertation is not an historical study of the policy 
changes that have taken place. I am not examining municipalities before and 
after the introduction of care choice systems. In making comparisons, I can 
only refer to municipalities without care choice systems and to the accounts 
given by my respondents. 
1.2.5 Outline 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. In the remainder of chapter 1, I will 
paint a broad and concise picture of the historical, legal historical, and legal 
background to the study, providing a framework within which the empirical 
chapters that follow may be better understood. In chapter 2, I will provide an 
account of my methodological starting points, explaining how I intend to adopt 
the perspective of governmentality studies and describing the benefits and 
limitations this might imply. I will also present the material used and the 
methods with which I have collected and analysed the data.  
Chapters 3–5 form the empirical part of my study and the heart of the thesis. 
Each chapter answers one of the three research questions. Chapter 3 discusses 
the governing of care choice systems and the role of the municipal 
administrations. Chapter 4 focuses on questions of quality. In chapter 5, I 
examine the question of public and private logics and instruments within care 
choice systems. These three chapters have the same form. At the beginning of 
each chapter, the main question is broken down into subquestions. The 
empirical investigation follows, and the chapter ends with a section that 
presents the results and answers the questions. 
65 It would have been interesting to study how private providers within care choice systems 
have been governed in the context of the crisis, but since time constraints made this 
impossible, the topic will have to be left to a future study. 
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In the concluding chapter, chapter 6, I discuss my results and relate them to 
theories of the organization of reproductive work under capitalism, theories of 
neoliberalism, and theories of law in the neoliberal era. In this section I also 
engage with feminist theories of the societal organization of social 
reproduction. The aim of this theoretical chapter is to discuss the implications 
of my empirical results and to try to understand why these results have been 
reached. The reason for introducing the theories in the final chapter is that I am 
seeking to study practices without – to the extent this is possible – adopting a 
predefined narrative which frames what is found. The role of the theories is to 
help me interpret the results and to see them within the broader context of the 
divisions of power and resources in contemporary society. 
To this end, the concluding chapter discusses how reforms such as the 
introduction of care choice systems reconfigure public administration and 
introduce different rationalities and tools of governing. I will also discuss new 
modes of governing through public and private law. Lastly, I will analyse the 
care choice system reforms through the lens of different theories of 
neoliberalism and the commodification of care. While my aim is to use these 
theories in order to deepen the understanding of the results of the empirical 
part of the study, I also seek, by testing the theories against these results, to 
contribute to a development of certain parts of these theories. I argue that any 
study of neoliberalism, if it is to be non-reductionist, has to be placed in a 
particular space and time, and must point out specificities while leaving room 
for resistance to the neoliberal order. This study identifies the specific conflicts 
that this reform has created, and shows how the relationship between public 
authorities and private providers can be understood in the light of theories of 
neoliberalism. A close study of the governmentalities of a certain formation of 
neoliberalism can show how conflicts of interest can play out in different ways, 
and thereby also identify how resistance can be formed. 
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1.3 Care choice systems as part of the development 
of the Swedish welfare state 
1.3.1 Swedish social democracy, welfare, and corporatism 
In order to provide a backdrop to recent developments in the Swedish elder 
care system, this section will provide a brief summary of relevant periods in 
the history of the Swedish welfare state and its elder care system. The Swedish 
elder care system is a product of Swedish social democracy, with its ambitions 
towards universalism and high-quality care for all. However, transformations 
within the welfare state – NPM reforms and privatization – have fundamentally 
changed the delivery of elder care. The care choice systems signify a new form 
of cooperation between public and private partners in the Swedish welfare 
model, but connections between the public and private within Sweden’s 
welfare state are not new.  
The social democratic model of welfare has been thoroughly theorized and 
discussed in the literature. As John Lapidus shows, the Swedish social 
democratic welfare project has been described in many different, and 
ideologically tinted, ways. It has been described as the result of a successful 
class mobilization, and as the result of a successful class compromise.66 The 
political hegemony of the Swedish Social Democratic Party from the 1930s to 
the late 1970s, and the elaborate welfare state constructed over those decades, 
produced something unique: what Peter Högfeldt calls ‘the most successful 
and long-lived political vision ever in a democracy’.67 An important aspect of 
this project was the extensive provision of social services based on principles 
of universalism and high-quality care. This meant a welfare system based on 
equal access to high-quality services for all rather than on means-testing. This 
model of welfare is described in Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s well-known 
typology of welfare states, in which the Nordic countries are characterized as 
social democratic welfare states that are organized around an ideal of securing 
greater independence for their citizens, independence from employers as well 
as from families, through ambitious programmes of social security and social 
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services. Sweden’s welfare state is characterized by the combination of 
universal access to tax-financed services and income-based social insurance.68  
The earlier version of the Swedish welfare state is often called ‘the people’s 
home’, after a phrase used by Sweden’s Social Democratic prime minister Per 
Albin Hansson in 1928. The phrase suggests a society in which the home (the 
state) and the people are reconstructed and improved for the common good. 
This ideology was developed theoretically and ideologically by Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal in the 1930s and by economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf 
Meidner, within the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, in the late 1940s. 
The model combined social policy governed by an idea of advancing the 
common interest with economic policy aimed at securing full employment 
through low inflation and high growth rates. Together, these would produce a 
high degree of equality and a high standard of living for most.69  
Sweden’s corporatist model is connected to the basic pragmatism of reformist 
social democracy. This explains the close connection between the state and 
business interests, which is a thread that has run throughout the history of the 
Swedish welfare state. Fundamental to the social democratic ideology is the 
belief that a strategic path towards a socialist society leads through ‘social 
engineering’,70 reform, compromise, and the formation of pragmatic alliances. 
The primary focus of the Swedish Social Democratic Party was, for a long 
time, securing full employment and creating a stable economy, goals that were 
to be reached through growth-enhancing public investment and an economic 
structure based on large industrial firms.71 In Swedish social democracy, this 
strategy was expressed very explicitly in the 1938 compromise between the 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Employer’s 
Confederation, formalized in the Saltsjöbaden Agreement. The agreement laid 
the foundation for close cooperation between the unions, the Social 
Democratic Party, and employers.72 Over time, the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party and the private corporate owners of Sweden’s largest firms developed 
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strong common interests, evidence of which may be seen in, among other 
things, the way companies, equities, and bonds are regulated.73 
1.3.2 ‘The golden years’ for Swedish elder care (1950s to 1980s) 
Like many other Western countries, Sweden boomed after the Second World 
War. During the Swedish welfare state’s ‘strong decades’, the 1950s to the 
1970s, the system of care for older people evolved from one of poor relief to a 
relatively extensive system of public care organized according to the principle 
of universalism. At the same time, the family’s legal responsibility for caring 
for older people was removed. The development of social services and welfare 
was explicitly motivated by the goal of reducing people’s dependence on the 
traditional family and liberating women from their informal responsibility for 
care by collectivizing the provision of care. This struggle for equality between 
the sexes also went hand in hand with the expansion of the labour market. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the collectivization of care tasks through 
universal public services made possible a gender-neutral ideal of paid work for 
everyone.74  
Publicly financed and administered elder care was thus a central part of the 
strong state, which aimed to take responsibility for many aspects of the lives 
of its citizens. These shifting responsibilities led to a dramatic expansion of 
municipal care for older people during the 1960s and 1970s.75 The ideal of 
universalism, along with other ideals, such as inclusiveness, social planning, 
and collectivism, sprang from the ideology of the ‘people’s home’.76 Gabrielle 
Meagher and Marta Szebehely emphasize that the public provision of services 
was critical to the ideas of the social democratic reformers because it was seen 
as the way to guarantee access to high-quality social services. The public 
provision of services was thus a cornerstone of the universalist project.77 
73 Högfeldt (n 67) 61. 
74 Åsa Lundqvist, Family Policy Paradoxes : Gender Equality and Labour Market Regulation 
in Sweden, 1930-2010 (Policy 2011) 3. 
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Another central ideal for Swedish social democracy during this time was that 
of material and social equality. Paula Blomqvist and Bo Rothstein identify five 
established ideals of equality in Swedish social policy: equal access, equal 
treatment, equal and consistent high quality, the strategic preservation of 
solidarity (which ensures middle class support for the welfare system), and 
social integration.78 Blomqvist points out that what is distinctive about the 
Nordic welfare state is not necessarily the level of welfare spending but the 
way in which the logics of universality and social equality were 
institutionalized and regulated through standardized and generous systems of 
public services.79 Blomqvist and Rothstein call this the ideal of the ‘high-
quality standard solution’, and argue that it was established as an ideal of the 
Swedish welfare state during the 1960s and 1970s.80 
1.3.3 Elder care in welfare state reform (1990s to 2000s)  
An important shift in the ambitious Swedish welfare project came during the 
1980s, as part of the wave of welfare reform that was sweeping the Western 
world at that time. These developments were also reflected in the elder care 
sector. In the late 1980s, a period of downsizing began that would continue 
into the 2000s. The proportion of older people (aged 80 and over) with access 
to some form of care, whether assisted living or home care, fell from 53 per 
cent in 1990 to 37 per cent in 2011.81 Every year since 1990, public spending 
on elder care has decreased in relation to the number of older people in the 
population.82 This decreased level of service provision has in turn led to an 
increase in informal, family-based care for older people.83 However, there were 
also changes in the organization of welfare and care provision. 
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The first NPM reforms came at the end of the 1980s, as certain municipalities 
and regions introduced internal markets and decentralized spending. These 
reforms were embraced and advocated by Social Democratic Party politicians 
such as Kjell-Olof Feldt (minister of finance from 1983 to 1990), and gradually 
came to be adopted at a national level, with the Ministry of Finance directing 
municipalities and regions to implement NPM-style governing principles and 
tools.84 Lapidus describes an internal battle within the Social Democratic Party 
between state-centred reformism and a more libertarian, although still socialist, 
view.85 Unlike the views that prevailed in the party during the 1960s and 1970s, 
private enterprise, rather than the public sector, was now seen as the main 
driver of the economy.86 Several authors explain the changes within the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party as a reflection of a more widespread 
ideological shift, which is taken to be the ultimate explanation of some of the 
changes in the organization of the welfare state in Sweden that have occurred 
since the 1980s.87 In a study of parliamentary debates in Sweden, Kristina 
Boréus shows that there was an increase in the expression of ‘right-wing’ ideas 
at the beginning of the 1980s. The traditional right-wing party, the Moderate 
Party, moved away from conservatism and towards neoliberalism during that 
period, and started advocating privatization, a slimmed-down public sector, 
and deregulation.88 She also shows that, from the 1980s onwards, private 
business strengthened its position in public debate, while the unions and other 
workers’ organizations were weakened.89 A broad change in the discourse, 
influenced by political developments in the rest of the Western world, was 
altering people’s views of welfare even in the stronghold of social democracy. 
Two significant government inquiries paved the way for welfare reform. The 
Power Investigation of 1990 framed the existing system of publicly delivered 
services as too large-scale and uniform, and thus as unable to live up to users’ 
increasingly differentiated expectations.90 The Inquiry on Competition, which 
presented its report in 1991, proposed a number of ways for the municipalities 
and regions to make their operations more effective, including through the 
84 Gingrich (n 12) 65–69. 
85 Lapidus (n 66) 15. 
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procurement of services. This required a number of changes to the laws 
regulating these services.91 The preparatory works for the Local Government 
Act of 1991, which gave the municipalities the responsibility for providing 
care services, emphasize the need to decentralize public bureaucracies, to focus 
governing more on targets, to report results more effectively, and to use 
resources more efficiently.92 The new act entailed more freedom for the 
municipalities to regulate their care services according to local political 
decisions. Some municipalities used their new autonomy to downsize services, 
increase fees, and outsource the delivery of services.93 
After almost a decade of internal debate, the 1991 budget proposal from the 
Social Democratic Party adopted a stance that promoted competition within 
the public sector and user choices in public services while remaining wedded 
to core principles of social solidarity and an extensive welfare state. Markets 
were thought necessary to address the economic and political challenges facing 
the welfare state while maintaining high-quality services.94 The year 1991 
continued to be an eventful year for welfare reform: there was a severe 
economic crisis in Sweden, and there was a new government, a coalition of 
right-wing parties, which took the reforms of the welfare system in a new 
direction. From being mostly focused on internal NPM reforms, privatization 
became a more salient part of the process.95 
The period from the late 1980s onwards was thus characterized by the 
implementation of NPM reforms. These reorganized the public sphere: 
decentralized responsibilities, purchaser–provider models, performance-based 
compensation, new governing models, and increased quality control have been 
key aspects of these reforms.96 They have had a significant impact on the 
organization of elder care. Before, the organization of elder care typically 
involved a close connection between decision-making and delivery. 
Organizing the delivery of services in an internal market, however, entails 
separating the planning and financing of services from the delivery of services, 
thereby creating self-governing units with responsibility to provide certain 
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services according to a specified budget. Municipal authorities could then act 
as purchasers, financial and other targets could be more clearly specified, and 
the units could compete against each other.97 This paved the way for the 
privatization of the delivery of services.98 
In parallel with the NPM reforms of the Swedish welfare state, right-wing 
politicians at the local level also used activist strategies to push for the 
privatization of service delivery through local examples. They politicized the 
delivery of services, using the language of ‘choice’ to introduce marketization 
reforms.99 The municipality of Nacka, close to Stockholm, was a pioneer in 
introducing care choice, and was soon followed by other municipalities, 
mainly in the Stockholm area, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.100 A 1992 
government bill on increased competition in the welfare sector advanced the 
idea of user participation as a central tool for change. User participation was 
supposed to create more agency, democracy, and service-mindedness in the 
care services. Relatedly, the Social Services Act, which, along with certain 
other laws, regulates welfare services, was changed to allow for competition, 
with the explicit aim of increasing efficiency and lowering costs.101 The Act 
on Public Procurement was introduced in 1994, regulating more clearly how 
private actors could be involved in providing care. Under the act, public 
procurement must involve open competition and public authorities must 
choose the best bid, with price the most important criterion.102  
Over time, questions of quality became more important in the debate about 
welfare state reform. Initially, the control over care providers was limited. A 
1995 study found that most municipalities with contracted-out services had 
little or no monitoring mechanisms for the private providers, and there were 
few national regulations or instruments concerning monitoring.103 
Amendments to the Social Services Act made in 1996–1997 brought issues of 
monitoring, measuring, and evaluation to the fore. In the preparatory works, 
there is a clear focus on efficiency and the improved measurement of spending 
97 Blomqvist (n 25) 49. 
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and results.104 This legislation laid the groundwork for an institutionalization 
of the private delivery of welfare. 
However, none of the new regulations allowing private providers to operate 
within the publicly funded welfare system set limits on the profits that could 
be made from these contracted-out services. Meagher and Szebehely underline 
the importance of this fact in understanding the way in which the market has 
developed within the Swedish welfare sector, which is internationally unique 
in this absence of a cap on potential profits.105  
[T]he LGA of 1991, which opened the way for private provision across all 
welfare services, was an important turning point. It unleashed a dynamic ratchet 
effect, unforeseen by the ambivalent Social Democratic government that 
introduced it, through which the growth of for-profit provision became self-
reinforcing. … [O]nce private providers had a presence, they sought to defend 
and extend it, with intense, wide-ranging and well-resourced lobbying efforts. 
The early involvement of business interest organisations and large corporations 
was decisive.106 
The development of the private care market happened in phases. At first, a 
number of small providers, often staffed by former employees of the publicly 
provided service, started care companies to enter the new markets. However, 
because municipalities were concerned above all to control costs, and because 
the Act on Public Procurement put price competition at the forefront, there was 
intense pressure on providers to cut costs. This was easiest for the larger care 
companies, which could use economies of scale. The result was consolidation 
in the care market: by the end of the 1990s, more than half of the contracted-
out care in Sweden was provided by four major private firms.107 In a study 
from 2011, Szebehely described the sector as characterized by a tendency 
towards oligopoly, with care provision dominated by four companies.108 
How can these events be explained? Bengt Larsson, Martin Letell, and Håkan 
Thörn note that the welfare state has experienced recurring crises, both 
economic and ideological, throughout its entire history. Ideologically, the 
welfare project has repeatedly been attacked from the right for harming growth 
and being inefficient, and from the left for not being able actually to eradicate 
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inequalities and instead producing a surveillance bureaucracy.109 Henrik 
Jordahl and Richard Öhrvall instead emphasize the importance of economic 
developments. During the 1970s, economic growth slowed and politicians 
found it harder to meet the growing expectations placed on welfare systems. 
The significant expansion of these systems had also produced inefficiencies 
and ineffective bureaucracies.110 The corporate ownership model of large firms 
was stable, but this sector was also prone to economic stagnation.111 Blomqvist 
and Rothstein state that the developments from the 1980s onwards were a 
necessary reaction to a widespread critique of the welfare state focusing on the 
economic inefficiency of the public sector and the paternalism of state 
bureaucracy.112 Particularly during the 1980s, terms such as ‘decentralization’ 
and ‘user influence’ were used by left-wing voices, critics of the strong state, 
who believed that the welfare state had brought with it not individual 
liberation, which must be the goal of any socialist movement, but instead rigid 
bureaucracy. From the right came arguments, supported by neo-classical 
economists, in favour of a slimmer and less interventionist state. Blomqvist 
and Rothstein emphasize, however, that it was the marked impact of market 
liberalism during the late 1980s which made it that the demands for user 
participation were formulated in terms of freedom of choice and the 
consumerization of welfare services.113 Katharina Tollin argues that decreasing 
trust in the political and a belief in the primacy of the economic led to changed 
view of welfare, at the same time that a discourse built around key terms such 
as ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘individual responsibility’ became increasingly 
prevalent.114 Lapidus emphasizes how industry and employers became less 
willing to compromise from the 1980s onwards, and how a political offensive 
by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise alongside a strong international 
trend towards neoliberalism, started to turn opinion against central elements of 
the welfare model.115 
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1.3.4 A decade of welfare debate (2010–2020) 
From the mid-1990s until the Act on Care Choice Systems reform of 2009, 
there were no significant legal reforms of the elder care sector, but during this 
period the proportion of services being delivered by private actors grew 
steadily and more and more municipalities introduced voucher systems. When 
a right-wing government, led by Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderate Party, took 
office in 2006, it promised to introduce reforms to increase choice in welfare. 
Issues relating to the organization of welfare have been on the agenda ever 
since, and this has been reflected both in the media and in government inquiries 
and proposals. 
At the same time that the government was preparing to introduce care choice 
systems, the Swedish National Audit Office released a report that came to 
attract a great deal of attention. The 2008 report reviewed quality management 
in privatized elder care, and sharply criticized the government, relevant 
national authorities, and the municipalities for their lack of knowledge of and 
control over private delivery.116 Just a few years later, in 2011, private elder 
care providers hit the headlines in a way that they never had before. The 
‘Carema scandal’ involved one of the largest care companies, owned by 
overseas venture capitalists. Several cases of medical neglect were brought to 
light, as were the company’s harsh cost-reduction programmes in some of their 
operations in the Stockholm area, prompting outrage across the country. More 
than 4,000 newspaper articles on privatized elder care were published in two 
months.117 The other major event was the publication of an edited volume on 
the consequences of competition in welfare services.118 The book was financed 
and published by an influential business think tank, the Centre for Business 
and Policy Studies. As it was, in parts, critical of the effects of privatization, 
several of the members of the think tank, who had connections with private 
companies in the welfare sector, protested the publication of the report. The 
editor of the volume, Laura Hartman, director of research at the centre, was 
severely criticized in the media by leading business figures and right-wing 
commentators. The affair prompted a debate about academic censorship, and 
Hartman left the organization.119 
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The issue remained on the agenda in the years that followed. The Reinfeldt 
government, which had introduced the Act on Care Choice Systems, set up a 
government inquiry into the question of whether care choice systems should 
be made obligatory for the municipalities. The inquiry concluded that there 
was no evidence that quality had increased in the municipalities with care 
choice systems. As this had been a main argument advanced in favour of the 
reforms, a new way of rationalizing the next step of the process was required, 
and it was found in the claim that the most important goal of the reforms was 
to introduce choice for users.120 The inquiry’s recommendation – that freedom 
of choice in social services be made obligatory for the municipalities – was 
presented in January 2014 but did not make it into a bill before the change of 
government later the same year. 
Leading up to the election of 2014, there was an intense political debate over 
the regulation of the welfare sector and the profits being made by private 
providers in the sector. The election result put the Social Democratic Party 
back in power after eight years out of office, and in his declaration of 
government, the newly elected prime minister, Stefan Löfven, promised to 
consider changes to the regulations governing private providers in the welfare 
sector.121 In 2015, a major government inquiry (‘The Welfare Inquiry’), 
looking into the regulation of profits and financing in the welfare sector was 
launched. From the start, the Swedish business community, and especially the 
business group Almega, which represents private employers in the service 
sector, was sceptical about the inquiry. It took 18 months for its first report to 
be published, and during that time the debate continued to rage in the media. 
The first report, called ‘Creating Order in the Welfare Sector’, argued that 
welfare services were not like other services on the market and that the use of 
for-profit businesses to provide such services tended to lead to reductions in 
quality, cuts to staff numbers, and the prioritization of those with less complex 
needs. It thus proposed a cap on profits in the welfare sector.122 The second 
report suggested improved monitoring123 and more transparency regarding the 
use of public funds to purchase the services of private welfare businesses.124 
The business community came out against the recommendations of the reports, 
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as did the right-wing parties in the Riksdag, who defeated the minority Social 
Democratic government in a vote on the proposed bill.125  
Several other government inquiries into the welfare sector more broadly were 
carried out in the years that followed, although they did not gain the same level 
of media attention. They suggested, among other things, increasing the 
monitoring of private providers and making private welfare businesses more 
transparent. One such inquiry was the extensive investigation of possible 
changes to the Local Government Act, which led to the creation of a new act.126 
The inquiry produced a report on private welfare providers, stating that the 
quality of monitoring in the municipalities was variable and that there was a 
need for a more strategic approach to control and transparency for privatized 
welfare.127 As a result, there were new requirements for municipalities to 
provide information about and improve the transparency of private companies 
operating in the welfare sector.128 Another inquiry looked into the assessment 
of the owners and managers of private businesses operating in the welfare 
sector. The inquiry concluded that Sweden had seen a rapid transfer of 
responsibility for providing welfare services to private companies and that, 
because the sector is characterized by stable demand and low barrier to market 
entry, private welfare companies are able to make large profits. The inquiry 
stated that ‘deregulation has been characterized by a certain cluelessness’ and 
concluded that more well-defined regulation was needed. The inquiry 
proposed, among other things, that businesses providing home care be required 
to seek further authorization from state authorities.129 These measures were 
eventually introduced as amendments to the Social Services Act and came into 
force in 2019. Private providers of home care services now must be authorized 
by the Health and Care Inspectorate, a government agency. 
Another important inquiry was the Trust Delegation, a large-scale government 
inquiry involving many welfare researchers and public administrations. The 
Trust Delegation was commissioned in an effort to address the alleged decline 
in the quality of welfare services, a problem which was often attributed to the 
adoption of NPM reforms in the public sector. The inquiry was tasked, 
specifically, with developing alternative governing procedures to strengthen 
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‘trust-based’ management at all levels of governing.130 According to its report, 
the introduction of targets and performance management has brought about an 
increased emphasis on evaluation and follow-up, but governing models 
inspired by NPM ideas have had a detrimental effect on values like 
‘cooperation, long-term sustainability, continuity, and professionalism’.131 The 
situation of staff providing home care was used as an example: workers, 
‘instead of meeting a citizen who needs support in their home, are supposed to 
perform a number of services on a list within a given time-frame’.132 The Trust 
Delegation’s report suggested a new underpinning ideal for welfare activities: 
trust in the professions, grounded in professional ethics, knowledge, and 
integrity.133  
At the time of writing, there is also an ongoing inquiry into possible 
amendments to the Social Services Act relating to elder care. The inquiry’s 
main task is to look into the demographic trend towards an ageing 
population.134 It is also investigating whether elder care should be regulated by 
its own piece of legislation rather than under the Social Services Act.135 
Besides those already mentioned, only a few concrete legislative proposals 
have resulted from these debates and inquiries. The question of welfare 
regulation has been, and still is, the subject of political tug of war in the current 
parliament. The issue of the quality of Swedish elder care has been further 
fuelled by the coronavirus pandemic, which has hit elder care (especially 
nursing homes) hard. The topic has been debated in the media and 
parliament,136 and the government has announced major investment to raise the 
quality of elder care and improve the competence of staff.137  
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1.3.5 Understanding how we got here 
The period from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s was one of 
significant reform in the Swedish welfare system. However, as Emmanuele 
Pavolini points out, although there were legal reforms during those years, 
larger structural changes did not occur until the 2000s, when ideas which had 
been introduced earlier were implemented in a more thoroughgoing way, 
particularly by the Reinfeldt government of 2006–2014.138 The introduction of 
different kinds of public–private partnership, such as care choice systems, has 
been the most salient aspect of marketization in the Nordic countries.139 
Larsson, Letell, and Thörn argue that welfare reform in Sweden has played out 
not so much through ‘free markets’ as through forms of public–private 
partnership, with a strong state working together with capital.140 
According to Blomqvist, the increasing privatization of the Swedish welfare 
system has taken place in three steps, each of which has been reflected in 
changes in the elder care system. During the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, decentralization and deregulation changed the organizational structures 
within the public sector, with the introduction of independent units with their 
own budgets, accountability for results, internal pricing systems, and an 
increasing focus on the user as a customer. During the 1990s, several important 
service sectors were opened up to external providers. This did not have any 
immediate effect, since there were still only a few private companies in the 
market. Under the third phase, towards the end of the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the 2000s, outsourcing and public procurement became important 
methods for public authorities seeking to implement austerity measures.141 A 
fourth phase could be added to the story, one in which certain private providers, 
which have grown significantly through traditional public procurement, have 
also increased their presence in care choice systems and in the new private 
market for elder care services. In this fourth phase, private delivery is now a 
central element of the Swedish welfare system and private financing is 
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increasingly common.142 A study from 2016 found that, nationally, 23 per cent 
of the hours worked in the home care sector were worked by staff employed 
by private providers. In 16 municipalities, private companies provide, on a per-
hour basis, more than half of the publicly funded care. Among the private 
providers, for-profit companies predominate. More than 90 per cent of 
privately employed staff were employed by for-profit businesses.143  
Szebehely notes that publicly funded elder care in Sweden has become an 
attractive market for international investors. International venture capital 
companies have entered the field on a large scale since 2005. Profit margins 
are good and generally higher than in other sectors. Since care services are 
always needed, the care sector is, from an investment perspective, seen as a 
stable market, and the comparatively low level of regulation only makes care 
a more attractive investment opportunity.144 Svallfors and Tyllström show that 
private care providers have pursued effective lobbying in Sweden.145 The care 
companies are a heterogenous group, comprising companies with quite varied 
interests, with the larger having most influence over lobbying.146 Svallfors and 
Tyllström note that the extensive Swedish welfare state constitutes a tempting 
business opportunity for many companies.147 As Meagher and Szebehely 
emphasize, the private welfare business is highly profitable. It promises an 
average return on investment of 27.5 per cent, compared to 14.3 per cent in the 
private sector overall.148 
As Katarina Andersson and Elin Kvist observe, the preparatory works to the 
Act on Care Choice Systems assume that the introduction of free establishment 
for businesses in the elder care sector will create opportunities for women to 
establish small businesses and lead to a competition between employers over 
working conditions, which will lead to improved conditions for women in the 
sector. However, studies have not borne this assumption out. On the contrary, 
smaller businesses, more often operated by women, have a hard time 
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competing with the large firms, more often owned and managed by men. 
Privatization has thus led to what Andersson and Kvist call the 
‘masculinization’ of the elder care sector: managers in this sector are more 
likely to be men than in the public sector more generally, and the owners of 
the larger businesses in their study were all men.149 
The significant impact of the NPM reforms on the Swedish welfare state 
explains why marketization has been easy to implement, for these reforms 
meant that there was already a distance between the political input side and the 
delivery of services. Along with the NPM reforms came an increased 
decentralization on the one hand and a focus on measurement and evaluation 
on the other. Ideas of accountability and the ways in which actors were held 
responsible changed. Prior to the implementation of the NPM agenda, trust 
between politicians, professionals, and users was central to the governing 
rationality. However, in the NPM era, mistrust of public actors and safeguards 
against abuses of power by politicians and authorities have become central to 
the way publicly funded services are organized. Trust is placed instead in the 
market, which authorities believe will solve all of the system’s problems.150  
At the same time, elder care has been increasingly professionalized, with more 
staff now holding an assistant nurse certificate.151 The group of older persons 
being cared for within the elder care system in general, and the home care 
system in particular, has changed too, becoming older and sicker. Because 
there are fewer hospital beds, and because of changed practices in the 
healthcare system, patients are now sent home quicker and sicker. This has 
changed the nature of home care, which now has to focus more on medical and 
physical needs and less on social and other practical needs.152 Staff working in 
the home care sector report that their working conditions have deteriorated 
during the last decade.153 Staff experience higher levels of stress, and say that 
the limited amount of time they have to do their job means they are forced to 
adopt a standardized and routinized attitude towards care users. While there 
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are ever-increasing political demands for higher quality, there are fewer 
resources to deliver it, which leads to feelings of inadequacy among staff.154  
Blomqvist notes that, while one of the initial aims of publicly financed welfare 
was to protect the sector against market forces and thereby to increase social 
equality, current Swedish social policy instead values consumer sovereignty, 
economic efficiency, and private initiative.155 Blomqvist has analysed a 
number of the changes that took place during the period from 1990 to 2015 
from the perspective of universalism, concluding that the universalism of the 
Swedish welfare system has been weakened, especially when it comes to the 
uniform quality of services and the ability of services to meet the needs of all 
citizens. Other aspects of the system, such as the inclusiveness of services and 
the financing of services, have not changed as much. What have changed are 
the features that made the Swedish welfare system unique: the uniformity of 
high-quality, publicly delivered services and the centrality of the value of 
equality.156  
To sum up, the implementation of a voucher system in the Swedish elder care 
system can be explained as the result of a combination of factors: changes in 
ideology, economic crises, and changes in the balance between relevant 
interests. I agree with Jane Gingrich, who states that the reform agenda that 
underpins privatization is a partisan one. Marketization cannot be seen merely 
as a functional response to the pressures on welfare states but must be seen as 
an instrument for reshaping the organization of services in particular ways. As 
she explains it, right-wing and centrist politicians have seen markets as a way 
to streamline the state, limit the role of the public, and create new bases of 
social support for further privatization of financing and service delivery, 
without needlessly antagonizing the electorate.157 However, the privatizations 
and NPM reforms also led to the growth, particularly during the 2010s, of a 
counter-movement. This made itself felt both in the media and political debate 
and in a number of government inquiries that recommended ways of solving 
and mitigating the problems caused by the marketization reforms. At the same 
time, privatizations increase, and the elder care market is growing. The current 
situation can thus be described as one that expresses conflicting tendencies 
within the Swedish welfare state project. 
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1.4 The legal framework for care choice systems 
1.4.1 General outline of the legal context  
The legal regulation of care choice systems exists within the framework of the 
public administrative law regulation of social services and EU public 
procurement regulations. Swedish elder care, the rights of older people in need 
of care, and the obligation for the municipalities to provide services to those in 
need are regulated by the Social Services Act. However, the act allows the 
municipalities to contract out their service delivery, either through the Public 
Procurement Act or under the Act on Care Choice Systems.   
As a framework law, the Social Services Act is built on statements of 
objectives, rules regarding the organization of social services, and procedural 
rules. The framework is supplemented by other legal sources: preliminary 
works, case law, provisions and guidelines from the National Board on Health 
and Welfare, reviews from the Parliamentary Ombudsman, and municipal 
norms and guidelines. Regulating social services through a framework law 
allows for the differing conditions of the municipalities to be taken into account 
in the enforcement of the law and for local political priorities to influence the 
way services are provided.158 This gives municipalities a significant role in 
designing social policy. The municipalities have not been given the formal 
competence to issue binding norms (except for provisions on fees), but general 
instructions, guidelines, and norms issued by the city council or boards are 
common in the municipalities.159 
There are a number of state agencies relevant to public procurement in elder 
care, the most important being the Health and Care Inspectorate and the 
National Board on Health and Welfare. The Health and Care Inspectorate has 
the important task of monitoring the municipalities’ social services, as well as 
authorizing private providers and monitoring their compliance with the terms 
of their authorization. The National Board on Health and Welfare is a 
government agency under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The 
National Board on Health and Welfare has the right to issue administrative 
provisions and general guidelines to help decision-makers with the application 
of legislation within these fields. The agency provides support to, but also 
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exerts influence over, staff, managers, and decision-makers in the fields of 
social services, health and medical services, patient safety, and epidemiology 
by collecting and analysing information, developing standards, keeping 
registers, and collating official statistics. As well as sharing knowledge and 
information, the agency also has a regulatory function. The provisions and 
guidelines issued by the board are non-binding, but in practice they have a 
significant influence over social services. Pernilla Leviner points out that, from 
a judicial perspective, these provisions must be seen as explanatory ‘quasi-
legal’ guidance rather than legally binding sources.160 As I will show in this 
study, a variety of national instruments are of importance in the governing of 
care choice systems. 
1.4.2 Regulation of social services and elder care 
Since 1980, the Swedish system of elder care has been regulated by the Social 
Services Act, which regulates a broad range of social services, from welfare 
benefits to addiction treatment services. The 1980 act was introduced partly in 
order to amalgamate several older acts, but for the most part it was new, 
following from an ambitious inquiry, which took more than 10 years to 
complete, into social questions and possible solutions. Its framework character 
means that the law provides ample opportunities for administrators and social 
workers to adopt an individualized, holistic perspective.161 This, in turn, has 
meant that a lot of the changes in the actual practices within social services in 
the years since the introduction of the law have been implemented without the 
need for any significant changes to the law itself. The fact that it is a framework 
law also means that the municipalities, where many of these changes were 
initiated, have a great deal of leeway in applying the law.  
The starting point for the development of the act was the wish to achieve 
certain social policy goals and to pursue the ambitions of the social democratic 
welfare state. These overarching goals are expressed in the opening sections, 
which describe the objectives of social services in terms of the values of 
‘democracy’, ‘equality’, ‘solidarity’, and ‘social security’. Social services 
should promote the economic and social security of the people and work 
towards ‘equality in living conditions’ between citizens.162 The goal is not 
merely formal equal treatment but also material equality in outcomes. Central 
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to the act is the idea of a holistic approach to service provision. The individual 
in contact with social services should not need to navigate a complex 
bureaucracy but should be met with an organization which is flexible and ready 
to take care of different kinds of need. Instead of focusing on isolated aspects 
of an individual’s life, the individual should be seen in their context, and 
different aspects of the relationship between society and the individual should 
be taken into account. The framework character of the act is meant to facilitate 
the achievement of this ambition.163 Under the act, the municipality has the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that those residing within its borders 
receive the support and assistance that they need.164 The municipality is 
ultimately responsible for providing a comprehensive safety net for the 
individual. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the municipalities have had the 
power to contract out the delivery of some municipal services.165 The 
municipality, however, retains the ultimate responsibility for the delivery and 
quality of services. 
The right to elder care is set out in the Social Services Act’s section on 
assistance,166 which states that those who cannot themselves meet their needs 
or have them met otherwise are entitled to assistance in order to achieve a 
reasonable standard of living. This is an individual right, the content of which 
follows from an individual needs assessment, which should be based on a 
holistic view of the individual’s situation. A reasonable standard of living 
implies not only that a person must have access to the basic necessities of life 
but also that a person must enjoy a certain quality of life, even if this is not 
clearly defined in law, preparatory works, or case law. Under the Social 
Services Act, the municipalities are free to organize the delivery of this, 
although the municipality is responsible for determining whether the individual 
is eligible to receive a particular service. The right to social care does not 
depend on the individual’s economic situation – an expression of the 
universalism of the system. The assessment of the individual’s right to 
assistance is conducted by municipal social work administrators, a professional 
group with a bureaucratic task separated from the delivery of the service itself, 
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which in most municipalities is organized according to a purchaser–provider 
model.167 
In addition to its ultimate responsibility for the welfare of all of its residents, a 
municipality also has a particular responsibility for certain groups, as laid out 
in the Social Services Act. This is where the care of older persons is mentioned. 
The Social Services Act states that the care for older people should focus on 
their welfare and on providing them with a dignified life. Older people should 
have the opportunity to live independently and safely and to have an active and 
meaningful existence in community with others.168 Old age should be regarded 
as a natural stage of life and not as an exception. Elder care should as far as 
possible be based on principles of self-determination and participation and 
should be tailored to individual needs. These objectives have led to a trend 
away from nursing homes and towards home services as the basis for the 
Swedish elder care system. Authorities focus on making it possible for older 
people to live in their own homes for as long as possible. This principle has 
been considered central to Swedish elder care ever since the introduction of 
the 1980 Social Services Act, and it marked a break from the tradition of 
institutionalized care. The goal is met through the provision of social and 
medical care at home, as well as through access to alarms, assistive technology, 
and help with adjusting the home environment to make it more accessible for 
older persons with functional impairments.  
The importance of quality, quality development, monitoring, and self-
monitoring in the social services sector has increased over time. The Social 
Services Act contains a section referred to as Lex Sarah,169 named for a 
whistle-blowing nurse, which imposes a responsibility on individuals and 
organizations within social services to report, document, investigate, and 
remedy abuses or significant risks of abuse. Because of Lex Sarah, 
organizations are required to set up self-monitoring systems, which must also 
be transparent to the supervisory authorities. The obligation applies to public 
as well as to private service delivery. However, private organizations need only 
inform the responsible municipal board of the existence of reports produced by 
the self-monitoring system; they do not have to pass on the reports themselves. 
Any instances of abuse or risks of abuse should in the first instance be handled 
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internally by the organization, but if there are serious abuses or risks the Health 
and Care Inspectorate must be notified, regardless of whether the provider is 
public or private. 
Since 1 January 2019, the Social Services Act has stated that the Health and 
Care Inspectorate must authorize private providers of home care services.170 
This applies to private companies that have a contract with a municipality to 
provide services. The fact that a provider has been authorized does not absolve 
the municipality of their oversight responsibilities, which means that there are 
now two monitoring systems and systems of control – one the responsibility of 
the state and the other the municipality. Authorization is granted only if the 
services provided meet quality and safety criteria. Among the quality 
requirements are that the person in charge of the organization must have 
appropriate qualifications and previous experience and be personally suitable 
for the role. Authorization may be granted conditional on certain quality and 
safety requirements being met. 
1.4.3 The regulation of care choice systems 
According to the Act on Care Choice Systems, a care choice system is a 
procedure in which the individual has the right to choose a supplier to provide 
the service that the municipality has decided the individual is eligible to 
receive. The individual can choose between suppliers that the municipal 
authority has approved and entered into a contract with. The Act on Care 
Choice Systems does not regulate the relationship between the public 
authorities and the citizen; rather, it addresses the municipal administrations’ 
public procurement processes with regard to care choice systems. The 
municipal authority must provide individuals in need of care with information 
on all suppliers that the municipality has contracted with within the framework 
of the care choice system. The information should be factual, relevant, easily 
understandable, and accessible, and it should allow individuals to make 
comparisons between providers. For the user who cannot or does not want to 
make an active choice, the municipality must provide a ‘no-choice’ alternative, 
which may be publicly delivered, privately delivered, or delivered through a 
combination of public and private providers.171 The user’s choice of supplier 
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does not imply a purchase of a service under the terms of the Consumer 
Services Act.172 
The contract is defined as a public service contract for pecuniary interest 
concluded in writing between a service provider and a contracting authority, 
relating to EU directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement. The municipal 
authority must advertise the care choice system to potential providers, together 
with a specification of the requirements to be met by the applying companies, 
on the national website set up for this purpose.173 Unlike tenders under the 
Public Procurement Act, there is no deadline for applications – they may be 
submitted at any time. The municipality must approve all applicants who meet 
the requirements stated in the tender, and these applicants must be offered a 
contract with the municipality. A supplier can be denied a contract on the basis 
of a number of grounds, some of which are specified in the legislation174 and 
others of which may be specified in the tender documents. The grounds 
mentioned in the law mainly relate to financial issues or to crimes relating to 
the profession. For example, applicants must not be bankrupt or subject to a 
business ban; must not have been convicted of a crime in connection with their 
profession; and must not have been shown to have made serious mistakes in 
the profession. They must have paid taxes and other fees and have provided 
correct information on their application. The legislation does not explicitly 
define the requirements that may be set by the municipalities, but the 
preparatory works provide examples such as criteria regarding staff 
competence, quality assurance work, management of complaints, and 
collaboration with other care providers. The requirements may also be of a 
social or environmental nature.175 If an application is rejected, an applicant can 
appeal the decision at the administrative court. If the court finds that the 
municipality has not applied the legislation correctly, the municipality has to 
rectify the decision and may be liable for damages. 
The designated municipal board has to ensure that the privately supplied 
service is delivered in accordance with the goals and guidelines set out in the 
Social Services Act, the municipal documents, and other relevant regulations. 
For this to be possible, the contract must allow for the control and monitoring 
of the business. The Local Government Act requires municipalities to ensure, 
172 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 20. 
173 ‘The Care Choice Website’ https://www.valfrihetswebben.se/ accessed 11 May 2020.  
174 Ch. 7 § 1 The Act on Care Choice Systems. 
175 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 15) 69–70. A further discussion of these 
criteria can be found in chapter 3. 
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when contracting out services, that they are able to monitor the businesses 
providing the services176 and that municipal citizens are able to access 
information about these agreements and about the operations of the private 
providers, if providing such information does not risk distorting market 
competition.177 The contract should also include clauses which give the 
municipality the opportunity to terminate the contract if the supplier violates 
the requirements. The grounds for termination must be proportional and related 
to the aim of ensuring the proper quality of care.178 
The Act on Care Choice Systems determines the framework for municipal 
contracts with private providers and ensures the equal treatment of providers 
under competition rules. The municipalities are supposed to comply with EU 
public procurement regulations when designing tender documents and signing 
contracts with external suppliers. In a public procurement process, the 
contracting authority is supposed to take into account the principles laid down 
in the public procurement directives and developed in case law. In particular, 
attention must be paid to the principles of non-discrimination, that the tender 
should not be formulated so as to exclude non-Swedish applicants; equal 
treatment, that all suppliers should be subject to similar conditions; 
transparency, that suppliers must have a right to access information; and 
proportionality, that the contracting authority must not impose more 
requirements than are necessary and appropriate for the instance of public 
procurement in question.179 Apart from the condition, laid down in the Act on 
Care Choice Systems,180 that requirements set out in the tender documents 
must be proportionate and relevant to the objectives pursued, the preparatory 
works do not go into detail about the kinds of requirements that are allowed 
under the EU proportionality principle, and they do not discuss the possibility 
of conflicts with the quality standards set out in the Social Services Act.181 
Because it seeks to standardize public procurement rules and strengthen the 
workings of the internal market, the EU public procurement directive might in 
theory be seen as limiting the latitude of public policy-makers. However, the 
directive also specifies several tendering procedures and types of contracts that 
fall outside of its scope, thus making possible divergences in national policy-
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making and governing in certain areas, one of which is social services.182 
However, in a study of national policy documents relating to the public 
procurement of social services, Signe Bock Seegard and Jo Saglie show that, 
in spite of this, Sweden and Denmark not only adhere to the public 
procurement directive but, in the limits placed on public authorities when 
designing tenders for traditional or quasi-market public procurement, go 
beyond it.183 Anneli Anttonen and Olli Karsio also state that, although 
marketization has been promoted by the OECD and the EU, regulations in the 
Nordic countries have often been more market friendly than is required by 
international agreements.184 
The empirical chapters of this thesis will describe further the criteria set by 
municipalities through tender documents and will investigate the logics and 
strategies that are operative when municipalities determine the requirements 
that must be met by private providers of home care. 
182 Johan Höök, ‘Valfrihet Från Rättsliga Utgångspunkter’ (2017) 94 Nordisk Administrativt 
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2 Methods and research material 
2.1 Introduction 
Answering my research questions has required me to draw on a variety of 
materials and to make use of various methods to process and analyse this 
material. Making use of a multitude of sources makes it possible to reveal the 
complexity of the topic being studied, to examine various aspects of the 
phenomena, and ultimately to produce a more comprehensive account of the 
issue.185 The nature of the research questions has made necessary an 
interdisciplinary approach and an openness about the choice of methods, 
materials, and theories. However, these choices are also grounded in 
methodological considerations. 
My study is based on a social constructivist view of law, according to which 
categories, representations, and materializations of law and jurisdiction are 
ultimately contingent (even if stable)186, and according to which legal 
institutions cannot be understood without seeing them in their social 
contexts.187 From this standpoint, a study in law should be broader than just an 
analysis of legal texts, and may analyse, in addition, the variety of apparatuses 
and institutions that use law. This starting point is guided by a pragmatist and 
non-formalist understanding of law. Deeper insights might be gained by 
studying law within its social environment, with help of a bottom-up approach, 
drawing on ground-level empirical research and social science 
methodologies.188 Sabino Cassese makes a similar case with regard to the study 
of administrative law. He argues that, because the public–private divide has 
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become blurred, and private law has invaded the space of public law, 
administrative law scholarship must change. While administrative law 
scholarship traditionally focused on statutes and judicial decisions, newer 
scholarship must focus on institutional practices instead. As Cassese points 
out, this can be achieved by combining legal analysis with fieldwork, with 
interviews and analyses of official documents and statistical data.189 
I start from the assumption that law is thoroughly embedded in social relations 
of power and cannot be separated from these relations. Law is not external to 
‘society’ or determined outside of existing power relations. That being said, 
law is not simply a tool of the dominant power. It can encompass and reproduce 
different, and potentially conflictual, logics. Law is an historical formation 
with no predefined features or functions, and it is deployed by different interest 
groups to achieve different ends.190  
This position is akin to that inspired by the works of Michel Foucault, which 
centres on the study of practices on a micro level. The study of concrete 
practices allows for a description of the phenomena which does not take 
concepts or models for granted a priori. A main aim of Foucauldian studies in 
law is precisely to show that critical engagement with law cannot be premised 
upon assumptions about stable concepts or entities.191 On a Foucauldian view, 
discourses which explain the nature of phenomena such as ‘the state’, 
‘politics’, or ‘law’ are seen not as absolute but as parts of a specific governing 
rationality. The use of universal concepts (such as ‘public’ and ‘private’) tends 
to reify what has been historically constructed through practices. A 
conceptualization is a kind of legitimization or rationalization of the practices 
that seeks to render them coherent and understandable. The dividing line 
between, for instance, ‘public’ and ‘private’ is thus embedded in specific 
practices within a specific rationality, according to which politics and the 
market are seen as independent spheres. On this approach, the aim is to start 
with the practices in order to understand the power structures and the 
connection between constructions and reconstructions of concepts and specific 
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social orders.192 This sort of Foucauldian approach has inspired a tradition of 
governmentality studies, further described below, and I will make use of 
theories in this field in this thesis. A governmentality approach urges the 
resarcher to study the techniques, the how, of governing, and to investigate 
how different legal orders are accompanied by different rationalities and 
technologies that are the results of political choices.193 
These starting points, which will be further explained below, form the basis for 
this study, which draws on a broad range of empirical material in order to 
describe the practices connected to the introduction of care choice systems in 
the provision of home care for older people in Sweden. The primary material 
consists of legal sources, such as legislation, preparatory works, and 
government policy, but the study focuses particularly on a qualitative analysis 
of material relating to the municipalities: all available tender documents and 
contracts used by the municipalities in administering care choice systems in 
home care for older people, and interviews with public officials in three 
municipalities that have care choice systems. In addition to these sources, there 
is a short questionnaire that was sent to all Swedish municipalities. All this 
empirical material will be described in more detail later in this chapter. Case 
law relating to my research questions is, however, relatively scarce, for reasons 
I will mention later. There are barely any precedents regarding care choice 
systems, or the privatization of social services more broadly, that are relevant 
to this study. Case law is usually helpful in understanding material facts, but 
because of this lack of relevant judgments I will only rarely refer to court cases 
in this study. 
The case studies of the three municipalities provide this study with a proximity 
to the implementation and implications of the care choice reforms, thus making 
possible a more nuanced view of what is happening. Learning by placing 
oneself within the context that is being studied is a good way of understanding 
something complex and gaining a more comprehensive view of a topic. If one 
is too distanced from the studied object, as is the case when undertaking textual 
analyses, the risk is that one will end up in what Bent Flyvbjerg calls ‘ritual 
academic blind alleys’, where the research is too far removed from what is 
being studied and the researcher loses a sense of the point of the research. 
Attending more closely to the complexity of the studied object challenges the 
researcher’s assumptions and adds nuance and depth to the image the 
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researcher produces.194 It was only once I engaged with the empirical material 
that my study really took shape. Previously, I was myself stuck in an ‘academic 
blind alley’, engaged in theoretical studies that simply proved what the theories 
already presupposed. Only by getting into the empirical material could I 
approach my questions in an open-minded way. 
2.2 Methodological starting points 
2.2.1 Governmentality studies 
Governmentality studies is a research tradition in the social sciences inspired 
by Foucault’s later work, especially by the lectures held at the Collège de 
France from 1975 to 1979.195 Important for my understanding of this tradition 
are the influential works of Mitchell Dean, Nikolas Rose, and Béatrice Hibou, 
but I am also inspired by the work of Canadian criminologist Mariana Valverde 
and her development of governmentality studies within the field of law. 
Governmentality studies focuses on the rationalities, techniques, and internal 
logics of governing. The internal logics of governing may be more or less 
explicit, and may be revealed through an overall analysis of different elements 
within a governing structure. A governmentality analysis attempts to show that 
the way of organizing something that a society takes for granted is in fact 
neither obvious nor necessary.196 The aim is therefore to map the studied area 
in order to describe the institutional, technological, and discursive conditions 
of different ways of governing.197 What is fruitful about a governmentality 
approach is that, as Rose explains, it implies a perspective which is empirical 
but not realist, which aims to be diagnostic in its ways of describing the world, 
and which entails an open and critical relation to strategies of governing.198 
194 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’ (2006) 12 
Qualitative Inquiry 223. 
195 Published in Foucault, Bertani and Fontana (n 43); Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart and 
Arnold Ira Davidson, Security, Territory, Population : Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977-1978 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) and; Michel Foucault and Michel Senellart, The 
Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978-1979 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008). 
196 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (n 44) 32. 
197 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (n 44) 39. 
198 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom : Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge University 
Press 1999) 19. 
65 
The diagnostic function means looking at different kinds of phenomena as 
symptoms and drawing connections between them. Establishing a possible 
diagnosis, setting out a symptomatology, requires a certain creativity.199 The 
broader definition of governing implied by the governmentality approach 
allows us to ‘identify tools of government where we might not have searched 
before, allowing us to look beyond legislations, rules and policies to see how 
government is exercised through, for example, dialogue, benchmarking, 
opinion pools, maps, or architecture’.200 In my case, this method of thinking 
has implied a need to be innovative in the choice of materials, going beyond 
legislation and making use of a number of different sources in seeking to 
produce a diagnosis of my object of study. 
Governing is based on strategies, techniques that are regulated by and specified 
in administrative processes. Strategies link planning at the policy level to 
activity at the operator level. As Magnus Hörnqvist describes it, there are no 
secrets in this process. The aims of power are publicly formulated. Power is 
regulated in legal documents. Interventions are described in manuals. 
Organizational routines are documented and monitored. The strategies lack 
strategists, in the sense that they are almost never the product of a single person 
and are not masterminded by particular institutions. Instead, they are the result 
of conflicts and compromises.201 All forms of governing must be broken down 
and transformed into aims, concrete objectives, and actual plans. This means 
that a study of forms of governing can begin from below, at the local level, 
investigating which governmentalities are at work in the studied 
institutionalized practices or regulations.202 Governmentality studies thus 
offers a useful way of revealing the concrete aspects of a governing rationality. 
It also makes possible a study of how conflicts about governing appear and 
what perceptions and values they rest on and utilize. As I see it, the 
governmentality approach has much in common with other forms of socio-
legal research that focus on the interaction between law, legal and non-legal 
institutions, and social factors.203 
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In Foucault’s work, however, governmentality is not only an analytic tool that 
enables the researcher to understand the relationship between rationalities and 
techniques of governing. The term is also, confusingly, used to describe a 
particular form of governing, one centred on economics and statistics. In 
Valverde’s reading, Foucault’s concept of governmentality can ‘be said to refer 
to ways of governing that are less intrusive and personal than discipline, and 
that rely more on managing risks, organizing spaces to minimize disorder and 
opportunities for crime, maximizing resources, and planning for the future’.204 
Instead of direct governing, where individual actors are disciplined to act 
according to what is considered the correct way to behave, governmentality 
acts on masses in such a way as to make them discipline themselves. For 
Foucault, a regime of governmentality is also an apparatus of security which 
‘seeks to govern risks and lower rates of offending by whatever means are 
empirically demonstrated to work’.205 Guidelines, behavioural standards, 
benchmarking, and similar ‘soft’ measures of governing are supposed to offer 
security while enabling the ‘freedom’ of individual subjects.  
2.2.2 A focus on practices 
Foucault’s key methodological innovation is the focus on practices or 
techniques of governing as the main object of research and analysis.206 Social 
systems are defined as much by their everyday practices as by their ideologies 
or explicit systems of thought. For this reason, there is a need to focus on the 
‘how’ of governing, and to make use of a broad variety of tools and 
perspectives in order to do so. In Valverde’s words, 
[i]n order to avoid sociological reductionism and better understand the ‘how’ 
of legal mechanisms, analyses need to be simultaneously inside and outside 
law, simultaneously technical and theoretical, legal and socio-legal. Doctrinal 
‘technicalities’ would be as important in such a study as sociological analyses 
of power effects.207 
In order to study the ‘how’ of legal systems – the technicalities of the formal 
and informal aspects of governing – Annelise Riles recommends the use of 
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close observation. Close observation renders visible and accessible to study 
that which would otherwise be taken for granted.208 She argues that the 
mundane technocratic dimensions of law, so often overlooked by critical or 
theoretical scholarship, are the most interesting artefacts of legal work. Thus, 
she argues, it is important to focus on the actual practice of ‘doing’ law: taking 
the technical forms of legal work seriously and studying them instead of 
ignoring them.209 In light of these methodological considerations, it is already 
clear why the focus on public administration is appropriate. As Anne Orford 
describes it, the ambition of a Foucauldian project is to make our present 
situation, its governing logics and techniques, intelligible, and to do this not by 
studying theoretical accounts but by looking at the ‘mundane’ work of 
bureaucrats and administrations. The crucial aspect of state power is not its 
perceived core, that is, sovereignty, but the administration that realizes that 
sovereignty – the practices. Foucault’s own works, which themselves drew on 
bureaucratic archives, 
suggest that there is much to be gained from the work of assembling new 
archives that might make visible the transformations articulated in the 
doctrines, practices, and rationalizations of the myriad administrators who now 
shape everyday life for many people on this planet.210 
Examining the practices of public administration reveals aspects of governing 
that would otherwise be hard to detect. It demonstrates the importance of, in 
Valverde’s words, the ‘hybrid, in-between knowledges deployed in regulatory 
and administrative law’.211 Governing institutions, when examined closely, 
turn out to be more hybrid and complex than theories about abstract 
rationalities (be they ‘neoliberalism’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘marketisation’, or 
‘contractualisation’) suggest. This study of the ‘how’ of governing also aims 
to demonstrate, as Rose puts it, ‘a respect for the particularities of specific 
cases’,212 instead of trying to force a range of different examples to fit within 
the scope of broad concepts. A technical study of the governing practices at 
work can reveal the interlegal complexities and conflicts that make up the field 
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being studied. The law becomes, in this way, a much richer object of study 
than is suggested by black-letter law.213  
It may be the case that there are conflicting governmentalities existing in 
parallel rather than there being a single, coherent rationality, and a 
governmentality analysis may examine these conflicts and inconsistencies and 
investigate how different governmentalities overlap, support, and challenge 
each other.214 According to Valverde, an important Foucauldian principle is 
that we cannot infer the origins of an institution or practice from the function 
it currently performs and that, by the same token, these origins do not 
determine the future purposes an institution or practice might be made to serve. 
Social practices may fit with all manner of social and political aims. They have 
chequered careers, and have been reinvented to serve a variety of objectives. 
Techniques of governance are flexible; they can be separated from the larger 
institutional contexts in which they were born and recycled in quite different 
contexts for different goals.215 
Methods of intervention travel easily from field to field, and it is helpful to 
study how a technique invented in one type of institution is borrowed by 
another. Thus, work in governmentality studies has shown how modern 
techniques of governing, such as audit, risk management, benchmarking, and 
different forms of marketization, have spread across institutions and how, 
through NPM reforms, they also came into the public sector.216  
2.2.3 Critical empiricism 
The same methodological principles that underpin governmentality studies are 
found in certain areas of legal studies, especially in the tradition of socio-legal 
studies. Margaret Davies argues that, by insisting on ‘an empirically-informed 
understanding of the actualization of law in social settings’, socio-legal 
research provides tools that enable us to understand law from a new 
perspective.217 The perspective of governmentality studies invites me to 
approach my research questions from the standpoint of critical empiricism. 
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This approach to legal studies decentres: it studies not what the law is but what 
the law does.218 What makes this approach ‘critical’ is that its starting point is 
a non-positivist idea about what the results of empirical study can tell us about 
the world. David M Trubek describes the critical empiricism project in legal 
studies in the following way: 
[F]actual inquiry in legal studies is necessary because law cannot be defined 
other than by the difference it makes in society, and empirical inquiry is 
necessary to determine what that is. This account of the reasons for empirical 
inquiry should be called ‘pragmatism.’ Pragmatists reject the notion that the 
goal of knowledge is to represent reality. Where positivists search for a method 
that will put us in touch with the way things ‘really’ are, pragmatists look for 
ways to talk about the world that are useful for specific purposes.219 
Trubek expands the critical project, in which law is expected to mirror 
structural power relations and to serve functions of power. In his version, the 
critical empirical project does not take the functions of law for granted but 
allows law to play a more complex role. If the functions, productions, and 
effects of law cannot be assumed, they must be described empirically.220 In the 
same way, legal and social institutions cannot be understood in terms of a 
simple functionalism; instead, they should be seen as spaces where conflicts 
temporarily converge.221  
The upshot of this reasoning for the legal researcher is that empirical studies 
become an important tool with which the workings of power may be revealed, 
and this is one of the presuppositions underlying my research. This cannot be 
achieved through theory alone. In accordance with the ethos of 
governmentality studies, my focus in the empirical parts of this study is the 
‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ or ‘what’ of the events that I am depicting. This 
means that I do not try to resolve uncertainties; rather, I see vagueness and the 
ways that actors attempt to deal with it as worth studying in themselves. Central 
to this study are technologies of governing: different tools or methods used in 
governing, such as legal instruments, institutions, routines, roles, and the 
prioritization of human and material resources. The technologies of 
                                                 
218 Silbey and Sarat (n 187) 165. 
219 David M Trubek, ‘Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism’ (1984) 36 
Stanford Law Review 581. 
220 David M Trubek and John Esser, ‘‘Critical Empiricism’ in American Legal Studies: 
Paradox, Program, or Pandora’s Box?’ (1989) 14 Law & Social Inquiry 3, 139–140. 
221 Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (n 211) 28. 
70 
government are not just an effect of governing; they constitute the institutions 
under investigation here.  
These methodological considerations led me to focus my investigation on 
municipal documents and on case studies with interviews and observations. 
Michelle Brady shows how participation and observation can inspire new ways 
of studying governing rationalities. An investigation of governmentality may 
thus combine the study of public documents with the use of interviews and the 
collection of documents on the ground, in this way displaying the connections 
between political rationalities, associated technologies, and actual practices of 
governing. This contributes more nuance to the analysis by militating against 
the researcher’s tendency towards polemical generalization, and in doing so it 
makes it possible to acknowledge that multiple rationalities can be in play at 
once.222 By focusing on the work of officials and administrators on the ground, 
and on mundane and micro-governmental techniques and tools, this approach 
allows the researcher to be more open to the unexpected, incoherent, and 
shifting.223  
2.3 The material and the execution of the study 
2.3.1 Legislation, preparatory works, and national policy 
documents 
Some of the legal sources upon which this study draws have already been 
mentioned: the Act on Care Choice Systems, which is at the centre of the study, 
and the Social Services Act, which is the most important piece of legislation 
for the regulation of elder care in Sweden. In Swedish legal research and 
practice, preparatory works to legal acts (bills and government inquiries) 
traditionally play a crucial role. Government inquiries, investigations carried 
out by an external investigator or investigating committee, are often the first 
step towards legal change. The inquiry lays the groundwork for the 
government bill that is submitted to parliament, which is usually based largely 
on what the inquiry has recommended. Both the government bill and the 
government inquiry are important sources for courts and public authorities to 
draw on in interpreting the law. The preparatory works may also reveal how a 
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question has been approached politically and what the government thinks 
about the matter, and in my study it is this role, rather than the interpretive role, 
that preparatory works play. The same role is played in this study by doctrinal 
sources, which I draw on to show how the law has been interpreted and to 
describe the discourses around certain issues. 
Where permitted by law, public authorities can issue provisions and guidelines. 
Provisions are binding regulations, and the role of guidelines is to help relevant 
actors apply the legislation. I refer to and analyse certain provisions and 
guidelines, especially those from the National Board on Health and Welfare 
and the Swedish Competition Authority. The National Board on Health and 
Welfare has, together with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (the organization for municipalities and regions), developed a list of 
indicators for measuring quality in elder care. The quality indicators have in 
turn been used by the Swedish Competition Authority in their guidelines on 
how municipalities should develop tender documents. These indicators help in 
showing how quality is understood in tender documents, something which will 
be expanded upon in chapter 5.  
In this study, legislation, preparatory works, and national policy documents 
primarily serve to facilitate descriptions and analyses of the structure and 
framework within which the municipal administrations work. They also reveal 
the discourses of the legislature, government, and policy authorities and show 
how national policy has developed.  
I have quoted passages from the preparatory works and official policy 
documents in the empirical chapters in this study. These passages have all been 
translated by me, as have the transcriptions of the interviews, which originally 
were conducted in Swedish. 
2.3.2 Tenders and contracts 
Central to my study are the tender documents issued by the municipalities as 
part of the administration of care choice systems and the contracts entered into 
by the municipalities and the private providers. The tender documents contain 
a description of the service and a list of requirements, of a more or less general 
character, which the applicant needs to meet for the municipality to approve 
the application. Besides quality requirements, the list of requirements for 
approving an application usually also includes financial, credibility, 
administrative, and other types of requirements. While the precise contents of 
tender documents and contracts differ among municipalities, it is often the case 
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that tenders specify the quality criteria and contracts set out the commercial 
agreement (termination, sanction, regulation of damages, etc.) with reference 
to the tender. I have also complemented this material with six monitoring 
reports from one of the municipalities. 
Municipalities design these documents in different ways, but there are also 
similarities and patterns among them. I have, as I mentioned above, studied the 
available tender documents and contracts looking at different aspects, 
recounted below. Ulrika Winblad et al. performed a large qualitative and 
quantitative study of tender dossiers, in 2014, for the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions,224 and this research complements and supports 
my own study. I have read in depth the tender documents provided by the three 
municipalities under investigation here. However, in order to discern broader 
patterns in tender documents across all the municipalities, I have 
complemented this content analysis with a quantitative analysis of a wider 
range of tender documents. This analysis looked for the frequency and 
presence of certain quality indicators, of specific clauses that benefit the 
providers, and of certain structures in the commercial agreements (such as 
duration, possibility to terminate the contract, regulation of fines, etc.). In this 
quantitative analysis, I made use of the 106 documents openly available on the 
municipalities’ websites, which were accessed during August 2018. These 
parallel qualitative and quantitative approaches allow for general patterns to be 
clearly presented, while insights gained through the qualitative research in 
particular makes possible the interpretation and deeper understanding of these 
patterns.225 
2.3.3 Questionnaire 
I also sent a short questionnaire to all 290 Swedish municipalities. This 
questionnaire included a set of questions for municipalities with care choice 
systems and a different, but related, set of questions for those without. The first 
question asked whether the municipality had an in-house provider for the 
delivery of municipal services. The second question regarded the governing of 
the in-house production of services, and asked whether the governing model 
used contracts (or contract-like) agreements. The third question asked which 
224 Ulrika Winblad and others, ‘Kvalitetskrav i valfrihetssystem : en analys av 
förfrågningsunderlagen’ (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 2014). 
225 Grønmo (n 185) 407. 
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governing model was instead used if the answer to the second question was 
‘no’.  
When it came time to compile the study, I had received responses from 178 (or 
61 per cent) of the municipalities. 
2.3.4 Municipal cases 
Case selection 
My ambition to study the technicalities and strategies used by municipalities 
more closely led me to the choice of three municipalities for my case studies. 
I have named the municipalities City L, City M, and City S, in reference to 
their relative size (large, medium-sized, and small, respectively). The choice 
to anonymize the case studies was primarily motivated by a desire to ensure 
that the reader views the cases as examples rather than as studies of specific 
municipalities. 
Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett define a ‘case’ as an instance of a 
class of events (a phenomenon of scientific interest) which ‘the investigator 
chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or “generic knowledge”) 
regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of 
that class of events’.226 A case study could provide an in-depth analysis of a 
single case, a comparison between a few cases, or a combination of in-depth 
analysis and comparative analysis. The three cases chosen in this study tell 
three partly different stories, which I compare with one another but also 
analyse separately. 
A case allows a researcher to tell a story, which may be rich in detail. 
Responding to the criticism that case studies yield ungeneralizable 
conclusions, Flyvbjerg argues that they bring other values to the table. He 
states that ‘researchers who have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies 
typically report that their preconceived views, assumptions, concepts, and 
hypotheses were wrong and that the case material has compelled them to revise 
their hypotheses on essential points’.227 This statement fits well with my own 
experience: my study changed and developed significantly as soon as I started 
investigating my cases. It also fits well with the ambition of studying 
phenomena from the bottom up, an ambition that has informed this study. This 
                                                 
226 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (MIT 2005) 18. 
227 Flyvbjerg (n 194) 235. 
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approach does, however, present a difficulty, in that it is a challenge to 
reproduce all of these nuances in their diversity. By letting the material ‘speak’, 
through a generous use of quotes and references, I have tried to be as 
transparent as possible about the choices made in this representation. 
In the selection of cases, the researcher should have in mind the kinds of 
variation required by the research problem. The researcher should determine 
whether the different cases belong to the same or to different subclasses and 
should ask to what extent fruitful comparisons between them may be made.228 
Critical cases can be found looking for ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’ cases, 
cases that are at either extreme regarding central aspects, and which are 
therefore more likely to showcase or refute hypotheses. In order to increase the 
likelihood of conclusions being generalizable, the researcher can choose a 
paradigmatic case, a case which sets an example which others follow.229 The 
municipalities in my study were chosen because they have all had care choice 
systems for a relatively long period of time. That means that any problems 
described by municipal officials will not be ‘teething troubles’ but of a more 
fundamental character. They are therefore what the case study literature refers 
to as ‘most likely cases’. City L and City M, and in certain respects also City 
S, are moreover paradigmatic cases in that they are municipalities which other 
municipalities look to when constructing their own care choice systems. 
Studying them will therefore allow for broader conclusions about these 
systems.  
There is a great deal of variation among the Swedish municipalities when it 
comes to care choice systems, with the size of the municipality seeming to be 
one decisive factor in whether a municipality implements such a system. There 
is a strong correlation between the size of the municipality and the presence of 
a care choice system: the larger the municipality, the higher the probability that 
it will have a care choice system.230 Private providers also tend to have 
somewhat larger market shares in larger municipalities.231 Smaller 
municipalities, especially those far away from larger cities, also find it more 
difficult to establish functioning quasi-markets. Several smaller municipalities 
have introduced care choice systems but have been unable to get any private 
                                                 
228 George and Bennett (n 226) 83. 
229 Flyvbjerg (n 194) 231–232. 
230 Jordahl and Öhrvall (n 100) 64. 
231 Blomqvist (n 25) 55. 
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companies to provide services in the municipality.232 In seeking to understand 
how the care choice system works in practice, it is therefore important to look 
at the differences between municipalities of different sizes. As the names I 
have given to the municipalities indicates, the selection of cases was made with 
a view to studying the differences between municipalities that arise because of 
their differing sizes, and therefore also their differing levels of resources, the 
differing dimensions of their administrations, and their differing internal 
competences. They are thus to some degree to be seen as separate cases, and 
this enables me to showcase different types of situations which can arise 
because of different preconditions. 
Interviews 
Talking to interviewees provides insights into routines, processes, roles, 
relations, and other aspects of the everyday work of administering care choice 
systems which cannot be inferred from policy documents. It also provides 
descriptions of how the system works in practice, accounts of interviewees’ 
own experiences of being actors within the system, and arguments and ideas 
regarding the functioning of the system. My view of the role of the interviewee 
is inspired by David M Engel, who describes his informants as ‘sociologists of 
everyday life’ and ‘observers of their own worlds’.233 As this suggests, 
interview subjects should be seen not as docile and passive but rather as active 
participants in the scholarly project. 
The officials’ views of the care choice systems are of course not static or 
objective descriptions of how these systems function. Their views are produced 
in the context of their work in a process of meaning creation, informed by a 
discourse which is based on their professional background (most of them are 
qualified social workers) as well as on the political context in which they 
operate, in which context they have a professional responsibility to make the 
care choice system function according to plan. Their expressed standpoints are 
constantly under development, formed by the context in which they work. Yet 
their insights provide a much fuller picture of how care choice systems work 
than could have been obtained simply from textual sources, and the sum of 
their testimonies provides the study with more than merely a series of 
individual experiences. My interviews were designed with the aim of 
                                                 
232 Mikael Elinder and Henrik Jordahl, ‘Kontrakt, Kostnader Och Kvalitet’ in Henrik Jordahl 
(ed), Välfärdstjänster i privat regi: framväxt och drivkrafter (SNS förlag 2013) 116. 
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extracting a detailed and in-depth description of the everyday practices of 
governing care choice systems. 
The process of designing the interview study and extracting conclusions from 
it took place in several steps: planning the interviews, formulating the 
questions, and conducting the interviews; transcribing, coding, and analysing 
the interviews with the help of memo-writing and clustering; and finally 
arranging the findings into the arguments and stories presented in this book. 
I first planned the interviews using Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann’s 
method. The interviewees were selected because they have special knowledge 
of, and therefore expertise in, the research topic. The interviews concentrate 
more on facts and description than on personal experiences and opinions, 
although these are also present.234 Before the interviews, I developed an 
interview guide including themes which, from my study of the secondary 
literature, legislation, preparatory works, policy documents, and some tenders 
and contracts, seemed to be central to my project. The questions were designed 
to be open ended, explorative, and semi-structured, in order to allow for the 
interviews to take different paths and be conversational in style.235 The first 
four interviews served as a pilot study (one of them was later excluded because 
the interviewee worked in a municipality which I later chose not to include in 
this study).236 After the pilot study, I transcribed the interviews and carried out 
an initial coding (which I discuss in more detail below). This pilot helped me 
to develop the interview guide significantly, and it kept developing as I 
conducted more interviews.  
The themes contained in the interview guide were the following: 
1. General background: the interviewee’s role in the care choice system 
and their general opinion of how it functions. 
2. Relationship with central government: the interviewee’s experiences 
of the state’s governing of the municipality, including the 
interpretation of existing legislation. 
                                                 
234 Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, InterViews : Learning the Craft of Qualitative 
Research Interviewing (Sage Publications 2009) 150–151. 
235 Kvale and Brinkmann (n 234) 130. 
236 I conducted the pilot study in collaboration with a doctoral student from Linköping 
University, Lisa Donlau. Donlau was studying business law and had her own set of 
questions (concerning insurance and the economic regulation of damages), but in the end 
the interviews came to focus largely on my questions, since hers were difficult to answer 
for the non-lawyers we interviewed. 
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3. The municipality’s development of its care choice system: how the 
system has developed, which actors are involved, what gets 
prioritized. 
4. Quality criteria in the tender documents: how criteria are developed, 
whether criteria have become stricter or less strict, how practices of 
quality assessment in the municipality have developed. 
5. Monitoring and control: how monitoring is carried out, how routines 
have developed over time, what is measured in monitoring, how 
sanctions are used. 
6. The relationship with the private providers: how communication is 
organized, what role legal instruments play in any communication, 
how the issue of ‘trust’ is viewed. 
In later interviews, I was able to elicit more elaborate and relevant answers 
because I had a much better understanding of the practices in which the 
interviewees were engaging. I also discarded some questions along the way 
when I came to realize that they were difficult to understand and did not prompt 
any interesting responses. Certain questions were also discarded as the 
knowledge I gained along the way led to changes in my own interests. 
In planning an interview study, there are also ethical issues to consider, the 
degree of confidentiality provided to the interviewees being central among 
these. The interviews were all conducted on the basis of informed consent. I 
started each interview by providing a brief background to the research project 
and telling the interviewee how the interviews were going to be used, and I 
told the interviewee that their responses would be anonymized. As Kvale and 
Brinkmann recommend, I did not go into detail about the research project and 
my specific research interests because I also wanted interviewees to respond 
spontaneously, not steered in any way by a desire to give me what I was 
looking for.237 The interviewees were also invited to ask me questions. Most 
of the questions I received had to do with the publication of the results, with 
interviewees expressing an interest in the study. I found the interviewees to 
respond confidently and speak freely. They were not particularly interested in 
who I was or in the details of my research project, but with few exceptions they 
were very committed to their profession and eager to talk about it, which made 
for rich conversations. They also responded positively to the fact that this topic 
was the subject of academic research, as in most cases they had reflected a lot 
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on care choice systems and their pros and cons. Their insiders’ perspective was 
crucial for the development of my own perspective. 
All in all, I interviewed 17 people, six from City L, five from City M, and six 
from City S. A few of the interviews were conducted in pairs or groups, and 
all were between one and two hours long. The interviewees were all working 
in roles relating to the purchase and/or monitoring of the services of private 
providers. They were of varying levels of seniority and varying levels of 
specialization. These factors depend on the size of the municipality and the 
total number of officials working on the care choice system. In City S, for 
example, I was able to interview all of the officials working on the care choice 
system. Three of them were social workers; the others were one procurement 
adviser, one nurse, and one physiotherapist. In City M, I interviewed two 
administrators with a social work background, one in a team leader position in 
elder care administration, two administrators in the monitoring team – one with 
a medical degree and the other a political scientist – and one social worker 
from the social work administration. In City L, I interviewed four 
administrators in central elder care administration, two of them working on the 
procurement side and two on monitoring. All four, two of whom were 
originally social workers and two of whom had mixed educational and 
professional backgrounds, held leading positions in the administration. The 
other two interviewees from City L were both trained social workers and were 
working in a local district within the municipality. The anonymization of the 
municipalities also has the effect of increasing the level of confidentiality 
provided to the interviewees. I am aware that the anonymization of the 
municipalities is not absolute – an informed and determined reader could find 
out the actual names of the municipalities that are hiding behind the fictitious 
ones. However, there is still a point to the anonymization, as it leads us to focus 
on the interviewees not as individuals speaking in their own names but as 
people performing in certain roles. 
The officials’ opinions on care choice systems differ widely, from highly 
critical to very positive. Given their differing opinions, it is interesting to note 
that the stories they tell about how the care choice systems work in practice are 
quite similar. They describe the same kinds of problems and issues, but they 
differ in how concerned they are about these problems, or in how they see these 
problems as relating to what they see as the advantages of the system. There 
are some differences in the responses that seem to be related to the differences 
in the size of the municipality, a point that is acknowledged in the study, but 
otherwise the answers often resemble each other. Where interviewees report 
different experiences, I have tried to account for this.  
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The interviewees relate stories and experiences from ‘on the ground’. 
Inevitably, the officials’ personal beliefs and perspectives, as well as tones and 
expressions, affect their responses and colour the resulting text. I have chosen 
to quote liberally from the interviews because this produces a richer, less 
distilled, narrative, but also because I want to let the officials’ voices be heard, 
since their stories underlie my arguments, rather than the other way around. It 
might have worthwhile spending some time understanding the everyday 
routines of the administrations’ offices by being present, taking field notes, and 
so on, but I was not able to conduct such an investigation and the potential 
value of such research only occurred to me later. 
Apart from the interview sessions, I also observed two branch meetings: 
meetings between the private providers, municipal officials, and relevant local 
politicians. These take place a few times a year in City M and City L, although 
there is no such meeting in City S. They were half-day meetings, and, although 
there was space for the providers to ask questions and discuss issues, they 
mostly centred on the administrations providing information to the providers. 
I made the decision to attend these meetings because it seemed important to 
understand more about the interactions between the administrations and the 
providers, although I would probably have learned more by sitting in on a 
closed meeting between municipal officials and a single provider, or by 
accompanying officials on an inspection. However, it was not possible to 
pursue these possibilities. They could be a worthwhile basis for a follow-up 
study. 
The processing of interview data 
After conducting the interviews, I began the task of extracting analysis, 
arguments, and theory from them. In this, I was inspired by Kathy 
Charmaz’s238 detailed account of how to construct grounded theory from 
interview material, and in particular her instructions on coding, clustering, and 
memo-writing. I used the programme NVivo 12 to code and sort the 
transcribed interviews. 
Coding is the process of systematically labelling what is found in the data and 
then sorting the results. The process of finding codes is also an analytical 
process in which the researcher defines what is happening in the data and 
begins to sort through the meanings found in it.239 The coding needs to happen 
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in stages in order to distil out of the data the most analytically relevant and 
common codes. Thus, in the first stage, after first having read through the 
transcriptions, I made an initial and very open list of possible codes – a process 
Charmaz terms initial coding.240 The initial codes were then clustered into 
main themes and subthemes and transferred to NVivo, where, using the 
programme’s coding system, I read and labelled all the interviews, line by line. 
In this way I ultimately produced six main themes and a total of 73 codes, 
which were displayed as a tree with many branches. Many lines in the 
transcript contained more than one code, but there were also lines which 
seemed less relevant to my research questions and did not contain any codes. 
Some codes were also later never used. It would thus have been possible to 
draw other labels, themes, and stories out of the material. My choices of code 
were guided by what I found to be relevant to my research questions, by the 
material itself, and by the secondary literature and theory. This second phase 
is what Charmaz calls focused coding, and is the process of synthesizing larger 
amounts of data according to what is found to be adequate in the initial coding 
process.241 
During the transcription and coding, as I worked through the material and got 
more and more accustomed to its content, I wrote short memos and notes. 
These were central to my analysis of the material. Memo-writing is a constant, 
open, and informal process of noting down ideas and sketches for later 
analyses. It is a way of capturing the thoughts, comparisons, and connections 
that arise spontaneously along the way, crystallizing questions that occur to 
one while reading.242 Another method which I used a great deal to develop my 
analysis is what Charmaz calls clustering – ‘mind mapping’, as it is also 
known. This refers to the construction of a non-linear and flexible image of 
what is appearing in the data, a visual representation of how topics fit together 
and relate to other phenomena.243 Clustering is a good way of getting to grips 
with large amounts of information, with all the threads, thoughts, and 
arguments which make up a research project. I also had colleagues read some 
of the transcriptions in order to see whether they could identify alternative 
perspectives and stories in the interviews.  
When I had completed the process of describing and coding the interviews, I 
was already quite far along in the first stage of analysis. At this point, I could 
240 Charmaz (n 238) 48. 
241 Charmaz (n 238) 57. 
242 Charmaz (n 238) 72–82. 
243 Charmaz (n 238) 86–87. 
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identify the main themes, narratives, and arguments that I would focus on in 
the study. As I wrote each empirical chapter, I read through my codes, chose 
the relevant ones, and, with the help of NVivo, found the lines and passages 
labelled with that code. I then performed a second analysis and comparison of 
all the passages labelled with each specific code. Working so closely with the 
material, tossing and turning it this way and that, getting to know it so deeply 
by sorting and re-sorting it, is the type of concentrated, active, and rigorous 
involvement with the material that Charmaz calls acting upon the data, a 
process that allows one to construct grounded theory.244 This process was a 
sometimes tiresome but very creative way of making sense of the data. 
From my methodological perspective, the aim of processing data is to discern 
describable logics in the complexity of the empirical material. Through my 
analysis of the interviews, narratives have emerged, certain of which I have 
chosen to highlight. These are merely some among several other possible 
narratives I could have chosen to emphasize. My choice of which narratives to 
highlight was a pragmatic one. Still, by starting from the practices, I have been 
able to display complexities and nuances in the story, and the reader can also 
draw their own conclusions from these. The mixed-methods approach, 
combining quantitative and qualitative elements of different kinds, has 
contributed a richness to the answers to my research questions. Through the 
use of interviews, I have been able to demonstrate how law is enacted, and how 
different legal tools can perform a multitude of functions in the everyday 
practices of public administration. 
The interviews are central to the presentation and analysis of the empirical 
material in the following three chapters, although I will also draw upon other 
empirical material and legal sources as necessary to answer the different 
questions each chapter considers. 
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3 The role of municipal 
administrations in the governing of 
care choice systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The central political aim of the Act on Care Choice Systems was to empower 
care users by giving them the ability to choose between a number of different 
providers. The introduction of choice and diversity was also thought to be a 
way of increasing the quality of services and boosting innovation by allowing 
new actors on to the scene.245 Municipal tender documents relating to the care 
choice systems often express the same ambitions. Municipalities that choose 
to introduce care choice systems in the home care sector have the task of 
creating an environment of enhanced choice, diversity, and innovation. In 
order to aid the municipalities in this task, central government also provided 
financial support. When the Act on Care Choice Systems was introduced, the 
government made available 280 million SEK (about 30 million euros) for 
municipalities that were considering introducing a care choice system. This 
financial incentive was intended to encourage municipalities to introduce such 
systems and to facilitate the transition from the traditional model of public 
procurement.246 The Swedish Competition Authority was at the same time 
given the task of supporting the municipalities in the implementation of care 
choice systems through the issuance of guidelines and the dissemination of 
other information. Even as they implement quasi-markets and try to encourage 
competition within the home care sector, the municipalities are still responsible 
for ensuring that high-quality home care is provided on an equal basis for all 
older people in need. 
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The aim of this first empirical chapter is to answer the first research question: 
how, and according to which rationalities, do the municipalities govern care 
choice systems in the provision of home care for older people in Sweden? How 
do these rationalities conflict, and what are the roles of public administration 
within them? In what follows, I will discuss the role of the municipal 
administrations in relation to the creation of markets, and in doing so I will 
analyse the governing logics behind these processes. I have broken down the 
main research question into the following questions, to be answered in this 
chapter.  
- What kinds of tools are used to support market actors, i.e. the users
and the private providers?
- What role do monitoring systems play in governing care choice
systems?
- Which rationalities are central to the municipalities’ governing of the
private providers?
To answer these questions, I will draw upon secondary literature and will 
analyse a variety of other sources: legislation, preparatory works, national 
policy documents, tender documents, monitoring reports, and the results of the 
interviews. I discuss the strategies used by national authorities and 
municipalities to support users in making active choices and analyse the 
regulations and strategies used on national and local levels to support the 
providers.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I describe the national framework 
that is in place to support the introduction of care choice systems in the 
municipalities and provide a general outline of the municipal tender processes. 
Then, I discuss the formal and informal procedures used by the municipalities 
to support market actors: i.e. the users and the private providers. Lastly, I 
describe the monitoring systems set up to control the private providers within 
care choice systems. The chapter ends with an analysis of the results. 
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3.2 Organizing the care choice system 
3.2.1 The framework for the implementation of care choice 
systems in a municipality 
A NPM reform that was key to the development of care choice systems was 
the purchaser–provider split at the municipal level, introduced in most 
municipalities at the beginning of the 1990s. The purchaser–provider model 
means that the administration and its decision-making are separated from the 
delivery of services. The administration purchases the services from the 
provider – in-house or private – which is responsible for planning and 
delivering the service within a given budget. The purchase and the provision 
of services take place within a legal framework and are informed by general 
advice from the National Board on Health and Welfare and municipal goals 
and guidelines. The local politicians responsible for elder care issues assesses 
the purchased services in order to determine whether the goals – which are 
often of an abstract kind, focusing on values – and the budget and efficiency 
requirements have been met. This assessment focuses on whether certain 
defined objectives have been met and on whether the overarching goals set by 
politicians, which are transformed by officials and professional staff into 
certain procedures and practices, are being achieved. It also looks at budgetary 
issues and the efficiency of the administration and provision of services.  
The procedure for setting up a care choice system is as follows. The 
municipalities develop a tender document, which sets out the requirements to 
be met by those applying to provide services under the care choice system. The 
tender document determines a quality threshold that an applicant must meet to 
be allowed to enter the system as a provider, but the document also plays a role 
in the monitoring of the providers within the system. The tender is announced 
on the designated national website,247 and applications can either be submitted 
on an ongoing basis or within a specified time period. The municipal 
administration assesses whether the applicant meets the requirements by 
examining the application and, often, meeting with the provider.248  
If the application is approved, the provider has the right to enter into a contract 
with the municipality. The terms of the contract, which refer back to the 
requirements listed in the tender document, are the same for all providers 
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within a particular care choice system. The contract regulates various aspects 
of the parties’ relationship, including providing for the possibility of sanctions 
and termination of the contract. Compliance with the terms of this contract 
(and attached tender) is thereafter monitored by the municipality. As I will 
explain below, there may also be other ways that the municipal administration 
and the providers come into contact with one another, such as through training 
sessions and regular meetings. In these ways, the municipality is able to steer 
the delivery of services within the care choice system.  
3.2.2 The influence of national authorities on the municipal tender 
process 
The municipal regulation of care providers by means of contracts is 
constrained by legislation. In particular, the Act on Care Choice Systems refers 
to the EU regulations on public procurement. The preparatory works state that 
the criteria in the tender documents must accord with the proportionality 
principle, that is, be proportionate in relation to the objective pursued.249 The 
criteria also have to be able to be monitored, and actually be monitored, by the 
procuring authority, as criteria that are too vague or broad may put off 
applicants.250 If an applicant is not approved by the municipality, the applicant 
may request that the municipality re-examine the application to see whether 
the requirements have been met. The municipality may also be liable for 
damages if the applicant can prove in court that the law has been breached and 
that the applicant has been made worse off as a result. The preparatory works 
state that it is reasonable for a disadvantaged supplier to be given the 
opportunity to claim damages for costs on the grounds of a loss of trade. They 
stress, further, that the possibility of damages claims will have a salutary effect 
on the contracting authorities, who will be less likely, whether knowingly or 
negligently, to set standards that are too high or to evaluate applications too 
strictly.251 But the preparatory works also suggest the following extensive and 
detailed list of criteria for the municipalities’ tenders:252 
- competence and experience requirements relating to staff, including
training
249 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 62. 
250 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 77. 
251 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 108. 
252 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 72. 
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- quality assurance and security requirements, i.e. complaints 
procedures and procedures for addressing problems with the service 
- monitoring requirements, e.g. that the provider should make data and 
documentation available 
- transparency requirements 
- equality requirements, i.e. the obligation to accept all users and to 
allow users to switch providers 
- any requirements relating to geographical limitations 
- requirements regarding the provision of information about changes to 
the provider 
- emergency preparedness requirements 
- IT requirements 
- requirements regarding the economic stability of the business 
- requirements regarding access for people with disabilities 
- quality requirements 
- requirements regarding cooperation with other care actors 
- opening hours  
Besides guidance in the preparatory works, there are also national policy 
documents relating to the municipal tender process. Several agencies support 
municipalities and companies in the public procurement process from a 
competition law perspective, including the Swedish Competition Authority, 
the National Agency for Public Procurement, and the Swedish Agency for 
Economic and Regional Growth. It is worth noting that the chief responsibility 
for supporting the municipalities in introducing care choice systems was given 
to the national body responsible for competition (i.e. the Swedish Competition 
Authority) and not to the National Board on Health and Welfare, which is 
generally responsible for working with the municipalities on questions of 
welfare.  
The National Agency for Public Procurement has developed several support 
documents for municipalities that have chosen to introduce care choice 
systems for home care. Among these documents is a detailed guide for the 
municipalities on how to develop an effective monitoring system. There is also 
a guide for the external suppliers on how to prepare an application, which 
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explains the legal requirements they must fulfil. The agency also provides a 
step-by-step guide for the municipalities on how to develop a tender dossier, 
with a list of special requirements to be fulfilled. This guide also includes 
information on how to set up and publicize an application procedure, how to 
write a contract, how to help users choose a provider, and how to dismantle a 
care choice system, if local politicians decide to do so.253 This guide was 
originally created in 2014 by the Swedish Competition Authority.254  
The guide points out that, while the municipalities can set out special 
requirements in their tender documents, they must, in doing so, take into 
account public procurement principles (discussed in section 1.4.3), such as the 
equal treatment of potential applicants and proportionality. At the same time, 
the contract has to ensure, through the conditions it specifies, that the supplier 
provides the services in such a way that the municipality does not breach its 
responsibilities under applicable laws and regulations. The guide states that the 
municipality cannot be discharged from liability for defects in the service 
provided by the supplier and that the municipality retains the ultimate 
responsibility in all cases. However, if there is an effective binding private law 
agreement with the supplier, the municipality may impose different types of 
measures on the supplier where there have been defects in the service provided. 
Other than the requirements listed here, and a series of recommendations about 
quality requirements, the guidelines do not include any specific directions 
regarding the form the municipal tender documents or contracts must take.255 
Winblad et al. have studied the requirements listed in tender documents from 
municipalities with care choice systems for elder care. They show that many 
of the municipal tender documents employ similar wording and that this can to 
some extent be traced back to the national authorities’ guidelines. Moreover, 
municipalities within the same geographical area often have very similar 
tender documents, suggesting that support networks of neighbouring 
municipalities might play a role in shaping the documents.256 This picture was 
253 National Agency for Public Procurement, ‘Guide for Municipalities’, 
https://www.upphandlingsmyndigheten.se/upphandla/valfrihetssystem/valfrihetssystem-
steg-for-steg/, accessed 30 August 2020, Kammarkollegiet, ‘Utformande av 
förfrågningsunderlag för upphandling enligt LOV’. 
254 The responsibility for supporting the municipalities has now been assumed by the National 
Agency for Public Procurement, but the guidelines from 2014 are still in effect. 
255 Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Guide on Specification of Criteria in Procuring Home 
Care 2014’ 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/publikationer/vagledningar/vagledning_2014
-2_kravspecifikation_hemtjanst.pdf accessed 30 August 2020.
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also confirmed by the officials interviewed for my case studies, who referred 
to the influence of regional networks on the development of their tender 
documents.257 Networks of municipalities, under the auspices of the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions, are an important source of 
information, support, and guidance.258 However, officials from City L, which 
has the care choice system with the most users, most providers, and largest 
administration, explained that, in terms of the development of care choice 
systems, they were ‘ahead’259 of other municipalities, which suggests that other 
municipalities might be looking towards City L for guidance instead. Studying 
the tender documents makes clear that many of the smaller municipalities near 
to City L have very similar tender documents to the one used by City L, which 
is more detailed and comprehensive in its requirements than the average 
municipal tender document. 
3.2.3 Patterns in the municipalities’ tenders and contracts 
The empirical element of this study includes a qualitative and quantitative 
investigation of municipal tender documents. The quality criteria set out in the 
tender documents will be discussed in section 4.2.3, but here I discuss the 
general outline of these documents and the similarities and differences between 
them.  
An analysis of the tender documents reveals that the recommendations and 
requirements set out in the legislation, the preparatory works, and the national 
policy documents seem to have been influential. However, there are also other 
patterns that can be discerned. Although the tender documents vary in length, 
specificity, and content, there are a number of similarities between them. The 
documents often begin by stating the political aim of the care choice system: 
in the case of City S, ‘to increase the freedom of choice for the user through 
the choice of provider and to increase the focus on quality’.260 The documents 
specify, in more or less detail, the kinds of services that are being put out to 
tender and detail how the administrative approval process works. The report 
written by Winblad et al. reveals that the tender documents on which the 
contracts are based differ greatly in length, with the longest being between 
10,000 and 13,000 words (40–45 pages), and the shortest around 2,000–3,500 
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258 S6, M5, L1, L2, L3. 
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260 City S Tender Document point 2. 
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words (under 10 pages). The authors also state that there is a strong correlation 
between document length and the number of requirements included in the 
document.261 One general observation, which is in line with Winblad et al.’s 
findings, is that, although the tender documents always detail the services 
being sought and the approval process, there is a great deal of variation in the 
level of detail provided about the requirements. Some include sweeping, 
general statements, while others include specific details about how and when 
different aspects of the service should be fulfilled. This difference in detail is 
what accounts for the varying length of the tender documents. Documents may 
also sometimes be accompanied by a short or long list of appendices, which 
provide details about the municipality’s policies and procedures, giving further 
information about the standards expected of the private provider.  
The contracts regulate levels of compensation, often in relation to different 
factors, such as travel time between users, administration, emergency 
situations, cases in which the user is not at home, etc. Some municipalities have 
more standardized models built on levels of care needs, but most require carers 
to log their worked hours, often through the use of a digitalized check-in 
system that registers the amount of time the carer is present in the user’s home. 
The regulation of compensation varies between different municipalities and is 
often complex in structure. 
Financial criteria are central to the tender documents. The Act on Care Choice 
requires the municipalities to exclude applicants who are bankrupt, whose 
affairs are being administered by a court, who have been convicted of a 
criminal offence affecting their professional standing, who have committed 
serious professional misconduct, or who have not paid social security 
contributions or taxes. The tender documents refer to these requirements and 
often supplement them. For instance, City L’s tender document stipulates that 
if a representative of the provider has been convicted of a serious crime this 
may prevent the applicant from being approved even if the crime did not relate 
to the applicant’s professional practice.262 Further, the City L administration 
takes into account any procurement agreements between the provider and the 
city in the three years preceding the date of the application and rejects 
applicants who have provided services with ‘documented defects that are not 
insignificant and that have not been corrected in a manner approved by the 
city’.263 Municipal tender documents moreover include requirements, of 
261 Winblad and others (n 224) 12–14. 
262 City L Tender Document 1.3.3. 
263 City L Tender Document 1.3.6. 
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varying levels of detail, relating to the applicant’s financial stability and 
strength, the credibility of the company description, and the business 
competence of the applicant. Some municipalities require a credit rating 
check.264 
In sum, there are differences between the municipalities’ tender documents and 
contracts, but there are also important similarities. There are no detailed 
regulations in the legislation or in documents from national agencies that 
determine how elder care should be organized or how private providers should 
be governed; the power to determine how welfare provision is governed 
therefore formally rests with the municipalities. The differences that exist 
between the municipalities in this regard illustrate the importance of local 
policy development within the framework set by national legislation, and care 
choice systems in particular reveal tendencies of decentralization in practices. 
Yet, in the ways the municipalities have constructed care choice systems, the 
similarities are still more apparent than the differences, and the expectations 
set out in the guidelines from the national authorities seem to have exerted a 
great deal of influence. 
3.3 Promoting user choice 
3.3.1 Providing information to users 
Previous research has called into question the extent to which the ability to 
choose service providers truly equates to self-determination for the user. 
Research shows that older people in general are pleased to be able to have a 
choice and increased influence over their care but that they find it more 
important to be able to choose which services are to be provided, and to have 
them adapted to their individual needs, than to choose among providers.265 
Older care recipients welcome the ability to make a choice, but few people 
actually make an active choice. Only about five per cent of care users change 
providers, and of those about 20 per cent only change provider because the 
company that was providing their care has gone out of business.266  
                                                 
264 E.g. City M Tender Document 4.1. 
265 Trydegård (n 81) 149; Andersson (n 17) 322. 
266 Erlandsson and others (n 23) 68. 
92 
The legal sources and national policy documents pay a great deal of attention 
to this low level of active choice by older users and suggest that it may be 
connected to a lack of information about the choices on offer. The problem of 
access to information was already discussed in the preparatory works to the 
Act on Care Choice Systems, and this issue was also followed up on in the 
official inquiry into the Act on Care Choice Systems in 2014. This discussion 
highlights the risk that limited access to information could lead to ‘market 
failures’,267 and expresses an ambition to find a solution to this problem. The 
preparatory works state that one precondition of the kinds of quality 
improvements that care choice systems aim to bring about is a functioning 
demand side, where the user has a real ability to choose provider through a 
rational choice based on the individual’s own needs and preferences. This idea 
is the basis of the public responsibility to provide easily accessible information 
that enables users to compare the different services on offer. The preparatory 
works further advocate the use of ‘soft paternalism’ to help individuals make 
decisions in complex choice situations while at the same time allowing for 
freedom of choice. This reasoning underlies the responsibility of both national 
and municipal authorities to inform individuals and to promote individual 
choice. According to the preparatory works, the provision of consumer 
information, usually taken care of through the regular marketing activities of 
market actors, also needs to be the responsibility of the public authorities 
operating markets for care services. The argument behind this requirement is 
that, because care is an essential service and the choice of care provider can 
have significant consequences for the individual, normal marketing will not 
suffice and must be complemented with more ‘factual’ information from a 
neutral source.268 
The responsibility that the preparatory works place on the public authorities to 
complement providers’ regular marketing with systems for the dissemination 
and provision of information might, the preparatory works state, come into 
conflict with the requirements for neutrality and proportionality set out in EU 
public procurement legislation. Accordingly, the preparatory works conclude 
that the municipality must not rank the services of the different providers 
267 Market failure is a concept derived from neo-classical economics. It is said to occur when 
the preconditions for a well-functioning market are missing, that is, when the allocation of 
resources achieved is not efficient. Matias Vernengo, Esteban P Caldentey and Barkley J 
Rosser (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2020) 
8247. 
268 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 90–92. 
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within a care choice system.269 Here there is a conflict between the ambition to 
give relevant information to ‘care consumers’ and the constraints that EU 
public procurement regulations place on the type and quality of information 
provided by public authorities.  
A study by the Swedish Competition Authority on the implementation of care 
choice systems in 10 selected municipalities has identified that a lack of 
adequate information from municipalities makes it difficult for users to choose 
among providers. The users reported a lack of relevant, factual, and easily 
understandable information about the providers and the quality of the services 
on offer.270 Several other studies have shown that it is difficult for older users 
and their relatives to understand the differences between providers, especially 
in municipalities where there are many suppliers to choose from. There is a 
lack of information about the results of quality monitoring, complaints, and 
staff competence.271 Another noteworthy study, conducted by Anna Dunér, 
found that only 71 per cent of older care recipients in a municipality with a 
care choice system were aware of their ability to choose among providers. On 
the other hand, 28 per cent of care recipients in a municipality without a care 
choice system believed that they were able to choose among providers when 
in fact they were not.272 In other words, care choice systems in elder care can 
be difficult for users to understand. 
3.3.2 Open Comparisons and the Elder Guide 
In order to improve access to information, the national authorities implemented 
a national benchmarking system based on a user survey and a few concrete 
measurements. The ‘Open Comparisons’ project was developed from 2007 to 
2009 by the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, together with the 
National Board on Health and Welfare and the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions. The goal of the project was to develop means of 
comparison which could support monitoring and decision-making. The 
original ambition was to create a comparison tool that could be used by public 
authorities, but it has increasingly been made available through interactive web 
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270 Swedish Competition Authority (n 16) 99. 
271 Erlandsson and others (n 23) 68; Moberg (n 55) 29. 
272 Anna Dunér, ‘Självbestämmande Och Kontroll i Den Svenska Hemtjänsten: Retorik Eller 
Praktik?’ in Håkan Jönson and Marta Szebehely (eds), Äldreomsorger i Sverige : Lokala 
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applications targeted at users.273 Open Comparisons thus aims to support 
citizens and users to make free and informed choices within care choice 
systems, stimulate developments in quality, and make the use of taxpayer 
money more transparent.274  
The National Board on Health and Welfare’s work on the ‘Open Comparisons’ 
project since 2007 has involved conducting surveys of users, providers, and 
municipal administrations. All of their surveys are based on the quality 
indicators which are used for benchmarking. Indicators are supposed to capture 
and reflect the quality and effectiveness of good care, and are based on a 
number of criteria. The agency also publishes these indicators in an ‘indicator 
library’, to which executives and providers may refer in their self-monitoring 
activities.275 The agency has developed a tool to provide information to older 
people and their relatives on the quality of care offered by different service 
providers in order to enable them to make informed choices. This tool is the 
Elder Guide – a quality index based on national annual surveys of elder care 
users. The national user survey is sent out to care users, who are supposed to 
respond themselves. The results are published each year on the agency’s ‘Open 
Comparisons’ website,276 from which users and relatives can get 
comprehensive information about different providers. Besides the user survey, 
the guide is based on other information from municipalities and providers. The 
guide includes the following information about each service: 
- overall user satisfaction
- user satisfaction with the service provided by the staff
- user satisfaction with the amount of time staff have to provide the
service
273 The Government Offices, ‘Öppna jämförelser inom hälso- och sjukvården 
– handlingsplan för 2014-2015’ available at
https://www.regeringen.se/49bbd2/contentassets/86a015c3d8f3475e9aefb377
0ab8e4e9/oppna-jamforelser-inom-halso--och-sjukvarden---handlingsplan-
for-2014-2015-s2014.008 accessed 30 August 2020.
274 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 35. 
275 National Board on Health and Welfare, ‘Indicators’ 
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/indikatorer accessed 11 May 2020. 
276 National Board on Health and Welfare, ‘Open Comparisons: The Elderguide’ 
http://oppnajamforelser.socialstyrelsen.se/aldreguiden accessed 11 May 2020. 
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- how much influence users feel they have over when services are 
provided 
- how much influence users feel they have over how services are 
provided 
- the percentage of users with a responsible point of contact among staff 
- the percentage of users with a care implementation plan  
- languages spoken by provider staff. 
Most of this data is based on the national user survey, an instrument which has 
been discussed in the literature. Several studies have pointed to a number of 
the survey’s limitations. The report of the 2014 inquiry details some of these. 
First of all, there is a risk that the survey results will paint a misleadingly 
positive picture, since older users may feel uncomfortable about criticizing and 
potentially offending staff to whom they feel loyal. Second, the surveys are 
often answered not by the user but by staff or by relatives. Third, there is a low 
response rate, especially among older users with the most complex care needs. 
Vision and hearing impairments, as well as the level of competence in the 
Swedish language, also affect the response rate.277 According to Marita 
Szebehely and Gun-Britt Trydegård, only about 30 per cent of home care users 
answer the survey themselves, and response rates have been decreasing over 
time.278 Further, as Håkan Jönson and Annika Taghizadeh Larsson point out, 
the structure of the Elder Guide makes it hard for the users actually to 
understand the information about satisfaction rates and staff ratios, and they 
question whether differences in survey results can be attributed to actual 
differences in quality or whether they are, rather, a reflection of differences 
between user groups.279 In their interviews with elder care users, they also 
detect an explicit loyalty between users and staff, which increases the 
probability that the users will evaluate their services positively, regardless of 
their actual level of satisfaction with the service.280  
Another limitation of the user surveys was revealed in the interviews in this 
study. Small businesses, which are often perceived by municipal officials as 
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being less serious providers, often receive positive ratings in user surveys. 
Officials from two of the three municipalities stated that several of the 
providers that had had their contracts with the municipality terminated were in 
fact providers that received very high user satisfaction ratings in the surveys. 
This might be explained by the fact that these providers may have breached 
requirements and regulations in ways that ultimately benefited older users. For 
example, the provider may have employed a relative of an older user as a care 
worker despite this not being permitted, or the provider may have exaggerated 
the needs of the older user in order to secure more resources for them. In these 
cases, users may be very satisfied, or at least may have an incentive to tell the 
municipality that they are.281 This seems to be another problem with the 
methods of data collection mentioned above.  
Linda Moberg has shown that, despite these proven limitations, a significant 
weight is generally attached to user satisfaction in public assessments of the 
quality of services.282 This finding is corroborated by my research. 
Municipalities are aware of the shortcomings of the Elder Guide, yet 
politicians and providers greatly value the results. In my fieldwork, I found 
that the national user survey was a frequent subject of discussion. It came up 
at both of the meetings between the municipalities and the providers that I 
attended. In City M, the results of the survey were presented and discussed, 
while at the same time the potential problems with the validity of the results 
were brought to people’s attention. The administration stated that political 
leaders valued the results highly in spite of these problems. The providers were 
worried about the shortcomings, and found it hard to interpret the survey 
results.283 A similar discussion took place in the City L branch meeting. 
Officials from City L said that the municipality was increasingly relying on its 
own user survey and on individual evaluations carried out by the municipal 
care managers in meetings with care users.284  
3.3.3 Municipal structures for promoting users’ choices and voices 
The municipalities have an obligation under the Act on Care Choice Systems 
to provide information to individual users about all providers which have 
contracts with the municipality within the care choice system. According to 
281 M1, M3, L1. 
282 Moberg (n 55) 36. 
283 City M Branch Meeting. 
284 City L Branch Meeting. 
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the act, this information should be factual, relevant, easily understandable, and 
easily accessible, and should facilitate comparisons among services on 
offer.285 This obligation is supposed to be discharged through the provision of 
information on websites, in leaflets, and through other such sources.286  
An important figure in the communication between the municipality and the 
user is the care manager, the administrator who is in direct contact with the 
user. According to the preparatory works, the role that the care manager is 
supposed to have in providing information to the user implies ‘encouraging 
and supporting’ the individual to make an active choice in order to meet the 
individual need. At the same time, the preparatory works indicate that the care 
manager must be ‘competition neutral’ in relation to all providers, including 
the municipal provider.287 The report of the public inquiry of 2014 states that 
here the balance seems to have leaned more in the direction of competition 
neutrality; out of fear of being seen to be biased, care managers have 
interpreted their responsibilities in a way that does not allow them to be very 
supportive of users making choices. On the other hand, the inquiry also found 
municipalities in which the care manager was expected to act as a consumer 
adviser, taking an active role in the choice of the individual.288 The inquiry 
proposed that the National Board on Health and Welfare should be given the 
task of developing a guide to improve the dissemination of information within 
the care choice systems, as well as a guide for care managers about how to 
inform users about provider choices.289 However, since the inquiry was never 
turned into a government bill, these guides were never produced.290  
This issue was also brought up by my interviewees. Several of the officials said 
that their understanding was that they were not permitted to recommend any 
provider and could only inform users about the choices on offer.291 One 
official, who was responsible for care managers, said the managers often found 
that they did not have the necessary means for providing information and that 
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this led them to provide very little information, for fear of saying too much.292 
Another official described situations in which care managers knew that certain 
suppliers provided a low-quality service, such that there was a conflict between 
the task of providing impartial information and that of helping the users make 
choices.293 
The municipalities also have other systems for providing information to users. 
City L has developed its own user surveys to complement the Elder Guide, 
mostly as a result of dissatisfaction with the national user survey. The results 
of City L’s own surveys, together with monitoring results, are published on the 
municipal website, with the aim being to give users more information about 
the companies.294 A brief overview of material from other municipalities shows 
that this is not a common procedure, but there are some other municipalities 
which provide this kind of information. City M created specific roles for 
individuals whose job is to guide older users in making their choices. These 
administrators are called ‘elder pilots’, and they are there to support older users 
who are hesitant about their choices. The ‘elder pilots’ are also responsible for 
improving and keeping up to date the information on the municipality’s care 
choice webpage.295 
One of the officials pointed out that changing providers was not the only means 
by which users let their opinions be known and that voice and dialogue were 
also important means in this regard. She said: ‘the goal should not be that, as 
soon as you are a little dissatisfied or something, you should change provider, 
but it must be that one has a dialogue about what is not working out first’.296 
The providers are also required to have an internal procedure for receiving and 
handling complaints; this is stated in the regulations on quality management, 
and it is something the municipalities should monitor.297 These procedures are 
a way of ensuring that user ‘voice’ exists, alongside ‘exit’, as an alternative 
way for users to help improve the service provided, in dialogue with the 
provider. The municipality can also support this dialogue between the user and 
the provider in certain ways.298 
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3.4 The conditions for private providers 
3.4.1 Diversity of providers as a central goal 
The government’s motives for introducing care choice systems were several. 
My empirical research indicates that the municipalities consider the goal of 
increasing the diversity of service providers to be the most important reason 
for introducing a care choice system and that, in order to achieve this goal, 
municipalities believe they must foster an environment within which providers 
can flourish. Increased diversity means more providers for the users to choose 
from, and officials believe this will also lead to innovation and improvements 
in quality.299 When asked to describe the positive aspects of care choice 
systems, officials also often mentioned the increase in users’ levels of self-
determination. A survey by Mats Brandt has indicated that a majority of 
municipal officials are of the impression that care choice systems have 
increased users’ level of self-determination.300  
The central political aim behind the introduction of a care choice system in 
City M was, according to one leading municipal official, to make it possible 
for small and medium-sized companies to establish in the sector and thereby 
to increase the diversity of providers. According to the officials, this has been 
successful, especially because of the entrance into the market of companies 
with staff that speak other languages and/or have other cultural understandings 
and therefore can match better with users.301 Official L3, from City L, while 
discussing the different situations in the different districts in the city, vividly 
described the point of increasing the diversity of providers:  
After all, it is the district that knows which kinds of providers they need, what 
kind of added value they want. It really differs. [City L] is very – it really 
contains a lot. If you think about it, the residents in [poor suburb], for example, 
they need one kind of support from the municipal or private providers based 
there, often linked to culture, knowledge about culture, knowledge of food, of 
language, and all of that. If you go to [rich inner-city neighbourhood], you don’t 
have that wish at all … You don’t have that; you have other needs for providers 
to deal with. You might need to meet an older woman who lives in a large, high-
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end flat and perhaps is used to being addressed with titles.302 … This diversity 
is needed. There are some companies that are perfect for [rich inner-city 
neighbourhood]. Another company’s staff would hit the roof because of 
ideological – … Yeah, so you might think it’s embarrassing, and why should 
that lady be allowed to say such things? But you must be able to handle this, in 
the management of the operations. So that’s why it is difficult. I think that [rich 
inner-city neighbourhood] needs their home care companies and [poor suburb] 
must have others.303 
The political ambition of supporting the creation of a market and fostering 
small businesses encourages the municipalities to create good conditions for 
private providers. However, they are not always successful in this endeavour. 
City S, for instance, have only one private provider, and, from the perspective 
of what is required to create a functioning market, this is seen as a problem. 
The administration is considering different ways in which the barriers to entry 
could be lowered or more providers could be attracted into the municipality’s 
care choice system through marketing initiatives.304 In general, the problem 
seems to have to do with the thresholds for getting into the market. Businesses 
that start from nothing have a hard time becoming profitable, and the 
companies which are already established, for example because they operate a 
residential home and provide services on the basis of normal public 
procurement, have a clear advantage.305 I will return to these issues in section 
4.5.2. 
3.4.2 The structural and organizational conditions for private 
providers 
Municipal tender documents set out the criteria and preconditions that the 
private providers in the care choice system must meet. The documents often 
provide for different ways in which the applying providers can choose to 
organize their activities in the municipality. These choices allow the private 
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providers to design their operations with regards to capacity, geography, the 
provision of additional services, and, in some municipalities, the hiring of the 
relatives of care users as staff. 
Table 1 Beneficial preconditions in the tender documents 
PRECONDITION N = 107 
 NR % 
Capacity limit 99 93 
Geographical limitation 81 76 
Additional services 100 93 
Hiring relatives 76 71 
 
If a provider has a capacity limit, it may refuse to take on new users if doing 
so would lead it to breach this limit. The amount of home care required within 
a municipality can be hard to forecast, since new users can enter the system at 
any time and the needs of users already in the system may unexpectedly 
become more serious or complex. Flexibility is thus important if home care 
services are to be able to meet the needs of older citizens, but this need for 
flexibility may also be seen as challenging and risky for businesses that need 
to be able to plan their activities in advance. The way care choice systems are 
organized takes into account this potential issue. As table 1 shows, more than 
90 per cent of municipalities allow providers to set a capacity limit on their 
services. This means that they are allowed to limit the number of users they 
can take on – or, more commonly, the number of hours they can work. 
According to the contracts, capacity limits can usually be increased easily. The 
limit allows the providers to say ‘no’ to new users when the capacity limit has 
been met, but the ambition, often stated in the tender documents, is to allow 
the providers to grow at their own pace and to adjust their staffing levels and 
capacity levels in a sustainable way. The flexibility needed in the system is left 
to the municipal provider to supply. 
Another aspect of many tender documents is the possibility for the providers 
to limit their activities geographically. Swedish municipalities differ greatly in 
size. Some municipalities are large, with fewer densely populated areas and 
citizens who live very remotely from the urban centre; others have large 
populations within a smaller geographical area. The provision of home care in 
more remote areas may be more costly because of travel expenses and the extra 
demand on staff time this implies. As table 1 shows, 75 per cent of 
municipalities allow providers to limit their activities to certain geographical 
areas within the municipality. Municipalities where geographical factors imply 
higher travel costs and where there are fewer users, and thus where it might be 
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harder for a care business to turn a profit, often allow for such geographical 
limitations. The private providers can, in this way, choose areas which are 
more profitable. Municipalities sometimes also combine the possibility of 
geographical limitations with schemes that provide extra compensation for 
providers that serve less densely populated areas or areas further from the 
urban centre of the municipality, although these schemes are also present in 
some of the municipalities which do not allow the providers to limit their scope 
geographically. These organizational structures have been created to ensure the 
profitability of the providers’ businesses. The upshot is that there may be 
situations in which users in one part of a municipality have many providers to 
choose from and users elsewhere have far fewer or only one.306  
Another regulation which benefits private providers is the right for private 
providers to offer ‘additional services’ to elder care users in addition to the 
service financed by the municipality. The individual right to home care is 
granted by a municipal decision based on a needs assessment, and the right is 
fairly strictly defined. It is usually restricted in terms of how long and how 
often care is to be provided and with regard to the kinds of tasks that the older 
person is to be helped with. But under the Act on Care Choice Systems, 
municipalities may allow the external providers that provide the services to 
offer additional services to their users. They may offer to extend the amount of 
time care is provided or offer extra services which are not included in the 
municipal decision. These services are paid for privately by the user.307 The 
kinds of services usually offered are housework, such as more thorough 
cleaning, laundry services, window cleaning, and gardening. The preparatory 
works state that the point of allowing providers to offer additional services is 
to help them be profitable.308 In my study, 100 of the 108 municipalities 
examined, 93 per cent, mention the possibility for private providers to offer 
additional services. In most cases, municipalities simply state that the 
providers are allowed to offer these services but that they are not allowed to 
charge privately for the services that the municipality has decided an individual 
is eligible to receive on the basis of their needs assessment. There are no 
306 Geographical restrictions may, however, also be imposed, as in City L, in order to increase 
efficiency. In City L, the long distances between different parts of the municipality make it 
irrational for providers to have only a few users in more remote parts of the city. The city 
therefore requires that at least one of the provider’s facilities be located so that staff going 
to and from a user can reach the facility by public transportation (including walking) within 
45 minutes. City L tender document 1.4.1. 
307 With respect to the additional services, the users are consumers under the terms of the 
Consumer Services Act, Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 15) 123. 
308 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 123. 
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statistics showing how many of the private companies offer additional services, 
but a study by Szebehely and Trydegård has found that most mention 
additional services on their websites.309 
When the government bill for the Act on Care Choice Systems was sent out to 
the municipalities for consultation, a large number expressed discontent over 
the fact that the municipalities themselves were not going to be allowed to offer 
additional services. The municipality’s own care organization does not have 
the option of providing additional services, except for some simple handyman 
services.310 This means that the users who choose the municipal provider 
cannot top up their services with private money, and thus that municipal 
providers may become less attractive options for those who can afford and 
want to top up their services. However, the preparatory works state that these 
kinds of services should be seen as outside of the scope of public provision and 
that it is not in the general interest to allow municipalities to deliver such 
services. They furthermore state that allowing municipalities to provide 
additional services might have negative consequences for small businesses, 
which care choice systems are designed to encourage. Despite the 
municipalities’ criticisms, the proposal was kept unchanged in the bill.311 The 
ability of private providers to offer additional services adds a new layer to the 
Swedish home care system: a private market for services on top of the publicly 
funded system. 
According to the quality regulations in the Social Services Act, home care 
should be performed by professional care workers. The act mentions, among 
other things, staff competence as a measure of quality. Although it was 
common in the 1970s for relatives to be employed as carers, this became less 
common in the years that followed.312 However, the care choice systems 
reforms have partly reversed this trend.313 Most, although not all, 
municipalities allow for private providers to hire relatives of care users as staff. 
This is an option which may seem to benefit the user, because they will already 
know and be comfortable with their carer, and especially if they have a relative 
in need of an income. If a provider offers this possibility this may therefore 
                                                 
309 Szebehely and Trydegård (n 2) 38. 
310 According to the law (2006:492) on municipal authority to provide services to senior 
citizens, Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 15) 123. 
311 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 127. 
312 Ann-Britt M Sand, Anhöriga som kombinerar förvärvsarbete och anhörigomsorg 
(Nationellt kompetenscentrum Anhöriga 2010) 42–43. 
313 Helene Brodin, ‘Hemmadöttrarnas Återkomst?’ (2015) 50–51 Fronesis. 
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make it more likely that users will choose that provider. Cities M and L, which 
both have a great deal of experience of administering care choice systems, have 
decided to forbid private providers from hiring staff who are the family 
members of the user they are supposed to care for, as well as from hiring staff 
to care solely for a single user. According to these administrations, these forms 
of employment often result in unprofessional care and sometimes even involve 
fraud.314 In the tender documents, however, only 31 out of 108 municipalities 
(29 per cent) do not allow providers to hire relatives or to hire staff to work 
solely with one user. Other municipalities allow the use of this form of 
employment only in certain cases, such as when the provider cannot otherwise 
find a staff member who speaks the user’s language. A majority of 
municipalities, however, do not place any restrictions on this form of 
employment at all. All these factors mean that there are, in many 
municipalities, favourable conditions for private providers entering the care 
choice system. These reduce the risk the private providers have to bear. 
3.4.3 Municipalities’ informal support structures for private 
providers 
The administrations have a general responsibility to create favourable 
conditions for care businesses. This was clear in the interviewees’ general 
attitudes, whether critical or uncritical, to their professional roles, and in the 
different ways in which they described dealing with the providers in their areas. 
As one leading official in City S put it: ‘the political ambition is to draw more 
providers into the market and we really pay attention to that’.315 One of the 
officials from City M pointed out that the local regulation of the care choice 
system ‘in some ways seems to have been designed less for the elder care users 
and more for the facilitation of starting businesses in the sector’. One example 
of this is the aforementioned ability of the providers to decide which parts of 
the city they want to operate in, thereby allowing providers not to serve less 
densely populated areas or areas with more complex social problems and 
leaving older persons in these areas with fewer options than those in other parts 
of the city. The official had the following view on the way the municipality’s 
system was organized: 
The whole [creation of the system] has not been done for the sake of the users 
but for the providers. And our elder board also had as a goal to stimulate small 
314 M1, L6. 
315 S2. 
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entrepreneurs, and doesn’t that seem strange: that a board for elderly matters 
should aim at stimulating entrepreneurship!316 
In cities M and L, both users and private providers were involved and had 
influence over the process of reforming tender documents and qualification 
criteria.317 The private providers, in other words, have the ability to affect the 
organization of care choice systems directly. 
Besides the formal criteria in the tenders, there are also more informal ways in 
which the administrations create favourable conditions for the private 
providers. Because local politicians have instructed their administrations to 
promote the creation of new care companies, an important task for municipal 
officials is creating favourable conditions for small business owners. What 
form do these informal measures take? My interviewees pointed to the 
approval process as an important factor, not only in making sure that the 
providers meet the requirements from the start but also in establishing a good 
relationship, which is important if the municipality is to be able to govern 
through dialogue. In this process, the conflict between the municipality’s 
different missions is clear: it is supposed both to support the providers and to 
control and monitor them. From the start, the aim is to create a climate of trust 
– but at the same time to let the providers know that they can be scrutinized.318 
In City S, there are structures in place to ensure that new providers are, first of 
all, introduced to and educated about various municipal policies and 
procedures. The administration then helps the provider set up internal 
structures, such as a functioning quality development system. Even when the 
provider is up and running, the administration seek, to be available for services 
when needed.319 One of the administrators commented on this structure by 
proudly stating: ‘I’d say we are pretty generous [to the private providers]!’320  
City M has developed an approval structure for new providers that involves a 
‘training package’ for all approved suppliers. The training provides an 
introduction to what home care is, as defined by legislation, national policy, 
and local policy guidelines, in order to ensure the providers will act in 
accordance with the regulations. The package includes training for staff about 
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the ‘individual- centred care’321 model. The providers are also given an 
introduction to how the municipality is structured and, in order to foster 
collaboration and ensure effective holistic support, an introduction to how to 
navigate other kinds of social care and healthcare services that might be 
relevant to the older persons for whom they will be caring. They are 
furthermore made aware of the digital and administrative management systems 
used by the municipality. There is also a team of municipal administrators that 
works together with different providers and that serves as the provider’s point 
of contact in the municipality.322  
Two of the officials from City M, generally seen by the interviewees as a 
‘business-friendly’ municipality, used the concept of ‘elder care school’323 to 
describe the service provided by the municipality to the private businesses. 
Some of the officials said they sometimes found this form of governing too 
generous to business. One said that a balance had been sought between helping 
too much and helping the providers, especially smaller companies, function 
well. She said it sometimes seemed as though the municipality was ‘creating 
the company together [with the entrepreneur]!’324 These statements are 
remarkable in how far-reaching they show the municipalities’ support for 
private providers to be. Providers are not kept at arm’s length; they are offered 
a great deal of assistance and are supported from early on in the process. 
In City L, approved providers are also given an information ‘tool box’ when 
entering the system, with details of different technical systems and a network 
of contacts within the administration. There are also regular information 
meetings and training sessions, as well as individual meetings between the 
administration and the provider’s management.325 The aim of establishing a 
good dialogue with the private providers is also the reason behind the 
arrangement of quarterly branch meetings. Besides these meetings, officials 
described ‘an open line’ between the providers and the administration: 
providers are welcome to call and ask questions or seek support.326  
Central to the way City L supports the private providers are the specially 
appointed ‘observers’, who have the task of visiting all providers over a few 
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weeks every other year and then providing constructive feedback on how the 
providers can improve their operations. This is in parallel with the system of 
inspections and monitoring, which will be described further below. After 
having agreed a suitable time with the provider, the observer spends around 
two weeks in the business, witnessing the day-to-day operations. The observer 
takes notes on situations and structures according to a protocol. Afterwards, 
there is a feedback session with the  management where strengths and areas for 
development are discussed. The system of ‘observers’ is part of the monitoring 
structure, and the explicit aim is to use monitoring as a tool to educate and 
support providers in their work.327 However, it is not the observer’s role to 
ensure that the contract clauses are being met; instead, the dialogue is 
constructive, and the observer provides recommendations and advice. The 
observer is described as a kind of ‘coach’, and the observer system as ‘a 
supportive function in the development of services’.328 The municipality thus 
effectively provides the private providers with quality consultants. The 
observers do not issue any action plans or use hard measures, and the basis for 
their interventions is a ‘soft’ dialogue, where the provider and the observer 
together try to analyse why certain problems exist in the operation and what 
could be done about them. If an observer is alarmed by what they have seen, 
they can bring it to the attention of the inspectors, who can then undertake a 
more thorough monitoring process, but the purpose of the observation is to 
prompt internal learning processes to take place in the provider.329 Observers 
also share recommendations and best practices among different providers. As 
one interviewee explained it: ‘they act like little bees – they pollinate!’330 She 
also explained that the providers’ management teams have very little time to 
work on quality development and that the municipality thus sought to provide 
analysis and recommendations of quality development measures in order for 
everyone to improve.331 
In all three municipalities, providing the private companies with education and 
training seems to be an important part of the practices of improving quality and 
providing favourable conditions for businesses to establish themselves in the 
municipality. The education and training initiatives thus have a double 
function: supporting the providers and ensuring the services are of a high-
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enough quality. They are an expression of a broader attitude: the administration 
seeks to support the private providers, to be available, and to have a continuous 
dialogue with the businesses on matters of quality improvement. Assisting the 
providers with their quality development, giving advice, and providing 
education have thus come to be key parts of the municipal administrations’ 
mission.  
3.5 Monitoring care choice systems 
3.5.1 The different aims of monitoring 
Monitoring is a central governing technique in the municipalities’ work with 
the private providers. Without a well-functioning monitoring system, the terms 
of the contracts might not be fulfilled. Questions of how monitoring works and 
how well it works are therefore central to understanding the governing of care 
choice systems.  
What is meant, more broadly, by ‘monitoring activities’? Ann-Charlotte 
Landelius suggests that in a Swedish legal context the term can refer to various 
activities, including counselling, licensing, information, evaluation, 
monitoring, and control of operations. The aim of the monitoring is often 
framed in terms of satisfying the citizens’ interest in legal certainty and 
efficiency and ensuring that democratic decisions are implemented. 
Monitoring is thus linked to the concept of democratic accountability.332 This 
is a traditional public-law perspective, but there is a parallel contractual 
principle: that whatever is set out in the contract must actually be realized 
before payment for the service is due. Given this, it is remarkable that the 
preparatory works to the Act on Care Choice Systems barely touch upon the 
subject. They state only that, in the municipalities that already had choice 
systems before the Act on Care Choice Systems, ‘an increased activity has 
been noted when it comes to monitoring, evaluations, and the development and 
assurance of quality’ and that 
this is a necessary development when a system built on a continuous 
competition between providers is implemented. For users to be able to choose, 
comparable information about the providers is needed – information that the 
332 Landelius (n 91) 99. 
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municipalities are obliged to give them and which, therefore, must be collected 
through continuous monitoring and control of activities.333  
These formulations give the impression that the main goal of monitoring is to 
facilitate the spread of information on the market. However, as we have already 
seen, municipal officials see it as a central tool for maintaining the quality of 
services and thus discharging the municipalities’ responsibilities, since user 
choice is not sufficient by itself to ensure that standards are maintained. The 
officials’ perspective is more evident in the 2014 inquiry report, which, while 
not discussing questions of monitoring at length, states that monitoring is an 
important method of ensuring that the individual user receives care in 
accordance with existing regulations.334 
A central aim of municipal monitoring systems is thus to ensure that the quality 
standards set out in the Social Services Act are upheld. However, as I will show 
below, monitoring is also seen as  having other functions. Monitoring is seen 
as a way of working alongside the providers to improve the quality of services, 
an understanding that fits well with the political ambition to promote small 
businesses. As one administrator explicitly stated: ‘There is a political will to 
have – to support small businesses and so – At least I understand the mission 
as promoting that, rather than dismissing someone just because everything is 
not in place at once.’335  
3.5.2 National monitoring and support for municipal monitoring 
Monitoring is more a municipal undertaking than a national responsibility, but 
there are also national structures set up for this purpose. The Health and Care 
Inspectorate oversees both publicly and privately provided social services.336 
This supervision involves reviewing whether the services meet the 
requirements and objectives set out in policy guidelines and in law, including 
the principles stated in the opening sections of the Social Services Act. The 
reviews are based on legal requirements as well as on the provisions and 
guidelines issued by the National Board on Health and Welfare on quality 
indicators, registers, and statistics. The inspectorate can review entire 
organizations or individual cases. It may issue fines, issue injunctions, and 
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revoke permits, but it also uses softer tools, providing advice and guidance as 
well as sharing knowledge and experience. 
Many of the officials I spoke with brought up the issue of the presence, or 
rather lack of presence, of the Health and Care Inspectorate in the monitoring 
process. The agency was described as being ‘very far away, at a critical 
distance’,337 ‘hard to reach’,338 and ‘just not present’.339 The municipalities find 
that it is hard to get information about the reviews that the Health and Care 
Inspectorate has conducted – it can review a private supplier without notifying 
the relevant municipality. There is thus no close connection between the 
monitoring work carried out by the Health and Care Inspectorate and that 
carried out by the municipalities.340 Officials repeatedly raised the problem of 
the long processing times at the agency.341 Officials questioned whether, when 
home care come to be included in the authorization system, just as nursing 
homes are today, there will be sufficient time for the national agency to deal 
with the extra work. One claimed that the change would be good for the 
companies, which would ‘rather have the Health and Care Inspectorate on their 
heels – since they don’t have the time to check them out’.342 The national 
control systems are perceived as underdeveloped and, unlike the 
municipalities’ control systems, too remote from activities the ground.343 From 
the branch meeting in City M, a clear picture emerged of the Health and Care 
Inspectorate as overloaded, and both the suppliers and the municipality 
expressed a great deal of frustration regarding how the agency worked.344 The 
same discussion arose at the City L branch meeting.345 
The Swedish Competition Authority also supports the municipalities in their 
monitoring, and it has developed a monitoring guide for administrations with 
care choice systems.346 The agency approaches the issue from a competition 
337 S2. 
338 S5. 
339 M5. 
340 M2, M3. 
341 S6, M5, L1. 
342 L1. 
343 L6. 
344 City M Branch Meeting. 
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346 The Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Monitoring Guide’ 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/upphandling/avtalsuppfoljning-av-vard-och-
omsorg.pdf accessed 11 May 2020. 
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perspective, and it highlights EU competition regulations in setting out its 
overarching idea for how monitoring should be performed: it is important that 
monitoring relies only on the criteria listed in the tender documents, and it is 
important not to ask for unnecessary statistics or information from the 
providers.347 The agency’s guide recommends a particular structure and a 
number of tools for monitoring. It lists visits (announced and unannounced), 
site inspections, surveys, accounting records, verification of invoices, and 
other supporting documents as the main tools for monitoring. It also 
recommends the use of digital systems for time keeping and for the processing 
of other data. According to the guide, monitoring should be carried out 
regularly, but, when warranted, it may also focus on specific factors. A number 
of roles may be involved in monitoring, including procurement advidsers, 
controllers, experts in the procured services, and independent auditors. The 
guide states that successful monitoring requires the municipality to invest in 
skilled staff, good working routines, and digital information systems.348 The 
monitoring should operate on several levels, the guide says. First of all, it 
should ensure that the contractual requirements regarding both the provider 
and the service itself are always being met. Second, the volume and price of 
the billed services must be checked in order to ensure that payments are 
accurate. Third, other contract clauses, such as those relating to working 
conditions and environmental standards, should also be monitored.349  
However, a decisive role is also played by the providers’ systems of self-
monitoring. These are undergirded by Lex Sarah in the Social Services Act, 
i.e. the obligation to report, document, investigate, and remedy abuses or 
significant risks of abuse.350 It is therefore crucial that the provider’s quality 
management system, which is the basis of self-monitoring processes, is itself 
monitored. The quality management system should contain adequate quality 
assurance mechanisms (to detect, remedy, and learn from mistakes), quality 
development processes and procedures, and ways of measuring quality against 
goals and standards.351 
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3.5.3 How the municipalities monitor the providers 
The guide issued by the National Authority on Public Procurement contains 
recommendations for how to organize monitoring on a municipal level, but the 
way monitoring is carried out is primarily a matter of municipal procedure. 
Here, I will analyse these procedures, drawing on the descriptions provided in 
the tender documents, the interviews, and, in case of City M, monitoring 
reports. Most of the tender documents regulate, or rather list, the ways in which 
monitoring will be carried out, but the lists are most often open ended or quite 
unspecific. City S’s tender document, for example, mentions: 
- consultation meetings
- planned and unplanned visits and observations
- reviews of how comments, complaints, and mistakes are addressed
- monitoring of documentation and care implementation plans
- user surveys
- monitoring of the internal quality management system
- follow-up on the internal operational plan
- auditing by municipal or external accountants
- contacts with other relevant actors.352
City M’s document lists most of these, and also mentions: 
- a requirement to provide a yearly account of the quality improvements
made by the provider
- monitoring of staff working conditions
- administrative audits
- sample checks
- screening
- more in-depth monitoring, if needed.
City L’s document contains similar descriptions of monitoring requirements to 
those listed above. As these requirements make clear, the monitoring process 
is an advanced apparatus of meetings, visits, reviews of documents, user 
352 City S Tender Document 3.10.5. 
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surveys, financial check-ups, and technical systems. In the interviews, it 
became clear that the levels of monitoring and the instruments and 
technologies used differ markedly among the municipalities, a variation which 
can be attributed to the different levels of resources available in smaller and 
larger municipalities. To paint a picture of these differences, each 
municipality’s monitoring system will be described in turn below. 
City S 
In City S, there is one controller who is responsible for the contract on the 
municipal side and four specialists (healthcare or social workers) responsible 
for monitoring the municipal provider and private providers. They all work 
within the same department and have the same manager. They are responsible 
not just for home care but also for other social services, such as residential 
care.353 They monitor the municipal provider and the private providers through 
(unannounced and announced) site visits, either regularly (quarterly) or as 
required, as well as through regular meetings. They talk to the management as 
well as to care workers. Self-monitoring is seen as an important part of the 
monitoring structure: the monitors send the providers sets of questions relating 
to the contract terms, read the responses, and follow up in conversation with 
the providers. The digital system through which the municipality places service 
orders and the provider reports the number of hours worked also serves as a 
control mechanism.354 Furthermore, care managers conduct individual 
evaluations when meeting users. If there is a problem, they will, with the 
consent of the user, tell the provider about the issue. If the problem is found to 
be particularly serious, they will write a report on the discrepancies. However, 
if the user concerned is being cared for by a private provider, this report is 
confidential, and thus is not seen by the municipal administration. In such 
cases, the system relies on the provider’s self-monitoring procedures.355 The 
reports on discrepacies do not, in other words, play a role in guiding users’ 
choices in the care choice system. 
In the interviews, the monitors claimed that they conducted overall 
assessments of the providers’ operations but also that there were certain aspects 
to which they paid particular attention. These included staffing levels and 
competence, procedures, reports on discrepancies, documentation, ID cards, 
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and implementation plans.356 In general, central to the monitoring process are 
the internal processes the provider has in place to meet formal requirements, 
as well as factors such as user participation, good treatment, and continuity.357 
As one administrator put it: ‘We are asking the question: “how do you achieve 
this?”’358 At the time of the interviews, there had been a recent reorganization 
on the monitoring side, and the four monitors had all been hired quite recently. 
The department had decided to reorganize the monitoring structures with the 
aim of refocusing the mission away from mere control and towards being more 
supportive. The plan was that the providers would be monitored for half of 
every year in accordance with the procedures described above, and that the 
monitors would then spend the other half of the year supporting the providers, 
helping them to improve whatever was found to be suboptimal during the 
evaluation.359 
City M 
In City M, three different departments are responsible for the monitoring of 
home care: the Social Work Department, the Care Service Department, and the 
Elder Department. The Social Work Department is home to the care managers, 
who are responsible for individual user evaluations. The Care Service 
Department and the Elder Department have a common Quality and Evaluation 
Office, which is responsible for the systematic monitoring of all social 
services, including home care. All three departments interact regularly and 
sometime do joint monitoring. Besides these activities, contract managers 
within the Elder Department have regular meetings with the providers.360 The 
individual evaluations conducted by the care managers within the Social Work 
Department are based on care implementation plans and on interviews with the 
users. They are compiled into anonymized reports, which are sent to the 
provider and the Care Service Office.361 The Quality and Evaluation Office 
conducts thorough monitoring processes to monitor compliance with contract 
terms, as well as thematic monitoring relating to specific aspects of 
operations.362 Their monitoring work is based on visits, documents, and 
interviews. The same procedures apply to both the municipal provider and the 
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private providers. The municipality publishes the results of monitoring 
activities on its website, and the provider is also obliged to be transparent and 
to allow municipal monitors to access relevant information.363 
The municipality sets yearly targets for the monitoring team, and currently 
aims to monitor all contracts at least once in every period of office (four years), 
but this means providers might not be monitored for several years. One third 
of the monitoring processes should be based on strategic choices (e.g. new 
providers), while one third should take place when warranted and one third 
should be randomly chosen. Since the Quality and Evaluation Office is 
responsible for providers in all areas of social services, most of which have 
choice systems, it has many providers to monitor – with 15 in home care 
alone.364 Interviewees reported that monitoring was resource intensive. 
Yes, it takes a lot of time, because, yes, of course we want to do this as seriously 
as possible, and it should be formally communicated, and – yes, it takes a lot of 
time. Maybe it can be simplified over time, but it has taken a lot of time, 
really.365 
The Quality and Evaluation Office has been up and running since 2013, when 
it was decided that, in order to make monitoring a priority, it would be best to 
have a number of administrators working solely on monitoring in a separate 
department.366 Over time, the whole process, from application stage to 
monitoring, has been developed and streamlined into a structure with defined 
internal roles: care managers, contract managers, digital system managers, 
controllers, and inspectors. There are now defined procedures for handling 
applications, meeting applicants, reviewing the strength of their application 
through interviews, and processing applications for approval. After approval, 
there are procedures for training, regular meetings, self-monitoring, and 
monitoring (as described above). There is also a dedicated team of officials at 
the administration that stays in contact with providers in order to detect any 
potential cases of fraud.367 Another aspect of the development of the 
monitoring system is the ongoing process of streamlining the technical systems 
that support care work, for instance the digitalization and standardization of 
individual care implementation plans and the supervision of these plans to 
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ensure that the right amount of time is spent in the user’s home, among other 
things.368  
The officials from City M who work on monitoring also regard supporting the 
providers as part of their role. The monitoring of the companies functions as a 
kind of learning process for the providers. When the monitors visit the 
providers, they also provide recommendations for how to improve procedures, 
and their reports may be seen as learning tools for the providers.369 This is 
especially true of the municipality’s relationships with the small providers. 
One official from City M stated: ‘we do put lower demands on the small and 
new companies’, adding that this meant that the services of different providers 
were of different levels of quality. The official said that the monitoring of small 
companies in particular took the form of education and support, since they  
do not have the same knowledge or organization behind them as with the more 
established providers. If a large provider opens a new home care service in a 
new city or on a new market, they will have – They have in their organization 
that knowledge and quality management system and everything. The small 
providers that can show up in care choice systems, they normally don’t have 
that.370  
As this makes clear, the levels of monitoring and control to which companies 
are subject vary depending on the size of the business, and monitoring not only 
serves to ensure the quality of the services for the users but also to support the 
private providers. 
Monitoring reports are published on the municipality’s website. I read six 
sample reports from the period 2015–2017 in order to get a fuller picture of 
how monitoring is conducted, the typical results of monitoring exercises, and 
the typical remedial actions proposed. Monitoring processes are either routine 
or one-off – for example if there have been complaints from users. The reports 
are based on visits (announced and unannounced), interviews, written 
documentation, and data from the municipality’s digital management system. 
The reports are structured so as to correspond to different contract clauses – 
i.e. the requirements set out in the tender document – and examine whether the 
service meets the required standard. If any shortcomings are identified, the 
report will list, at the end of the document, measures that the provider has to 
implement, with a deadline by which the changes have to be made. Two out of 
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the six sample reports conclude that the providers meet all of the requirements, 
recommending a few areas for improvement but not requiring any actions of 
the providers. The other four (samples A–D) are described in detail below. 
Report A identifies several defects in the service. The planning of daily 
operations had not been functioning for some time. High staff turnover and a 
general lack of staff meant that not all planned care activities had been carried 
out, which meant that users had not received services they were entitled to 
according to municipal decisions. Adequate quality management procedures 
were in place, but they had not been implemented and followed appropriately. 
Mistakes had not been registered in the municipality’s digital management 
system. Individual care implementation plans were not up to date, and users 
were not being visited by their assigned carers. Furthermore, the provider had 
received low ratings in the user survey carried out by the National Board on 
Health and Welfare earlier in the year. The actions taken by the municipality 
were to call the provider’s regional office to make them aware of the defects 
and to require several measures to be implemented, with the provider to report 
back within four weeks.371 
Monitoring report B lists several areas in which the provider had to make 
structural improvements in order to achieve professional levels of operation 
and meet contractual obligations. The defects identified were that the quality 
management system was not sufficiently developed or implemented, that only 
about 25 per cent of the staff had had adequate training, and that staff were 
sometimes scheduled to work 12-hour shifts but were only paid for the time 
they were in the users’ homes. Care implementation plans were not used to 
guide daily operations, and staff were not equipped with phones to ensure their 
availability. The municipality required the provider to produce an action plan 
within 10 weeks, threatening to terminate the agreement if the defects were not 
addressed. The action plan had to show that the quality management system 
would be updated and implemented; that there would be procedures put in 
place regarding care work in the users’ homes; that the provider would ensure 
staff availability, give staff time to document and transmit information, and 
improve staff working conditions; that a training plan for staff would be drawn 
up; that the care implementation plans would be updated and staff trained in 
how to use them; and that procedures would be established for cooperation 
with other relevant actors in the care of individuals.372 
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Report C similarly finds a series of actions that had to be taken to improve 
procedures and internal structures. The most remarkable aspect of this report 
is that it states that the provider had been wrongly approved: the requirements 
in the tender document were not fulfilled at the time of approval, and this was 
known prior to the approval decision being taken. The problem, specifically, 
was the competence and experience of the operations manager, which was still 
an issue at the time the report was compiled. Furthermore, the quality 
management system was found to be inadequate and to have been not 
sufficiently implemented. There were inadequate procedures for sharing 
information about the users among staff, problems with documentation, and 
issues with staff availability. The staff did not regularly visit the provider’s 
premises but travelled between users’ homes and their own homes, without 
seeing management or colleagues. Care implementation plans were deficient; 
they were not based on user participation and were not used by staff. Keys 
were not stored and handled in a secure way. Documentation was not handled 
digitally but completed on paper once a week. The municipality gave the 
provider 10 weeks to implement changes, and stated that the contract might be 
terminated if defects were not remedied.373 
Report D states that there were severe problems with the provider’s service and 
that the provider had to make extensive improvements if it was to keep the 
contract. The report mentions working conditions that violated the Work 
Environment Act, an inadequate quality management system, almost no staff 
with qualifications, no access to staff over the phone, no care implementation 
plans or user participation, and problems in the recording of time worked and 
invoicing. The provider was given 10 weeks to implement certain measures 
but 14 weeks for others.374 
Apart from report A, which refers to the results of the national user survey, 
these reports do not rely on measurable outcomes. It is also remarkable that 
providers were given several months to remedy defects, even in cases where 
these were deemed severe. I do not have access to the follow-ups or know 
whether these providers are still in business. 
City L 
City L has a comprehensive regime for monitoring providers, of which there 
are around 100. The municipality is divided into 14 districts, each of which has 
its own monitoring organization, with care managers, contract controllers, and 
373 City M Monitoring Report Dnr ÄN 2016-612. 
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quality inspectors. There is also a central administration with its own contract 
managers, inspectors, and observers.375 I conducted interviews with 
administrators from the central Elder Department and administrators from one 
district.  
The districts are responsible for individual evaluations. These are carried out 
yearly by care managers through care implementation plan follow-up 
investigations and interviews with users that ask pre-defined questions about 
perceptions of trust, social contact, and continuity.376 The point of the interview 
is to complement the national survey, as there are seen to be problems with the 
validity of the results of this survey, as I mentioned in section 3.3.2. However, 
similar criticisms have also been levelled at the municipal user survey; in 
particular, it has been claimed that users are unwilling to criticize their carers, 
to whom they feel loyal.377 The districts are also in charge of payments; they 
deal with invoicing and track billed hours with the help of a digital system 
through which the providers register the amount of time they have spent caring 
for each user. This digital system also allows the municipality to ensure that 
users actually receive the hours of care to which they are entitled,378 although 
one official from the central department alleged that local districts were more 
interested in ensuring that they were not overbilled than in ensuring that users 
received the services to which they were entitled.379 This highlights the conflict 
between the different aims of monitoring.  
Further, each district is responsible for overseeing its providers through a 
yearly quality control process. In order to increase efficiency, if yearly 
inspections of a particular provider are not deemed necessary, the process takes 
place only every other year.380 In this process, local inspectors use a monitoring 
system developed and managed centrally. Their tools are visits, reports and 
documents, and data and statistics drawn from the digital systems. They also 
monitor the providers’ quality management systems, staffing levels and 
competence, security procedures, and other issues central to the contract.381 
Where there are problems, they meet with the providers and may refer the 
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matter to the central administration, which will then carry out a more thorough 
investigation and may impose sanctions, if necessary.382 
The central administration is responsible for the contracts with the providers. 
Six months after a provider is approved, contract managers assess compliance 
with contract clauses. They look at issues such as facilities, the share of staff 
with assistant nursing diplomas, salaries and working conditions, procedures 
for handling users’ keys, work clothes, statutory documentation procedures, 
and confidentiality. They will also be in touch with providers concerning any 
complaints and reported discrepancies and will carry out some site visits.383 
The inspectors’ primary responsibility is quality assurance, so they mostly 
respond to reports, complaints, or other signals of problems within an 
organization. This function was created in 2011, in the wake of a care scandal. 
The contract managers, inspectors, observers, and care workers responsible for 
quality assurance meet weekly, going through complaints and other reports to 
decide how to act and to divide up responsibilities. They may decide to call the 
provider, have a meeting with the provider, conduct an unannounced site 
inspection, initiate sanctions procedures, or even, in the most serious cases, 
move towards the termination of the contract.384 The role of the observers, 
discussed above, centres on supporting the providers and helping them to 
improve their operations. Interview evidence from contract managers in City 
L indicates that, unless they are monitoring compliance with contract clauses, 
they approach their visits to providers in a similar way. They advise the 
providers on strategic issues, share experiences, and discuss weaknesses, with 
the aim of helping providers find better solutions.385 
3.5.4 Monitoring: a demanding task for municipalities 
Many of the officials that were interviewed agreed that monitoring was a 
demanding undertaking for the municipal administrations, implying significant 
time, personnel, and resource commitments. Officials who were otherwise 
positive about the care choice system all mentioned this as the most 
problematic aspect of the system.386 L3 said that monitoring the ‘soft sector’ 
was very difficult and that ensuring that holistic, qualitative monitoring was 
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actually achieved required an ambitious and careful programme of monitoring 
work, including individual follow-ups and thorough analyses. If the 
administration requires a provider to improve its procedures, which is a 
common action taken following an inspection, the provider will often submit 
a description of the steps taken to improve procedures. Assessing whether 
improvements have actually been implemented requires administrations to put 
more resources into monitoring and inspecting on site.387  
The challenges are that it is so incredibly large. There are so many providers 
who are eligible, so it is difficult to have contact with everyone and monitor 
everyone as you might want, because it is, after all, our users who have these 
providers – One would want to have a little more monitoring and control, and 
it is in principle impossible to have that with everyone.388 
The extent of the monitoring seems also to be steadily growing, a trend the 
officials explained with reference to the growing number of providers, a 
growing political awareness of quality issues, and a general tendency in the 
care sector towards increased measurement and evaluation.389  
In elder care, it has become just more and more monitoring, more and more 
control, and more and more indicators and – so it is just, ‘Look at the 
newspapers! Here is Sweden’s best residential home!’ That news then comes 
from the National Board on Health and Welfare’s surveys that have just been 
published and it has shown all kinds of results. So, if I am a provider, then I can 
get, first, an inspection and next month comes a controller to do the annual 
monitoring of the contract. Then next an observation – 390 
L3, who was, again, very positive about the care choice system generally, 
stating that it was a good thing for the development of elder care, also said that 
monitoring and securing services for individual users required a lot of 
resources. The system required purchasers to take on a lot of responsibility, 
she said, for ensuring that unserious or unqualified providers were not allowed 
to operate, a task she said was highly demanding. She emphasized that, 
especially in recent years, monitoring work had increased, both centrally and 
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in the districts, as had the resources committed to monitoring.391 This was a 
view shared by the district-level officials392 and by L1, a contract manager. 
Interviewer: Has the monitoring developed, from the introduction of the act? 
L1: Yes, it has, it has. You come to realize that you need to monitor more. You 
have to do that. The monitoring is, after all, the most important of all. 
Interviewer: So, in the beginning the organization was a bit more unclear and 
then it has developed to be more systematic? 
L1: Yes, in the beginning it was only [L6] who was here, and then she could 
not do anything, except approving contracts for applicants. 
Interviewer: But that also means that the resources for monitoring have 
increased over time? 
L1: Yes, yes. When I came in four and a half years ago, we started to develop 
the monitoring, because then we had more time to do it. 
Interviewer: Quite recently, in other words, really? 
L1: Mm-hmm. 
Over the years, more resources have also gone into monitoring, and many 
administrators have been employed for this purpose.393 As the interviewees 
described it, in the early years of their care choice systems, the focus was on 
the application process, but now their focus is increasingly on monitoring, on 
what happens after the approval of a provider. As can be seen from the 
descriptions above, in all three municipalities monitoring is increasingly 
central to the work of the administration. After a care choice system has been 
introduced, the felt need to subject providers to continuing assessment seems 
to intensify. The methods, tools, and professionals involved also seem to 
become more specialized over time. 
391 L3. 
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3.6 Results 
The answer to this chapter’s central question is that, in creating quasi-markets 
in the provision of home care, Swedish municipal administrations commit a lot 
of resources to both supporting and monitoring private providers. The role of 
municipal administrations in relation to elder care changes, for public 
authorities are now responsible for creating and protecting favourable 
conditions for market competition as well as for monitoring the outcomes of 
this competition – sanctioning providers and compensating for market failures. 
As we have seen from the material presented in this chapter, municipalities 
have implemented measures to support users’ choices and, through support and 
training, and through regulations that are often beneficial to private providers, 
to create an environment within which businesses can thrive. In what follows, 
I discuss the questions set out in the introduction in turn. 
What kinds of tools are used to support the users as market actors? 
One of the basic premises of care choice systems is that home care should 
function like a market. The role of the public authorities administering care 
choice systems becomes that of creating and protecting the market so that 
independent market actors can operate effectively. Discussion in legal sources 
and national policy documents seeks to explain one of the shortcomings of the 
care choice systems, the low levels of active choices made by users, in large 
part in terms of a lack of information among the users, and so proposes that the 
solution is to improve systems for collecting and disseminating information. 
Both the central government and the municipalities have adopted techniques 
to provide better information to users. However, there is a fundamental conflict 
between the municipal administrators’ role of providing guidance and their 
obligation to act impartially with respect to competing market actors, and 
according to my research it is the latter that seems to have the upper hand. 
When providing information to users, municipal administrators put a lot of 
effort into providing ‘neutral’ information, paying close attention to the ‘rules 
of the market’ on competition neutrality. It is this logic, rather than the older 
person’s need, that seems to govern the way municipalities provide 
information. This is in accordance with the EU’s rules on public procurement 
and state aid, which place certain limits on the actions of public administrations 
and politicians: for instance, these rules mean that care managers are not 
permitted to recommend providers they believe provide a good service over 
businesses they think just barely live up to the requirements.   
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What kinds of tools are used to support the private providers? 
The main responsibility for creating and maintaining home care markets falls 
on the municipal administration. The logic seems to be that, because 
competition is the way to increase quality, the appropriate role for public 
administration is to stimulate and create competition. The municipalities seem 
to be committed to supporting private providers: providers are allowed to 
effectively outsource certain functions to the municipality and thus to save 
money and resources. This also changes the relationship between private actors 
and the municipality – in this case, the municipality must exercise monitoring 
and regulatory functions while at the same time supporting and promoting the 
companies.  
All three municipalities in my case study have education and training 
programmes for approved private providers. After the approval process, there 
are meetings and training sessions to get the providers started. There is also 
ongoing work to help the private providers improve their services. Through the 
appointment of municipal administrators as points of contact for the providers 
and the regular meetings, training sessions, and feedback procedures that they 
organize, responsibility for certain aspects of quality development comes to be 
assumed by the municipality.  
In addition, since providing conditions for businesses, especially small 
businesses, to flourish is central to the creation of care choice systems, 
municipalities ensure that there are favourable market conditions in place to 
increase the likelihood that providers will be successful. The system is geared 
towards the private providers, which enjoy better conditions than the municipal 
providers. Private providers have options for organizing their services that the 
municipalities do not have: the private providers can limit the geographical 
scope of their operations or the number of users for whom they are responsible, 
which are things the municipality cannot do. Cream skimming is a concept used 
to describe a practice whereby producers (in this case private care providers) 
opt to provide a service only or mainly to relatively low-cost (i.e. more 
profitable) users.394 If providers are able to cream off the more profitable users 
in this way, there is a risk that welfare services will be provided in a way that 
discriminates against more costly or risky groups within the population, who 
might get stuck with lower-quality care, and that the system will thus become 
more unequal.395 Even though discrimination against the users of elder care is 
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prohibited,396 if providers target certain less-costly groups or areas, there is still 
a risk of cream skimming occurring in practice.397 The possibilities that exist 
in many municipalities for providers to choose certain areas and to place 
capacity limits on their services allow for a form of cream skimming which 
benefits the providers on account of the level of equality between the users. 
The fact that providers are allowed to deliver additional services is another 
condition favourable to these companies. The ability of private providers to 
offer their users additional services should be seen as part of a governing logic 
which steers the system towards the establishment of conditions that enable 
private providers to make profits, whether within or outside of the publicly 
funded welfare system. This is in line with the reasoning of Sara Erlandsson et 
al., who argue that the ability to ‘top up’ care with additional services creates 
incentives for more affluent groups of seniors to choose private providers. This 
may also make it more likely that private providers will offer their services in 
geographical areas where they think they can attract users who will purchase 
the additional services. Those with fewer resources and more complex needs 
cluster in the no-choice alternative, which risks becoming relatively worse.398 
There is a notion that competition should promote better quality. At the same 
time, there is a tendency among market players to prioritize more profitable 
areas and groups. There is a clear contradiction here – if companies cluster in 
some parts of the municipality rather than others, the result is not only uneven 
provision but also uneven competition (more in some areas, less in others). 
Poorer areas attract fewer suppliers and thus have less competition, which 
according to the prevailing logic should lead to (even) poorer services. 
What role do monitoring systems play in governing care choice systems? 
The monitoring of operations, municipal as well as private, has undoubtedly 
become a large and growing part of municipal administration. This is not 
something really reflected in the preparatory works or national policy 
documents, but it is clear from the empirical evidence from the municipalities. 
This evidence shows that municipalities have implemented a broad range of 
monitoring measures in order to assess the providers’ operations. The 
monitoring work focuses on the requirements in the tender documents and 
contracts, particularly on the existence and implementation of procedures, 
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plans, and systems and on the competence and working conditions of staff. 
Extensive monitoring is seen as necessary to ensure quality. 
In a meta-study from 2011, Szebehely states that several studies showed that 
municipal monitoring activities in care choice systems for elder care were 
generally limited and that many municipalities seemed to rely largely on 
complaints from users or on users opting out of providers that they were not 
satisfied with.399 There are no studies which directly follow up on these results, 
but, given the general tendency towards increased monitoring, the high-profile 
scandals in the sector, and the development of national guidelines on how to 
monitor private providers, there is reason to believe that there has been a 
significant increase in monitoring activities in the municipalities since 2011.400 
There is also reason to believe that the extent to which authorities are able to 
conduct effective monitoring differs markedly among municipalities 
depending on their size and that monitoring has developed in different ways in 
different municipalities depending on how long the care choice system has 
been in place. These findings are in line with those of Moberg, who shows in 
her dissertation that public authorities have enhanced their monitoring systems 
in order to ensure that the providers of publicly funded elder care fulfil 
regulatory requirements. However, it also seems as though this monitoring is 
unsystematic and that, especially on the local level, there is a lack of continuity 
in how quality control is conducted.401  
Even though the municipal administrations spend a great deal of time and a lot 
of resources monitoring the providers, they still have to rely on the providers’ 
self-monitoring systems, and thus also to prioritize efforts to support the 
development of these systems. Monitoring focuses primarily on processes and 
on the implementation of self-monitoring through quality management 
systems. This is described by Toomas Kotkas as a response to a new challenge: 
how to monitor the operations of private service providers effectively while at 
the same time not increasing the costs of monitoring. The resources for 
monitoring need to be allocated more efficiently, and this is achieved through 
the introduction of self-monitoring systems.402 Instead of direct monitoring by 
                                                 
399 Szebehely (n 3) 248. 
400 See e.g. The Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Monitoring Guide’ 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/upphandling/avtalsuppfoljning-
av-vard-och-omsorg.pdf accessed 11 May 2020. 
401 Moberg (n 55) 23–25. 
402  Toomas Kotkas, ‘From Official Supervision to Self-Monitoring: Privatizing Supervision of 
Private Social Care Services in Finland’ (2016) 50 Social Policy & Administration 602. 
127 
public authorities, the focus is on pre-emptive supervision, in which the 
controlling agency issues regulations and instructions that guide private social 
welfare service providers in drawing up self-monitoring plans.403 
Studying the municipalities’ monitoring systems reveals that they seem to have 
several different aims at once: ensuring that the service meets the requirements 
set out in the Social Services Act, ensuring that the provider is complying with 
the clauses in the contract, and helping (especially small) businesses to prosper. 
The last aim marks a step away from a more traditional view of monitoring 
activities. If, as my research indicates, the effectiveness of quality control is 
not uniform across larger and smaller care companies, this may imply that legal 
requirements on equal treatment are not being fulfilled. 
The extent of monitoring activities in the municipalities with care choice 
systems, and the importance attached to them, also suggests that the nature of 
public administration is changing. Municipal monitoring systems are large and 
complicated, especially in the larger municipalities. Many actors are involved, 
on many levels, and they produce large amounts of data and many reports. This 
suggests that public officials are increasingly adapting to the care choice 
reforms. The development towards increasing levels of measurement and 
evaluation was already present prior to the implementation of the reforms, but 
the Act on Care Choice Systems seems to have catalysed this development.  
Which rationalities are central to the municipalities’ governing of the private 
providers? 
The political aims behind the introduction of care choice systems were to move 
towards the use of a market-like model to coordinate the provision of elder 
care, to improve the quality of services, and to empower users. To fulfil these 
objectives, public authorities take active measures to deal with perceived 
‘market failures’. Because the municipalities are at the same time responsible 
for the quality of home care, there is a conflict between rationalities here. To 
resolve this conflict, the interviews suggested, there is a need to use alternative 
methods of governing: a combination of rigorous systems of evaluation and 
monitoring with systems of support, coaching, and education for the providers. 
This changes the relationship between the municipal administration and private 
providers – public administrators are enrolled in the task of aiding and assisting 
private providers, even in tasks that relate more to business administration than 
to the provision of care. The development of care choice systems also exhibits 
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tendencies of decentralization – towards the municipalities from the national 
level, and towards the providers from the municipal administrations. 
These results fit well with those of Gingrich, who argues that markets in 
welfare services have in this way significantly changed the conditions of care. 
They have brought about distributional and political changes within the public 
sector and the state itself. The introduction of markets has implications beyond 
the way citizens’ care is provided; it also affects the relative power of 
professionals, users, and the state, both socially and materially.404 Anna H 
Glenngård describes the move towards markets and choice as ‘a shift from the 
sphere of political authority towards the sphere of voluntary exchange as the 
mode for social coordination’.405 This development entails a change in the role 
of public authorities – from setting objectives, defining rules, and exercising 
control to creating and protecting the market.  
A fundamental belief of those in favour of the ‘free market’ is that when agents 
act freely and in accordance with their own interests the result, eventually, is 
beneficial for everyone. It is therefore paradoxical that the municipalities are 
supposed to, and do, take responsibility for the market, encouraging users, in 
various ways, to make active choices and supporting private providers – to 
such an extent, in some instances, that municipal officials feel that they are 
actually helping to set up businesses. The municipalities’ involvement in the 
quasi-markets of the care choice systems is in this way very far from the ideal 
of the laissez-faire market. The administrations have the responsibility both to 
support private businesses and to guarantee the provision of high-quality elder 
care. The role of municipalities administering care choice systems might, in 
this way, be contradictory, a question to which the following chapters will 
return. 
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4 Governing quality and practices 
of quality improvement 
4.1 Introduction 
A central goal of care choice systems is to increase the quality of elder care. 
According to the Social Services Act, the municipality is responsible for 
ensuring that the care provided to older people is of high quality, regardless of 
whether the care is provided publicly or privately. Through a contract with a 
private provider, part of the responsibility for fulfilling political objectives 
regarding the quality of services is in practice transferred to the private 
company. On the other hand, a central task for municipal administrations 
seeking to introduce a care choice system is, as chapter 3 demonstrated, 
creating market conditions favourable to private providers. The conflict 
between the objectives of the Social Services Act and the motivations behind 
the introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems was identified by the 
public inquiry that preceded the introduction of the latter act. 
One purpose of introducing a care choice system is to increase the diversity of 
service provision. How significant the increase will be depends on the 
requirements that will be placed on the suppliers in the specifications which 
form the basis for the municipal contract with the external suppliers. If the 
requirements are numerous and strict, external suppliers will be less interested 
in providing services and less able to meet the requirements. With standards 
that are too numerous and too high, there is a risk that services will be more 
uniform and less diverse. However, it is essential that the activities should be 
carried out according to current regulations, and that means, among other 
things, that they must comply with the Social Services Act’s demands for good 
quality.406 
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This passage highlights a possible conflict between setting tough quality 
criteria for the private providers and fostering innovation within the sector. The 
aim of this chapter is to answer the second research question: how does the 
introduction of care choice systems affect the definition of quality within home 
care for older people, and how do the changes in the municipalities’ governing 
structures and tools affect practices of quality assessment? I have broken down 
this question into the following subquestions: 
- How is quality defined within the care choice systems? 
- Which strategies and tools are used by the public authorities to govern 
practices of quality improvement and assessment? 
- What conflicts might arise in the governing of quality through a care 
choice system? 
I will first discuss how, and by whom, quality and practices of quality 
assessment are defined, with a focus on the quality criteria found in the tender 
documents. I then provide a description of the strategies and tools used in the 
three municipalities I have studied. The chapter will conclude with a discussion 
of how the municipalities deal with the conflicts which arise when they seek 
to govern quality within a care choice system. 
4.2 How are quality and practices of quality 
assessment defined? 
4.2.1 Quality definitions in legislation and preparatory works 
One starting point for understanding the definition of quality relevant to 
Swedish elder care is the legislation. Requirements relating to the quality of 
social services are set out in the Social Services Act.407 They are, however, not 
fully defined in the law, preparatory works, or case law. The section of the 
legislation dealing explicitly with quality requirements was introduced in the 
Social Services Act following the changes made through government bill 
1996/97:124. The preparatory works to this amendment state that ‘quality is an 
elaborate concept’ and that ‘what is good quality cannot be determined in an 
unambiguous and objective way’. That said, the preparatory works also state 
                                                 
407 Ch. 3 § 3 Social Services Act. 
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that the concept should be taken to include the employment of knowledgeable 
staff, expertise, and adequate resources and, in addition, factors such as legal 
certainty, individual participation, good treatment, and the availability of 
services. Services should be characterized by a respect for individual self-
determination and flexibility.  
The amendment of 1996/1997 came in response to calls for better quality 
control in the sector. The preparatory works state that  
[l]imited financial resources in the municipalities in combination with new 
principles for the governing and management of the activities have in recent 
years brought to the forefront issues of quality and quality development. The 
importance of evaluating the effects and results of the social services’ activities 
and gaining an overall view of the content and development of the social 
services has increased.408  
As this passage highlights, measuring and evaluation are central parts of the 
practices of quality improvement in the municipalities. The preparatory works 
also state that quality development needs to focus not only on the results 
achieved but also on organizational structures and working practices, and that 
quality development implies a need for systematic documentation.409 The Trust 
Delegation claims that the effect of the 1996/1997 reforms was to steer the 
focus towards measurable quality indicators, and argues that there is a problem 
with this:  
[S]ocio-economic, legal, or ethical goals are difficult to formulate in terms of 
well-defined numerical goals. They are therefore often left out of formulations 
of targets (at least the type of targets which lay the groundwork for follow-up 
and evaluation of the activities) and therefore risk being given a lower priority 
in daily activities. This affects, among other things, collaboration and a holistic 
perspective, as these things can be difficult to properly measure and evaluate.410 
The changes that took place in the 1990s laid the groundwork for an 
organizational culture of measurement and self-evaluation within the 
municipal administrations. This is also acknowledged in the preparatory works 
to the Act on Care Choice Systems, which state that practices of quality 
assessment – the formulation of requirements, goals, measurements, 
                                                 
408 Prop. 1996/97:124 Ändring i socialtjänstlagen (n 104) 51. 
409 Prop. 1996/97:124 Ändring i socialtjänstlagen (n 104) 53. 
410 SOU 2018:47 Med tillit växer handlingsutrymmet: tillitsbaserad styrning och ledning av 
välfärdssektorn (n 130) 85. 
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comparisons, and results – have become integral to social services. The 
preparatory works underline the importance of this development, arguing for 
more and higher-quality statistics and assessments and further work on quality 
indicators and benchmarking, which the preparatory works state could also 
play a role in improving the information provided to customers within care 
choice systems.411 The preparatory works conclude that it is more difficult in 
the elder care sector than in the healthcare sector to define what counts as 
‘quality’ care. The existing knowledge of these standards is thought to consist 
of information which is difficult to collect, quantify, and present in an 
aggregated format, which limits the usefulness of any potential definition.412 
This complicates the task of governing quality within a care choice system. 
4.2.2 Quality in national policy documents 
National agencies have developed instruments to govern and support the 
municipalities’ practices of quality assessment. The National Board on Health 
and Welfare has published a number of important provisions and guidelines413 
relating to the definition of quality in home care for older people. The most 
important of these documents are presented here. They are all dated after the 
introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems. 
- SOSFS 2012:3 is general guidance on how to interpret the set of values
expressed in the Social Services Act regarding social services for older
people: the right to dignity and well-being and the promotion of
security and a meaningful existence in community with others. The
guidance includes some further discussion of these values, but it does
not go into detail.414
- The general guidance document SOSFS 2011:12 lists the basic
knowledge and competence which is expected of staff working in elder
care.415 These guidelines are not binding, however, and as will be seen
below there are large numbers of untrained staff working in elder care.
411 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 35. 
412 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 34. 
413 As discussed in previous chapters, provisions are binding regulations, and guidelines are 
intended to help in the application of the law. 
414 SOSFS 2012:3 Värdegrunden i socialtjänstens omsorg om äldre. 
415 SOSFS 2011:12 Grundläggande kunskaper hos personal som arbetar i socialtjänstens 
omsorg om äldre. 
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- SOSFS 2011:5 (amended through SOSFS 2013:16) is an 
administrative provision detailing the application of Lex Sarah, the 
system for the self-reporting of problems by providers.416  
- SOSFS 2015:10 is a provision setting out standards for hygiene, 
infection control measures, and clothes for staff working in elder care 
(and in other health and social services).417 
- An administrative provision from 2014, updated in 2018 (HSLF-FS 
2018:24), clarifies the need for the documentation of all social services 
activities, something which has become increasingly important over 
time.418  
Of particular importance for this study is administrative provision SOSFS 
2011:9, which relates to systematic quality management. The first version of 
the provision was published in 1998 in response to the 1996/1997 amendment 
mentioned above, which had called for systematic quality development work, 
and the 2011 version develops and adds further detail to the provision. The 
provision calls for the systematic and continuous development of methods of 
ensuring the quality of services, and for care organizations this means having 
to implement self-monitoring systems to plan, monitor, evaluate, and improve 
their operations. This requires analysing the risks of any defects in the service 
arising and identifying, developing, and implementing the necessary quality 
management procedures within the organization. The system should be self-
monitored and should build on internal quality improvement structures. The 
system should also involve cooperation with other actors and take into account 
complaints and feedback from users. All quality management work should be 
documented.419 To complement this provision, the National Board on Health 
and Welfare has published a guide to help organizations create quality 
management systems.420 What is noteworthy here is the focus on processes of 
                                                 
416 SOSFS 2013:16 Senaste versionen av Socialstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd 
(SOSFS 2011:5) om lex Sarah. 
417 SOSFS 2015:10 Basal hygien i vård och omsorg. 
418 HSLF-FS 2018:24 Senaste version av Socialstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd 
(SOSFS 2014:5) om dokumentation i verksamhet som bedrivs med stöd av SoL, LVU, 
LVM och LSS. 
419 SOSFS 2011:9 Socialstyrelsen föreskrifter och allmänna råd om ledningssystem för 
systematiskt kvalitetsarbete. 
420 National Board on Health and Welfare, ‘Guide to Quality Management Systems’ 
https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Lists/Artikelkatalog/Attachments/18777/2012-6-53.pdf 
accessed 25 November 2019. 
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quality development rather than on organizational structures or outcomes and 
results. 
My interviewees frequently mentioned quality management systems as central 
to the way the administrations work to ensure quality within care choice 
systems. They look to SOSFS 2011:9 both for guidance in developing their 
own municipal control systems and as a benchmark for the service providers.421 
Interviewees stated that it was also central to the monitoring of the private 
providers. An official in the central office of City L indicated that monitoring 
had shifted from examining the providers’ activities and procedures to 
studying how their systems of quality management and self-evaluation were 
designed.422 Another stated that the provision was a central tool for 
municipalities in seeking to govern the ‘soft values’ of care provision, as it 
provided a way of examining the processes and internal structure of the care 
providers.423 One official  whose work was crucial to the implementation of 
monitoring systems in a district in City L stated that the focus tended to be on 
the existence and design of the providers’ quality management systems, not on 
whether or how these systems were actually being used.424 As this evidence 
shows, explicit and systematic quality development work has become 
increasingly central to the provision of elder care. This is connected to and 
reflected in the way the private providers are governed. The requirement that 
providers have a quality management system in place is included in 94 per cent 
of all tender documents in my quantitative study, despite the fact that providers 
are already subject to this requirement directly through the National Board on 
Health and Welfare provision. 
4.2.3 Quality criteria in tender documents and contract clauses 
In order to complement the national authorities’ guidelines, the National Board 
on Health and Welfare and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions have developed a list (first published in 2007) of definitions and 
indicators of six quality areas. These indicators are intended as a structure for 
the quality criteria that municipalities apply to home care – they are, in other 
words, one of the ways in which the state has attempted to support the 
municipalities in defining and improving quality. The quality indicators have 
421 S5, S6. 
422 L2. 
423 L6. 
424 L4. 
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in turn been operationalized by the Swedish Competition Authority in their 
guide to municipalities on how to develop tender documents.425 
The quality areas are self-determination and integrity, overall approach and 
coordination, safety and security, knowledge-based activities, accessibility, 
and efficiency.426 The quality indicators play an important role in governing: 
they are listed in most of the tender documents, albeit in different forms. They 
thus serve as a good starting point for understanding the quality requirements 
listed in the tender documents. Tender documents break down the quality 
indicators into specific requirements. The Swedish Competition Authority’s 
guide seems to have been followed by most municipalities at least to some 
extent: many of the criteria suggested in the guide are found in the 
municipalities’ documents. However, there are also significant differences 
between different municipalities’ documents. The guide lists 16 distinct 
criteria. Table 2 shows that less than 10 per cent of municipalities include all 
16 requirements in their tender documents, while about 10 per cent have 
include 10 or fewer of the listed requirements. However, the table shows that 
there is, in general, a high level of adherence to the criteria suggested in the 
guide, which indicates that the guide is a useful tool for studying the regulation 
of quality in municipal tender documents.  
Table 2 Regulation of indicators 
NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
  N=107 
16 9 8 
15 17 16 
14 20 19 
13 18 17 
12 18 17 
11 15 14 
10 4 3 
9 1 1 
8 3 3 
7 2 2 
 
  
                                                 
425 Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Guide on Specification of Criteria in Procuring Home 
Care 2014’ 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/publikationer/vagledningar/vagledning_2014-
2_kravspecifikation_hemtjanst.pdf accessed 30 August 2020. 
426 National Board on Health and Welfare, ‘Indicators’ 
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/indikatorer accessed 11 May 2020. 
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The section below will discuss the criteria that are included more and less 
frequently and how they are presented. This indicates where and how the 
municipalities focus on the quality requirements they impose on the private 
providers in care choice systems. The quality indicators, and especially the 
specific criteria in the Swedish Competition Authority’s guide, are an attempt 
to standardize quality measurements nationally, and it is important to 
understand how they have been taken up and implemented by the 
municipalities in their tender documents.427  
Criteria regarding self-determination and integrity 
The first quality indicator is self-determination and integrity, defined as the 
ability of the individual to be involved in and have an influence over their care 
and the opportunity for the individual to make their own choices. The guide 
operationalizes this overarching goal as three specific criteria: the 
establishment of an individual implementation plan; a system for feedback and 
complaints; and written procedures for the good treatment of users. The 
findings are presented in table 3.  
Table 3 Regulation of indicators concerning self-determination and integrity 
INDICATOR NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
N=107 
Individual implementation plans 105 98 
System for comments/complaints 97 91 
Written procedures for good 
treatment 
7 7 
Almost all municipalities have requirements on individual implementation 
plans – plans created together with the user or a relative that define when and 
how different care activities should be carried out. It is more unusual, however, 
for municipalities to require written procedures for good treatment. In the 
interviews, officials mentioned competence and professionalism in caring for 
older users as some of the most central aspects of what they took to be high-
quality care. They also said these were some of the things most often 
complained about by users.428 Many tender documents emphasize the 
importance of the good treatment of users, but few translate this into 
monitorable requirements. Reference is often made to values and principles, 
with more or less clear criteria given for how these must be put into practice. 
427 It is important to say here that I am not concerned with whether these are the right or the 
best criteria for measuring the quality of elder care. I am simply interested in the way in 
which quality and practices of quality assessment are defined in these instruments. 
428 S4, M4, M5. 
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The criterion of good treatment may include requirements relating to non-
discrimination and the Discrimination Act and the principle of equal treatment 
in public administrative law. Even if procedures for good treatment and the 
involvement of users do not take the form of explicit requirements, tender 
documents often include references to this quality indicator. In City S, for 
example, providers are required to ‘take into account and respect the user’s 
integrity and self-determination; take note of the user’s wishes about where, 
when, how, and by whom activities should be implemented; at each occasion 
meet the user with respect, consideration, and responsiveness’.429 The way 
municipalities ensure that procedures of this kind are employed by a provider 
is often by requesting that the company provide evidence of relevant policies 
in the course of the application process. 
Criteria regarding collaboration and a holistic approach 
The second quality indicator relates to collaboration and a holistic approach. 
These are operationalized as cooperation with relevant actors, such as relatives, 
trustees, healthcare providers, and other persons and organizations relevant to 
the user. Eighty-seven per cent of the studied municipal tender documents 
require this explicitly. 
Criteria regarding safety and security 
According to the Swedish Competition Authority’s guide, the safety and 
security indicator implies that services must be provided in accordance with 
applicable regulations. The services should be transparent and predictable, and 
preventive work should be undertaken to reduce the risk of abuse, neglect, and 
physical and mental harm.430 More specifically, there must be procedures in 
place regarding users’ keys and cash, the documentation of completed actions, 
and the reporting of irregularities in accordance with Lex Sarah.431 As table 4 
shows, these criteria are all very frequently mentioned in the municipalities’ 
tenders. 
  
                                                 
429 City S Tender Document 3.10.1.3. 
430 Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Guide on Specification of Criteria in Procuring Home 
Care 2014’ 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/publikationer/vagledningar/vagledning_2014
-2_kravspecifikation_hemtjanst.pdf accessed 30 August 2020. 
431 Lex Sarah sets out a system not only for reporting problems but also for self-evaluating and 
learning from mistakes internally in the organization. See section 1.4.2. 
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Table 4 Regulation of indicators concerning safety and security 
INDICATOR NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
  N=107 
Documentation 106 99 
Lex Sarah 101 94 
Procedures for keys 99 93 
Procedures for cash 90 84 
 
Tender documents also often include general remarks about the safety and 
security of the user, as in the case of City S, whose tender document states that 
the provider should ‘act in a professional and lawful manner; prioritize staff 
and care continuity; have staff with relevant knowledge and skills; document, 
investigate, and remedy deviations, complaints, and abuses; notify the 
municipality if the user can be in need of a custodian’.432 Similar phrases can 
be found in many of the tender documents. 
Criteria regarding the skills and competence of management and staff 
The fourth quality indicator has to do with skills and competence. It includes 
requirements for the level of competence and experience required of 
management and staff and the company’s internal skills development 
strategies. Infection control procedures433 and food hygiene and nutrition 
policies are also included under this heading.  
Table 5 Regulation of indicators concerning skills and competence 
INDICATOR NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
  N=107 
Competence of head of operation 93 87 
Infection control procedures 67 63 
Skills development strategies 65 61 
Competence of staff 60 56 
Food hygiene and nutrition 34 32 
In the interviews, officials mentioned the knowledge and experience of the 
operations’ manager of the provider as a key factor in whether a care company 
could be said to provide good-quality care.434 As can be seen in table 5, almost 
90 per cent of the tender documents contain a specific requirement relating to 
the qualifications of the operations’ manager, most often that they must possess 
                                                 
432 City S Tender Document 3.10.1.1. 
433 Since 2015 there has been an administrative provision from the National Board on Health 
and Welfare, SOSFS 2015:10, regulating infection control procedures for both municipally 
provided and privately provided home care. 
434 See e.g. M1, L1, L2. 
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a relevant university degree, such as in social work or nursing, and appropriate 
professional experience. Sometimes having an assistant nurse diploma – a non-
university qualification – combined with a certain number of years of 
professional experience is sufficient.435 
Requirements relating to the skills of staff on the ground, however, differ 
greatly across the municipalities. As table 5 shows, only 56 per cent of 
municipal tender documents include competence requirements for the private 
providers’ staff. Almost half of the municipalities either have no requirements 
at all or simply include a general statement to the effect that the private 
providers should strive to employ trained and experienced staff. Some 
municipalities’ requirements are broad and general, such as in City M, whose 
tender document stipulates that ‘applicants must ensure that the business has 
sufficient staff with such skills as are necessary to ensure the user receives 
good-quality care based on the user’s individual needs’.436 While some 
municipalities require that all permanent staff have an assistant nurse diploma, 
it is more common for a municipality to require that at least 60–80 per cent 
have one. In some municipalities, the required proportion drops as low as 30–
40 per cent. Very occasionally, documents include requirements relating to the 
proportion of permanent staff in the company.  
Short-term employment and hourly paid work is quite common in the sector, 
with 27 per cent of municipal workers and 37 per cent of workers in private 
companies in these forms of employment (in 2017).437 The working conditions 
in the sector have become a topic of public debate during the coronavirus 
pandemic,438 as it has become clear that poor working conditions contributed 
to the fact that care workers were still going to work despite being ill.439 Some 
                                                 
435 Since 2019 the Health and Care Inspectorate has also examined the competence of the CEO 
and senior management as part of the authorization process for home care providers. 
436 City M tender document 5.3. 
437 Kommunal, ‘Så mycket bättre? En jämförelse av anställningsvillkor och löner i privat och 
kommunalt driven äldreomsorg’ (2018)  
<https://www.kommunal.se/sites/default/files/sa_mycket_battre_2018_webb.pdf> accessed 
30 August 2020. 
438 ‘Coronakrisen blottar brister i äldreomsorgen’ forskning.se (12 May 2020) 
<https://www.forskning.se/2020/05/12/coronakrisen-blottar-brister-i-aldreomsorgen/> 
accessed 8 July 2020. 
439 Sanna Arbman Hansing, ‘23 av 57 anställda på äldreboende gick till jobbet sjuka’ gp.se (21 
April 2020) <http://www.gp.se/1.27040356> accessed 8 July 2020. 
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have suggested that the low proportion of skilled workers in the sector has 
contributed to the high levels of infection within elder care.440  
Criteria regarding the accessibility of services 
According to the Swedish Competition Authority’s guide, the accessibility 
quality indicator has to do with information and communication. The most 
important requirement is that each user should have a contact person, someone 
who is primarily responsible for all communication with that user. The tender 
documents state that this is important in order to ensure continuity of care. The 
other requirements are that the provider should be contactable during office 
hours and that staff should wear visible ID cards.  
Table 6 Regulation of indicators concerning information and communication 
INDICATOR NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
N=107 
ID cards 97 91 
Contact person 94 88 
Phone hours 36 34 
As table 6 shows, requirements on contact persons and ID cards are common. 
The requirement that the provider should be reachable by phone during office 
hours is, however, only included in a third of municipal tender documents. 
Criteria regarding efficiency 
The last quality indicator, efficiency, is operationalized through certain 
measurable efficiency targets, which are found in only seven per cent of 
municipal tender documents. I will return to this issue in section 4.3. 
Other relevant criteria 
The tender documents vary in length and in the numbers of requirements they 
include, and some of the longer and more detailed documents contain 
requirements other than those listed above. There are certain words frequently 
used to describe the general attitude towards care that the documents expect 
providers to adopt: for instance salutogenic, rehabilitating, and active. They 
thus seek to promote a progressive view of care and a view of the older user as 
an active participant in their own care and in society. The provider may be 
440 However, there has not been any evidence of different COVID-19 mortality rates in private 
and public elder care providers. Janne Sundling, ‘Höga dödstal på äldreboenden – ett 
globalt problem’ Fokus (7 May 2020) <https://www.fokus.se/2020/05/hoga-dodstal-pa-
aldreboenden-ett-globalt-problem/> accessed 8 July 2020. 
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asked to facilitate the user’s ability to live an active life and to maintain contact 
with relatives, organizations, or other actors.441 How these goals are to be met 
and how this attitude is to be monitored are usually not specified; they are not 
operationalized into concrete requirements for the providers. 
Continuity of care is another frequently mentioned concept. It is defined in 
relation to staff, meaning that the user should usually meet the same care 
workers; in relation to time, meaning that care should normally be provided at 
the same times each day; and in relation to care activities, meaning that the 
same tasks should be carried out in the same way. When older persons 
themselves are asked to define good-quality care, continuity is frequently cited 
as a central factor,442 although individual users’ perceptions and definitions of 
continuity vary. As I will explain in section 4.3, despite the fact that continuity 
of care is measurable, only a few municipalities have set specific targets for it. 
4.2.4 The user’s role in defining quality 
Besides creating more diversity in care provision, improving the quality of care 
through increased competition in the social services sector was, as I stated 
above, a central aim behind the introduction of care choice systems. The 
preparatory works to the Act on Care Choice Systems argue that the operation 
of market forces, via users’ choices, should lead to increased quality. As I 
mentioned in chapter 1, the idea of using a voucher system to introduce 
competition and improve quality comes from neo-classical economic theory.443 
According to these theories, certain conditions must be met in order to ensure 
that the market works as intended, which in our case means that the market 
produces higher-quality care.444 The connection between quality and 
competition, as the preparatory works explain it, is that ‘consumers’ have the 
ability to choose and switch providers, which then have a need to retain their 
customers and thereby protect their revenues.445 Because ‘poor customer 
satisfaction will lead to the user or citizen choosing another provider, which 
                                                 
441 E.g. City S Tender Document 3.10.1.2. 
442 This topic has also been raised in the context of the coronavirus crisis in elder care. Some 
have asked whether high staff turnover may have contributed to the spread of the virus. 
Felicia Nordlund, ‘En sargad äldreomsorg står inför stora utmaningar’ SVT Nyheter (14 
June 2020) <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/forskaren-har-ar-aldreomsorgens-
utmaningar> accessed 8 July 2020. 
443 See section 1.1.1. 
444 Le Grand and Bartlett (n 8) 19; Glenngård (n 57) 14–15. 
445 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 94. 
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stimulates the providers to develop their activities’, freedom of choice drives 
quality improvements.446 Quality control and quality evaluation are thus 
supposed to result from individual choice, through the operation of the 
invisible hand of the market. The self-interest that is assumed to guide 
providers’ (i.e. businesses’) conduct, the profit motive, is supposed to function 
as a force that, in the aggregate, drives quality and efficiency improvements.447 
This explains one of the findings of chapter 3, that the state and the 
municipalities have focused on promoting users’ choices through systems of 
information and benchmarking. What explains this focus is not only that 
individual choice is seen as good in itself but also that an individual choice is 
seen as one of a multiplicity of choices which functions to increase the quality 
of services. In this model, the user is central to defining and improving quality. 
This issue also came up in the interviews. The officials, almost without 
exception, stated that it was not possible to maintain high-quality services 
simply through the choices of the users and the invisible hand of the market. 
They were of the impression that older persons in general did not act as 
customers and that the market was difficult for them to understand. Two 
officials described the dilemma in similar ways. 
S2: And the idea is, though, that it should be self-regulating, in fact. Of course, 
we will have some control mechanisms in place, but it’s ‘voting with your feet’ 
[that should be the effective mechanism]. But these customers or users are not 
the ones that can run 100 metres in 10 seconds, if you like. They are not easily 
mobilized … But, of course, the idea is to ‘vote with your feet’ and that those 
companies that do not measure up, they disappear. Whether it actually works 
on this quasi-market, I cannot say that, but – but if it did, we would not be 
needing such hard control mechanisms, because then it would be self-
regulated!448 
L3: The thing is – it should not be like you sometimes hear people say in this 
debate, which I can get a little annoyed at: ‘yes, but if you don’t like it you can 
move somewhere else, or if you don’t enjoy the home care service you can 
choose someone else’. Sure, that sounds good, because I mean, if I have been 
badly treated in a shop, I’ll be damned if I go there again! Then I go to another 
store and shop. That is, if I can choose – but these poor people cannot choose! 
And then we have to make sure that they do not end up in a bad situation. So it 
should not really at all actually – it should not be an option for those people 
                                                 
446 SOU 2008:15 LOV att välja - Lag Om Valfrihetssystem (n 178) 261–262. 
447 Glenngård (n 57) 26. 
448 S2. 
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who are very vulnerable, that they should have to vote with their feet, as you 
say.449 
As was shown in chapter 3, national policy documents primarily ascribe the 
low levels of active choice to problems with accessing information, but the 
interviews provided a few more hints as to the barriers to user choice. One 
interviewee said that the reason why choice is not that important to users is the 
quality of care is seen as down not to the company but to the particular worker 
providing the care. The interviewee put it as follows: 
If you talk to the older people receiving home care, they don’t really care about 
the company but about the individual people [in the company]. If it is somebody 
you don’t like, you have them do what’s necessary and then you send them on 
their way. Here it seems like too much is made of freedom of choice. It is, at 
the end of the day, the relationship between these people which is important, 
not which [provider logo] is on the clothes.450 
Another aspect of the users’ role in this context is to ensure that sufficient 
weight is attached to the ‘subjective’ dimension of the definition of quality. 
The subjective side of the definition of good quality is indirectly laid down in 
the law: the Social Services Act mentions individualization, flexibility, and 
self-determination as important aspects of care. As I mentioned earlier, a 
central idea behind care choice systems, as both the preparatory works451 and 
many municipal documents state, is that the users’ definition of quality should 
be valued more highly than any professionally or politically defined idea of 
good-quality care. This is supposed to come about both through choice and 
through voice, both of which are meant to help foster a user-oriented 
perspective in the delivery of services. As one administrator described it: ‘the 
provider and the staff, together with the user receiving the help, should agree 
on the “how”. That is how they should decide how the activities should be 
carried out, and at what time, and so on.’452 
As the inquiry prior to the Act on Care Choice Systems pointed out, the user’s 
basis for assessing services might differ from what is valued by professionals, 
and the individual user’s preferences will not necessarily take the collective 
good into account. Therefore, quality must also be measured against 
                                                 
449 L3. 
450 M1. 
451 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 54. 
452 M1. 
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requirements insisted upon by the municipality.453 This tension was recognized 
by the interviewees. When users switch from a provider, this may signal to the 
municipality that it should review the quality of that provider. According to the 
municipal officials, however, the fact that users were switching from a 
particular provider would not be enough to lead them to review the quality of 
the service it provides, since the professionals’ definition of quality, which 
involves the question of whether laws, regulations, and procedures are being 
followed, may be very different from the users’ definitions.454 One 
administrator pinpointed the tension created by the care choice system:  
So we could have our opinion, one idea of quality, and then the user can have 
a different opinion and be happy anyway. It may be that they arrive on time and 
that it is always Linda who sees them. But that might not be – we might have 
higher standards.455 
The tension also arises from the fact that, when administrators evaluate the 
providers, they examine aspects other than simply how the service in the user’s 
home is provided. Whether they are good employers and how they handle 
documentation, confidentiality, and other such procedures might not directly 
affect the user, but from the more legalistic perspective of the administrations 
these issues are very important. The following excerpt from an interview 
further demonstrates the interviewees’ doubts about the effectiveness of choice 
in the system. 
Interviewer: So, the quality is ensured partly through the switching of 
providers? 
L1: No, but I don’t think it actually is. I find that point about quality very hard. 
I mean, the customer could be very satisfied with this person, but then the 
company can be –  lousy, as an employer and all the rest of it. But they are 
happy with this one person … 
Interviewer: So the customers’ experiences of quality do not have a lot to do 
with how you – which providers you kick out of the system? 
L1: No, they actually don’t. It could even be that the customers get hugely upset 
because we close down the company. 
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After this exchange, she described another situation she had experienced, a 
case involving fraud from which both the provider and the user were 
benefiting. A similar case was the subject of a significant scandal in another 
municipality. In a situation in which the customers are benefiting financially 
or are dependent on the relationship with the provider, such as when the 
company is paying the user’s municipal fees for them – an example brought 
up in the interview – the quality of the services is not the user’s main 
concern.456 A related type of situation was also brought up by an official from 
another municipality, who claimed that the reason most users switched 
providers was that the municipality’s contract with the user’s provider had 
been terminated and that such users often seemed to move to similar providers, 
smaller companies who were ‘not really following the municipality’s rules’. 
Some users have in this way been forced to change providers several times, 
because the contracts with their providers keep being terminated. According to 
the interviewee, this is the main reason that users change providers within the 
care choice system: ‘otherwise [there is] no particular swapping, really’.457 
From the above, we can conclude that, despite the aims of the legislation, the 
users’ role in defining quality is limited, both because of the low levels of 
active user choice and because the administrators’ broader perspectives on 
what counts as a good-quality service take precedence over the individuals’. 
4.3 The monitorability and measurability of quality 
criteria 
The extent to which requirements set out in contractual clauses are monitorable 
affects the extent to which the municipality is able to respond to defective 
services with sanctions, and this is particularly important when it comes to a 
municipality’s ability to govern quality. As will be seen in chapter 5, the 
officials view the contract as of crucial importance: essential to providing the 
framework within which services are provided and the basis for governing 
quality. However, as the preparatory works to the Act on Care Choice Systems 
point out, under EU public procurement regulations, requirements imposed on 
private providers must also be monitorable.458 This section discusses the extent 
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to which the criteria in the tender documents are in fact monitorable and in 
what way they may be monitored. Connected to this issue is the question of the 
degree to which the criteria may be measured, and in what way they may be 
measured (whether quantitatively or by some other means), as well as the 
matter of the difficulties and possible effects of focusing governing on 
monitorable and measurable criteria.  
To understand the results of my study, it is valuable to look first at those of 
Winblad et al., who found that 44 per cent of the requirements in the tender 
documents were not monitorable at all, while 49 per cent were monitorable but 
not measurable.459 Only seven per cent were both measurable and monitorable. 
There were also substantial differences between different types of quality 
measures. Requirements relating to organizational structures were the most 
likely to be measurable, while requirements regarding outcomes were the least 
likely. Winblad et al.’s study also found that 88 per cent of the listed 
requirements were connected to the quality of processes (the ‘how’), 12 per 
cent to organizational structures, and only one per cent to the quality of 
outcomes. The focus of the municipalities’ requirements is generally how the 
providers function rather than the results the providers are expected to 
achieve.460 
My quantitative study of the tender documents complements and adds further 
detail to Winblad et al.’s results. What is particularly notable in my quantitative 
study is the way the criteria in the tenders are structured so as to prioritize 
certain kinds of quality measurements. As mentioned in 4.2.3, less than 10 per 
cent of municipalities have a measurable requirement, a specific target to be 
met by the provider, relating to results. The targets in the municipal documents 
that I have studied are of two kinds: they refer either to a measurement of 
continuity of care or to the results of the national user survey. The targets for 
continuity of care refer to the number of different people visiting the older 
person within a certain time period, for instance a maximum of 10 in 14 days.461 
Targets relating to the results of the user survey refer to levels of consumer 
satisfaction, either overall or in relation to specific aspects of the service. For 
example, the tender documents may state that ‘at least 95 per cent of the users 
and relatives should be satisfied with the treatment’462 or that ‘if less than 80 
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per cent of the provider’s survey responses are positive, an action plan needs 
to be presented’.463  
The results of my interviews, parts of which focused on how the requirements 
in the tender documents were chosen, go some way to explaining these 
findings. Some interviewees highlighted the potential difficulties created by 
the focus on monitorability in the governing of quality. Officials said the 
question of monitorability was central to the way the tender documents were 
formulated and that the tender documents and contracts played a crucial role 
in the monitoring process.464 L6 discussed the relationship between the contract 
and the monitoring of the quality of the services provided. 
You could have, no matter how good a contract – if you don’t follow up or 
control it, the contract is not worth anything, so it is very important to monitor, 
and what you write in the contract is something that you actually must be able 
to monitor and so forth, so that it is not just there for show and then you don’t 
know how to control it. When you look at these terms, you have to know that 
they are possible to follow up on and that you actually have the ability to do so 
too.465 
At the same time, the list of requirements in the contract is seen as having clear 
limitations as a monitoring tool. According to officials, the central problem is 
that it is difficult to standardize and define the ‘soft values’ of care in a way 
which can be fit into the form of a contract. In the interviews, the difficulty of 
formulating, monitoring, and enforcing ‘soft values’ was a central topic. The 
‘fuzziness’ of the concept of good-quality care, as one official put it, is hard to 
capture in a contract clause.466 The issue seems to be that, in the home care 
sector, where good relationships are central, it is particularly difficult to 
formulate monitorable quality requirements.  
Unlike in healthcare, in elder care there are few agreed standards of quality, 
and this makes it much harder to find precise wordings or definitions of quality 
for use in the tender documents, leaving the municipalities to develop them 
without the benefit of nationally agreed standards.467 One official said that, 
compared to other social services, he found the home care service for older 
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people to be ‘more like a piece of soap. It slips away. It is very hard to get a 
grip on.’468 As such, he said, it was hard to regulate and monitor. 
One official argued that the contract could be a more effective tool but that the 
municipalities were too cautious about setting clear quality criteria or were 
unaware of methods for doing so. She also compared this situation with that in 
healthcare, where standards are much more clearly defined and regulated. 
According to her, elder care could function according to similar standards. 
We should be able to say that these theories, these working methods, should be 
pursued, to reach the goal of self-determination, for example. If we then meet a 
provider and they don’t work according to these theories, then we should be 
able to dismiss them if we want to! … If we see that, here, they don’t work 
according to the salutogenic model – yes, but isn’t that grounds for being 
questioned?469  
The attempt to define this slippery concept of quality in terms of measurable 
criteria creates problems for the monitoring system. Social services staff are 
used to adopting a holistic view of services, and they will, through their 
collective experience, form an overall impression of the quality of a certain 
provider’s service, but they then need to relate this impression to the aspects 
that are covered by the contract.  
You form a lot of impressions. You are out and meet staff and managers and 
you review documentation and that kind of information, and you get an 
impression of the operations, of the whole picture, in some way, whether it is 
functioning well or not, and so forth. It is an art to go from that impression and 
everything to a report that must relate to the contract.470  
It is important to note that the need for requirements to be monitorable also 
shapes how quality is defined in the tender documents. One administrator 
captured this well: 
We’ve included requirements that we know for certain can be monitored. So 
‘person-centred care’ comes to equal the existence of care implementation 
plans. And then we’ve gone out and said that everyone should have approved 
implementation plans but that that is perhaps not what actually should be 
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followed up on. Rather it should be what the user actually thinks about the 
quality, and so on.471 
As this implies, definitions of quality in terms of broader values, such as 
‘person-centred care’, must be broken down and operationalized in ways that 
can be captured in the tender documents and contracts, and hence are possible 
to monitor. On the other hand, as the descriptions above – and Winblad et al.’s 
findings – show, there is a lack of monitorable requirements in these 
documents. There thus seems to be a conflict between the aim of governing the 
‘soft’ aspects of quality and the mechanisms of governing made possible by 
contracts and contract monitoring. 
4.4 Changes in practices of quality assessment within 
the municipalities 
Even though the preparatory works to the original act do not discuss the aim 
of enhancing the quality and efficiency of the municipal service providers, 
several of the officials suggested that the reforms had had this effect. This issue 
was discussed, however, in the government inquiry into care choice systems in 
2014. The report states that most municipal administrators surveyed were of 
the opinion that the implementation of the care choice system had led to quality 
improvements in the municipal delivery of services. The report states that there 
seemed to be an increased ‘awareness’ of quality issues within the 
municipalities.472 
This fits well with the findings of Brandt’s study of care choice systems in 
Sweden and Finland. A majority of the municipal administrators responding to 
his survey said that the working methods within the municipal operations had 
changed as a result of the introduction of care choice systems within elder care: 
72 per cent of the Swedish municipal administrators working within social 
services agreed with the statement ‘we are learning to develop our own 
operations by comparing ourselves to private providers’, and 58 per cent 
agreed that ‘we are changing our own service structure to adjust to the 
competition from outside’.473  
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The results of my interviews deepen our understanding of the kinds of changes 
brought about by the introduction of care choice systems. One official said that 
the process of introducing the care choice system meant that the municipal 
organization had had to make a list of quality criteria as a reference point for 
the development of the contract. This provided a new perspective on the 
municipality’s own operations that had not been appreciated before, and it 
changed their ways of thinking about how to specify and define quality in 
measurable ways.474  
Interviewer: So you agree with one another that the care choice system has 
influenced the municipal delivery of care? 
S3: Positively, yes.  
Interviewer: Would you like to develop that? In which way? 
S4: Yes, but it is kind of like my colleague says, that you have to stop and think: 
what do we offer and what are the requirements that we place on our private 
providers? And then, what should we ask of ourselves? What is our minimum 
level? Because we must bear in mind that we – that the demands we put on 
others, we must of course also ask of ourselves. 
The contract was described as a good benchmark or measuring tool for 
assessing the municipal delivery of services.475 The need to detail the various 
tasks involved in a service also brings with it a more comprehensive 
understanding of costs, which makes it possible to streamline the delivery of 
services in the same way as the private providers do.476  
Interviewer: Maybe this question is hard to answer, but – what is the difference 
in the internal relationship to the municipal provider before and after the 
introduction of the care choice system? We have touched upon it, but would 
you like to elaborate? 
S4: Well, I just remember, because then I was working on the ground as a 
physiotherapist, and I remember that when we were to introduce care choice, 
then all of a sudden you started to make specifications of requirements, that is, 
on what you were doing in your own activities. And that had not been done 
before, and that was quite interesting. Then you started to think along these 
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lines: for us to be able to set requirements for the [private providers], we need 
to figure out first – what demands do we place on ourselves?  
S6: What do we actually do? 
S4: What are we doing? Exactly! What do we do? What are we offering?  
Interviewer: But how did the governing work before, when that was not 
happening? Was it more about simply trusting the professionals? An unspoken 
confidence? How would you express it?  
S4: Yes, exactly. That is how it was, yes. 
The need to specify requirements led to a kind of standardization: increasingly, 
everyone started to work in the same way. Before the introduction of care 
choice, municipal staff were mostly governed through an implicit trust, which 
also meant  
that not everyone does the same. That one home care group could have a routine 
on one thing and someone else another. What help you got could look very 
different depending on where you lived within the city. But now that it all has 
been become clearer – I think it has been tightened up as well.477 
This official went on to describe the influence the provision on systematic 
quality management had exerted on the municipalities’ work, leading it to 
standardize its quality development procedures. 
I think that the SOSFS, when it came in in 2011, the one about quality 
management systems, it contributed to the fact that all municipalities, 
regardless of whether you have many or a few care choice providers, have been 
forced to think of and have a process around different things. It has contributed 
to more quality thinking and so – before, there was maybe more confidence in 
the profession than there is now.478 
This statement accords with a more general development described by a long-
serving official from another municipality. She said that the provision of care 
nowadays is governed by far stricter requirements in general – on 
documentation, technical systems, and security. The focus on monitoring and 
evaluation had also increased over time, she said, a development which she 
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believed had been driven by the increasing use of contracts as a tool within the 
system.479 
Interviewees also described the competition brought about by the introduction 
of care choice systems as having ‘put pressure’480 on the municipalities 
themselves by providing incentives and ideas for change. They spoke about 
developing ‘a concept’481 of the municipality’s operations, as though the 
municipal provider were a private company presenting its business 
proposition. Within this discourse, the user is more often referred to as a 
‘customer’. Officials said that thinking of the recipient as a customer changed 
the municipalities’ approach and attitude towards the care user. The 
municipalities increasingly have to start thinking about the service they 
provide in the language of business. This shift goes hand in hand with the 
introduction of competition in the system. Through the ‘consumerization’ of 
care users, another view of flexibility becomes apparent. If the rule is that ‘the 
customer decides’, subjective views of quality and the individualization of 
services become increasingly important. As one official pointed out, there is a 
tension between this way of seeing service provision and the more legalistic 
and formal administrative processes normally carried out by municipal 
administrations, with their needs-testing and formal decision-making. That 
said, she thought the development of the care choice system, and the attendant 
consumerization of care users, was a positive step.482 
4.5 Balancing conflicting missions 
4.5.1 Blocking loopholes and handling fraud 
One obvious internal conflict in the role of the municipalities is that between 
the aim of ensuring that services provided are of high quality and that of 
promoting diversity in service delivery. A recurring issue in the interviews was 
how municipalities handled providers who did not meet the quality 
requirements, or were even fraudulent. One issue with more business-friendly 
regulations, as the officials saw it, is that these provide incentives for 
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companies to ‘nudge down the level of quality if it means that you can earn 
more’.483 As one official pointed out, it was relatively easy for rogue 
companies to make money in rather unregulated sectors or in sectors where 
monitoring was not efficient enough. She expressed her view of the situation 
bluntly: 
It is like that, unfortunately, when you have – what to say –  when you have a 
private market, then that’s the case. And the welfare system in Sweden is 
unique, and there’s definitely a lot of cheating and fraud in it, unfortunately! … 
So we try to keep up, but it’s not that easy. I am completely convinced that we 
are being cheated, in several places. However, we are trying to do something 
about it.484 
When the officials were asked to explain why they found it hard to keep out 
the more unscrupulous private providers, they pointed to the problems raised 
by the need to govern through tenders and contracts. One such problem is that 
it is difficult to define quality in a monitorable way. This, in turn, creates a 
structure within which more unscrupulous companies can flourish. Several 
administrators highlighted the fact that it can be hard to use contractual 
requirements to deny entry to the system to unsuitable companies, as a 
company may have all the formalities in place but have flaws or display 
incompetence in areas that are not directly captured by the specified 
requirements. The Act on Care Choice Systems states that municipalities have 
to accept providers who meet the requirements in the act and tender 
documents.485 There might thus be a conflict between the aim of upholding 
standards of quality and this legal demand to accept all companies that formally 
meet the requirements. One official said that she had met aspiring providers 
who fulfilled all the formal requirements but seemed not to be knowledgeable 
about basic regulations or did ‘not seem to know what they [were] talking 
about’. In those situations, she said, ‘it is hard for us to do anything about it’.486 
As another put it: 
As long as they meet the requirements in the regulation, we cannot say that they 
are not entitled to establish their business here. We here [at the administration] 
can think ‘hmm, that is not going to work’, or ‘that is not okay’, or ‘you don’t 
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know what you are talking about’, but they still have fulfilled what is required 
of them, even if they do not understand the implications of it.487 
A third interviewee, a leading official in City L, described the dilemma the 
administration faced when trying to use the quality requirements to keep rogue 
companies out: 
The problem is that there are companies that can describe very well that they 
can – that they will manage it. So it looks good on paper, but then when they 
get started, we notice during the monitoring that it just doesn’t work, and then 
it becomes difficult. And that is why you have to raise the bar to get in, in some 
way. And I personally think that a main thing should be the driving motivation, 
the idea of why you want to be in the sector. Why are you starting an elder care 
company in the first place? And that is a very relevant question, because many 
of those who have been interested [in getting in] and still are or are already in 
– they have taxi companies; they can have beauty – what’s the name? –
parlours. I also had one who had a vehicle service station and – it really can be
– and if you have three, four of these business areas, then it is pretty relevant to
ask, ‘why should you be in elder care?’488
However, it is difficult to get at these motivations simply on the basis of the 
contract. Another problem officials mentioned was that certain shortcomings 
in service provision, things which are clearly inappropriate, are hard to tackle 
if not regulated in the contract beforehand. Similarly, it is difficult to foresee 
all possible situations and regulate them ex ante through a service contract. It 
is, in other words, difficult to close all the possible ‘loopholes’ that a provider 
might find in a contract, and these loopholes might thus be exploited by 
unscrupulous providers: 
It is also one – how should I put it? – an area in which you can pretty quickly 
make big money. The turnover is quite large, and if you are a serious provider, 
there is no excessive compensation, but if you find loopholes, this may be quite 
a large number. So I guess it is – well, it is not directly connected to care choice 
as a system, but it is linked to – yes, you open yourself up to it, you might say.489 
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This highlights a central tension: to get rid of the loopholes, the regulation 
would need to be so detailed that it would be difficult for providers to enter the 
system at all. This dilemma will be discussed in the next section. 
4.5.2 Regulation versus innovation 
As the above makes clear, the priorities of the Social Services Act and the Act 
on Care Choice Systems can be seen to produce a regulatory conflict, where 
the responsibility to uphold quality standards comes into conflict with the 
responsibility to foster ‘innovation’ in the care choice system and to provide 
‘flexibility’ for the private care companies. The tension between the objectives 
set out in the Act on Care Choice Systems and those in the Social Services Act 
relates particularly to the quality requirements that may be stated in the 
contracts. Even as municipalities aim to encourage diversity and innovation, to 
create markets and support (especially small) businesses, there is a public 
regulation which must be adhered to, through the use of tenders and contracts. 
Yet, if these contractual requirements are too onerous, the growth of the market 
will be constrained. One official summed up the dilemma in the following way: 
‘you cannot raise the quality there and make it that fewer are able to get in, 
because then – that’s not within the meaning of the Act on Care Choice 
Systems’.490  
This conflict becomes central to the municipal administration of elder care, 
particularly because of the existence of unscrupulous and fraudulent providers 
in the system, and it affects the form and outcomes of care choice systems. 
Officials described the conflict as one between regulation and innovation. The 
positive aspect of care choice systems is that they allow new ideas and 
providers into the field. This was described by one of the officials in the 
following way: 
You get creative, innovative ideas into the sector. That is the good thing, and 
that is the thought behind the care choice system: that the procurement should 
not be so detailed, but it should allow space for the entrepreneur or provider to 
bring their innovative ideas and find solutions. There should be clear objectives 
but not a specified way there.491 
Compared to traditional public procurement, a care choice system is also, 
depending on how the contracts are constructed, relatively easy to adapt. The 
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ability to easily change the requirements is seen as an advantage that the Act 
on Care Choice Systems has over traditional procurement under the Public 
Procurement Act. However, officials find that this is difficult in practice. 
Contracts within care choice systems do not in fact include many fewer 
requirements than those used in traditional public procurement. The report by 
Winblad et al. for the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, 
mentioned above, shows that the requirements in tender documents in care 
choice systems are often as many and as extensive as in traditional public 
procurement.492 One official said she had been surprised when she started 
working on the care choice system in City S. She had previously worked with 
traditional public procurement and thought that the Act on Care Choice 
Systems would provide much more freedom. Instead, she found the list of 
specifications very detailed. ‘Personally, I think that we can ease up on certain 
things, partly because it should be easier to apply and not –  because if you are 
presented with this as a small company you could be – it can scare you 
away.’493  
One explanation for the stringency of the requirements is that officials consider 
the provision of elder care to be governed by quite strict public regulations to 
which the requirements in the tender must adhere. The regulations, especially 
the provisions and guidelines from the National Board on Health and Welfare, 
also to some degree specify how services should be provided – from rules on 
giving out medicine, to serving food, to how staff should dress.494 These 
aspects of service provision are regulated in detail in the provisions from the 
National Board on Health and Welfare, and also often through local guidelines. 
The stringency of the requirements may also be explained in terms of the fact 
that the municipality has a responsibility to ensure that privately delivered 
services are of a certain level of quality. Official M5 pointed out that securing 
quality required distinct and effective standards to be set out in the contract, as 
well as an effective monitoring process.495  
But private providers find these regulations difficult to understand. Officials 
confront the conflict between regulation and innovation in some of their 
dealings with providers. According to several officials, some of the private 
providers struggle to understand the fact that they have to work within a 
regulated framework when providing home care, for instance that they must 
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adhere to certain formalities when they give out medicine or perform other 
healthcare tasks.496 Many of the interviewees said that certain companies, 
especially the smaller ones, were simply unprepared for dealing with the vast 
numbers of regulations pertaining to the elder care sector. While the large care 
companies often have administrators and even lawyers, and more experience 
of complying with regulations, smaller companies find it difficult to keep up 
with laws and regulations around issues such as documentation, delegation of 
healthcare tasks, confidentiality, treatment issues, etc.497 According to the 
interviewees, the companies sometimes expressed a lack of understanding 
about why they had to comply with the requirements of a public-law 
framework. One official even went as far as to state that many of the companies 
showed ‘no respect’ for the legal regulations that govern elder care.498 
Sometimes the providers want to provide more services than the municipal 
decision has determined the older user has a right to receive.499 ‘And what is 
difficult then is that the provider does not understand the issue, but rather finds 
us bureaucratic, complicated, and an obstacle to their entrepreneurship. They 
don’t see these differences; they haven’t thought that way.’500 This problem 
seems to come up most often with the smaller companies, whereas the larger 
companies, which the officials see as more ‘serious’, may welcome stricter 
regulation because they want compete with other serious actors, as one 
administrator put it.501  
In City M, stricter regulation and stringent monitoring led to some contracts 
being terminated, with the number of private providers declining from about 
20 when they started monitor more strictly a few years back to about 15 today. 
A leading official from City M said there were companies that had complained 
about the extent of the requirements, especially those relating to digital 
systems, documentation, and technology, which were seen as creating a barrier 
to new market entrants. City M has gone from ‘leaving very, very much to the 
providers, towards managing more, while still, as I’ve said, trying to retain the 
differences, because there is no point in a care choice system if everything is 
exactly the same’.502  
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However, the official said, because of the rules and regulations governing the 
sector, the scope for developing and changing services ‘is not extremely large’. 
This leads to a lot of discussion with certain companies, for example regarding 
how generous they can be in providing social activities for older persons. 
‘There should be room for some type of variation and some type of freedom to 
build your own competence and your own approach, and so on. But, as I said, 
it is limited on account of the specific conditions and what you need to adhere 
to.’503 
There also seems to be a widely shared wish across the municipalities to keep 
control over the services provided in order to ensure quality and limit fraud. 
Some of the more detailed tender documents even specify how different care 
tasks are to be carried out in order to deliver quality care. City S’s tender 
document is one such example. The document lists and defines different care 
tasks in detail: for instance hygiene, oral hygiene, dressing, shower and body 
care, diet and meal support, physical activation, and assistance for self-care.504 
Such specific requirements, however, limit the extent to which services can 
actually be changed and developed. One administrator stated that the ability of 
private providers to actually develop their services is clearly limited by the fact 
that they are providing services within a very regulated sphere. ‘They have a 
high level of trust from us, but it is still supposed to be the case that home care 
should be provided based on the Social Services Act and the guidelines in [City 
M]. So there are definitely limits to what you can offer.’505 
The need to strictly regulate the elder care sector thus conflicts with the aim of 
supporting businesses (see section 3.4.3). One official described experiencing 
this conflict when dealing with small companies which she believed, despite 
the administration’s goal of supporting small businesses, might not really be 
able to deliver the level of quality that was required. It is hard to get at the 
problem, as long as the company meet the demands set up in law and the 
municipality’s list of requirements.506 That creates a situation in which the 
municipality itself cannot live up to its responsibility regarding the quality of 
services. The end result of the strict regulation and detailed governing of the 
                                                 
503 M5. 
504 For example, diet and meal support is defined in the following way: ‘The provider must be 
able to provide the user with help and support for main meal, breakfast, snacks, and supper. 
For example, with heating food, setting the table and washing the dishes. In addition, the 
provider must be able to assist the user in eating and be available during the meal to 
motivate and support the user.’ (City S Tender Document 3.5). 
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home care sector, from the national level as well as the municipal level, is less 
diversity in the sector and higher barriers to new entrants. Disappointment over 
this difficult dilemma from the political side was captured in a remark from a 
municipal councillor for elder care at the City L branch meeting: 
CL: I think it would be great if we had greater diversity among the private 
providers. Really, there are a lot of very similar profiles, if you look at the big 
picture. Really, it is not like we have a lot of linguistic diversity or special – I 
mean if you compare it to kindergartens, which often have pedagogical 
profiling and such things, here everyone is very similar, which is really 
unfortunate in a way.507 
The conflict discussed in this section was a recurring theme in the interviews. 
One administrator described it as a catch-22: either you lock small and newly 
established businesses out of the market and risk creating an oligopoly, or you 
have a more open policy and risk getting stuck with poor providers.  
It is a balancing act. I mean, you could raise the demands on the companies, but 
if you do so suddenly you have tied up the market. Several of the providers that 
we have that are – they would never have existed if it wasn’t done more openly 
from the start, so it is a bit of a catch-22, how to do this. 
The same administrator vividly described this balancing act through a 
metaphor of different games. 
Another alternative is to play ‘beggar-my-neighbour’, and be left with seven 
big dragons in the whole care market in [City L], or you keep it pretty free, and 
if you’re open, you are at risk at being left with the ‘Black Peter’, the bad 
card.508 
The ultimate source of this catch-22 is the conflict created by the need to ensure 
quality by insisting on certain requirements in policies, tenders, and contracts, 
which leads public authorities to find more streamlined, standardized, and 
detailed ways of defining and governing quality. 
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4.6 Results 
The development of care choice systems takes place within a particular 
context. This is often described as a context in which the ideas of New Public 
Management have become increasingly central, where practices of quality 
assessment have become more explicit and more focused on measurement. But 
this context also includes the voices of those critical of these tendencies – in 
Sweden, for example, the Trust Delegation. This chapter asked how the 
implementation of care choice systems affects the municipal authorities’ 
governing of quality issues and whether any such effects might be part of a 
longer-term trend towards particular ways of governing quality. My empirical 
research shows that the attempts to define and monitor quality are central to 
the work carried out by the administrations. Defining and operationalizing 
quality are seen as difficult, but these processes are also viewed in a positive 
light, since they lead to a focus on quality improvement in municipal elder 
care. The need to define quality in measurable and quantifiable ways within 
care choice systems has knock-on effects for the care provided by the 
municipalities. Through the ways of operationalizing quality indicators 
provided by national policy instruments and tender documents, services 
become more specified, detailed, and standardized. 
My study of the tender documents and contracts reveals that they contain a 
great level of detail. According to the Trust Delegation’s inquiry, there has 
been an increasing focus on detailed regulation in the welfare sector as a whole, 
and the main reason for this is the contracting out of services. The results of 
my empirical investigations also reveal a connection between levels of 
regulation and instances of fraud, where providers abuse loopholes in the 
contracts to lower quality. As the Trust Delegation states, a common response 
of municipal administrations in such cases is to advocate even more precise 
specifications and more detailed control in public procurement.509  
When studying the question of the governing of quality in care choice systems, 
the logic that becomes visible is one which centres around standardization, 
streamlining, measurement, and evaluation. Even in the preparatory works to 
the Social Services Act in the 1990s, which introduced practices of quality 
assessment into social services, there was already an increased focus on 
509 SOU 2018:47 Med tillit växer handlingsutrymmet: tillitsbaserad styrning och ledning av 
välfärdssektorn (n 130) 105–106. 
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measurement and evaluation in social services. Care choice systems strengthen 
this logic.  
What this chapter has also shown is that from the detailed specification of tasks 
required by the use of contracts a detailed form of technical monitoring has 
followed. The focus on monitoring promoted by care choice systems leads to 
increasing standardization and increased measurement. This is an aspect of the 
reform the importance of which must be underscored. All of these tendencies 
produced by the introduction of care choice systems have the effect of 
increasing bureaucracy. Another implication of these systems is that, even 
though the purpose of creating these markets and supporting (especially small) 
providers is to promote diversity, the logics of standardization and streamlining 
work in the opposite direction. 
How is quality defined within the care choice systems? 
A first question here regards where the definitions of quality relevant to care 
choice systems are to be found. They are not explicitly provided in the 
legislation but are left to national authorities and municipalities. Unlike related 
public services such as healthcare, which often makes use of highly specific 
quality standards, the definition of what constitutes quality in elder care is left 
relatively open by national policy documents: it mostly consists of values and 
rules governing certain processes, whether more concrete ones, such as basic 
hygiene, or more overarching ones, such as quality development and internal 
learning.  
The National Board on Health and Welfare has issued several relevant 
regulatory documents, and other state agencies, such as the National Agency 
for Public Procurement, also issue guidelines and provide support for 
municipalities with care choice systems. The introduction of a new national 
agency, the Health and Care Inspectorate, in 2013 was also motivated by a 
desire to increase the level of monitoring of the sector from central 
government. The introduction, in 2019, of the authorization requirements for 
providers of elder care further underlined that tendency. Relatedly, there has 
been an increased use of national guidelines and provisions by the National 
Board on Health and Welfare for the area of elder care, many of which were 
written after the Act on Care Choice Systems came into force. One important 
national policy document which governs the municipalities’ practices of 
quality assessment is the list of quality indicators developed by the National 
Board on Health and Welfare and the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions. The quality indicators have in turn been 
operationalized for use by those administering care choice systems in a policy 
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document issued by the Swedish Competition Authority. These quality 
indicators are intended as a way of streamlining definitions of quality 
nationally, especially the definitions employed by municipalities with care 
choice systems. Hence, although the legislation leaves much leeway for 
municipalities to produce their own interpretations of quality, the national 
policy documents limit this freedom somewhat. It appears as though this is the 
result of the growing importance of private interests in the sector and the high-
profile scandals of the last decade, which have led to political pressure to 
govern the sector more stringently, but an investigation of this is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
A second question regards who should be given the role of determining 
definitions of quality. A central purpose of the introduction of care choice 
systems was to increase the influence of users over services, the idea being that 
care users, as customers, would favour companies that provide good-quality 
care and that this would drive quality competition between different service 
providers. My empirical research shows that there is evidence to suggest that 
public providers too have come to adopt a similar market-oriented 
understanding of quality, using many of the same tools and discourses as 
private providers. However, as this510 and other studies have shown, choice is 
not an effective tool for increasing the quality of services. The preparatory 
works suggest an image of the user, and of the sorts of choices that are 
important to users, that is not confirmed by the experiences of the municipal 
officials. Because municipalities are still responsible for the quality of the 
services provided, the recognition that choices are few and limited has led 
municipal administrations to more actively monitor and control the private 
delivery of services. 
Through care choice systems, with their focus on benchmarking through the 
user survey, the Elder Guide, and Open Comparison, the definition of quality 
has also become a matter of user satisfaction. The definition of quality created 
through this quasi-market differs from the definition employed by municipal 
administrations, which focuses rather on whether regulations and standards are 
being adhered to and is based on professional judgements of what constitutes 
quality in elder care. Because the criteria that are measured become ever more 
central to the service provided, the logic of benchmarking steers the governing 
rationality in a certain direction. When thinking about Open Comparison’s role 
in the care choice system, it is important to note that the data collected is based 
largely on subjective factors rather than on the formal aspects of a service. The 
510 See section 4.2.4. 
163 
measurements do not relate to organizational factors such as staff ratios or staff 
competence. The fact that so much weight is given to subjective experiences 
marks a step away from the professional definition of quality. The significant 
impact of the user survey results and the comparison mechanism, despite the 
criticisms these tools have come in for from several organizations and 
researchers, is an expression of this trend. The importance accorded to 
subjective experiences might be seen as empowering the users, but it also 
facilitates the marketization of services and the consumerization of users. 
Instead of being able to trust that the care given complies with professional 
standards, is high quality, and is equal, as one might expect of public services 
run on universalist lines, each user is supposed to look to other users’ 
experiences of and levels of satisfaction with particular service providers. At 
the same time, service providers are expected to compete on the basis of user 
satisfaction rates rather than other standards of quality.  
This account of developments accords with that provided by Susan Ilcan, who 
states that benchmarking sets up a learning and feedback system that is based 
on precisely the aspects measured by the benchmarks. Her study shows that 
‘rendering something “benchmarkable” shapes the practices that are to be 
benchmarked’, which marginalizes established knowledge and expertise.511 
Wendy Brown makes a similar point, arguing that benchmarking tends to lead 
to a ‘mission drift’, a reorientation or recalibration of the goals of an activity 
or an organization.512 Such a reorientation may be seen in the importance 
accorded to the user surveys and Elder Guide by the municipalities, which has 
the effect that both private and municipal provision come to be increasingly 
directed towards the measurements contained in the guide. Benchmarking 
systems which are digitalized, such as throught the Elder Guide, also bring 
technical systems into play, as Peter Triantafillou points out, as they allow the 
performance of the providers to be scrutinized not only by their superiors (in 
this case municipal officials and politicians) but also by citizens. The citizens 
are in turn supposed to act as informed and critical customers who make active 
use of digital and other information systems and take responsibility for their 
own situations.513 In a similar vein, Moberg, whose dissertation studies some 
of the implications of the introduction of care choice systems for governing, 
concludes that 
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it can be argued that the organizational logic behind the Swedish eldercare 
sector was, up until 1990, based on the assumption that public regulation and 
provision, in combination with trust in the discretion of eldercare workers, were 
the best means to ensure that eldercare services of high quality were available 
to all citizens in need of them. In this light, the introduction of marketization 
reforms marks a turning point in the organization and governance structures of 
Swedish eldercare. … [T]he sector has come to rely more on the market logic 
in the sense that the wishes and demands of the service users should have more 
impact when steering the supply and quality of publicly funded eldercare.514 
Hence, even though users exert only a limited influence on services through 
their choices, there has still been a move away from trusting the professionals 
and towards benchmarking based on user satisfaction as the definition of 
quality. At the same time, the municipalities still have the responsibility to 
ensure the services provided are of high quality, and they try to achieve this 
through the use of tender documents as governing instruments.  
What are the effects of these new ways of defining quality? My analysis of the 
tender documents suggests that concrete, formal criteria – such as the 
requirement to produce individual care implementation plans, to provide 
assigned contact persons, to have procedures in place for handling users’ keys, 
to display staff ID cards, and to have procedures for documentation and 
reporting errors and risks (according to Lex Sarah515) – are all frequently 
included. These criteria are easy to fulfil, and it is easy to provide evidence that 
they have been fulfilled. More demanding requirements, such as having a 
skilled workforce and implementing knowledge-based written procedures, are 
seldom included in the tender documents. Skilled management is valued more 
highly and regulated more strictly than a skilled workforce ‘on the ground’. 
Staff continuity, which care users often state is a value of central importance 
for them, is only regulated in a handful of municipalities.  
The provision issued by the National Board on Health and Welfare regarding 
systematic quality management seems to have influenced the governing of care 
choice systems, bringing processes of quality assurance into providers’ 
operations. These quality management systems are focused on implementing 
procedures to plan, monitor, and evaluate services, thereby also contributing 
to the focus on measurement and evaluation. In the context of care choice 
systems, the significance of quality management systems is that they ensure 
that providers have self-management systems in place, and these are in turn 
514 Moberg (n 55) 25–27. 
515 See section 1.4.2. 
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governed by public officials. Furthermore, many tender documents include key 
words that are intended to denote the kind of quality that providers should 
strive to achieve, words such as ‘salutogenic’ and ‘rehabilitating’. These are, 
however, seldom operationalized into concrete, monitorable criteria. It is also 
worth noting that simply requiring providers to have in place procedures for 
ensuring ‘good treatment’ does not necessarily lead to the good treatment of 
users in practice. This highlights the difficulty of regulating the central aspects 
of good care in formal terms. 
Criteria related to security occur frequently in the tender documents. Quality 
assurance seems to be central to the definition of quality. This relates to the 
risk of rogue and fraudulent providers operating within the market, an issue 
that came up in the conversations with the municipal officials. My research 
corroborates a point made by the Trust Delegation: that the risk of companies 
using loopholes to lower quality leads to ever stricter regulation. As the 
municipalities can only keep out or get rid of providers who clearly breach 
requirements and/or contractual clauses, quality must be able to be transformed 
into formal and measurable criteria. The struggle to formulate such 
monitorable criteria is the result of the shift of focus from content to process 
in the understanding of quality.  
The quality requirements in the tenders hence focus more on processes than on 
outputs. Criteria relating to organizational structures sometimes appear, but 
more costly requirements, such as those relating to staff density or staff 
competence, are more unusual. It seems to be easier – it is at least more 
common – to use contracts to regulate processes rather than outcomes. Details 
of the processes, the ‘how’ of operations, become central, and the definition of 
quality seems to become narrower. Overall there has been a shift from 
profession-centric systems of quality assurance to complex qualitative and 
quantitative measures. This has in some cases increased the administrative 
workload for private and public providers. From a market perspective, it does 
not make sense to limit the support given to older persons to the strict and often 
detailed framework which results from the administrative need-testing process. 
This produces a conflict with the way the municipal officials believe home care 
services should be provided, a view informed by public regulations and the 
needs-testing defined by the Social Services Act. 
Which strategies and tools are used by the public authorities to govern 
practices of quality improvement and assessment? 
The development of good tender dossiers and contracts has become an 
increasingly important, and difficult, task for municipal administrations. The 
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centrality of this task changes the role of the municipal authority. Using the 
purchaser–provider model was already a step towards using market models in 
public services, but care choice systems take this model further by increasing 
the distance between purchaser and provider. This distance means that the 
service and the requirements must be more clearly defined and that formal 
regulations must be explicit and enforced. Through the use of contracts, quality 
comes to be defined by processes, formalized, and standardized. 
Monitoring is a central tool in governing practices of quality assessment, and 
my empirical research shows that one risk with this is that whichever formal 
aspects of service provision can be established concretely will become central 
to the monitoring, further accelerating the trend towards the standardization of 
services. As Rose explains, in this way monitoring changes what is supposed 
to be monitored. The ‘logics and technical requirements of audit displace the 
internal logics of expertise’, and norms of accountability and trust in 
professional competence and the decisions of specialists and politicians are 
replaced by other norms, such as observability and legal enforceability.516  
At the same time, the tenders often contain unmonitorable clauses. As we have 
seen, the ‘soft values’ in the contracts seem to be hard to define in a way that 
avoids detailed standardized criteria. The quality requirements are designed to 
constitute contractual terms, such that a failure to meet them will entail a clear 
breach of contract. However, many of the quality requirements are unclear, and 
without clarity it is difficult to make a legal claim of breach of contract if the 
provider fails to meet them. Winblad et al. emphasize that the lack of 
monitorable and measurable quality requirements creates incentives for profit-
making companies to offer lower-quality services. Their point is that 
monitorable lists of requirements are therefore an important tool for ensuring 
and improving quality in elder care.517 Without monitorable requirements, the 
municipality cannot determine whether specific goals have been achieved. The 
lack of monitorable clauses may be explained by the nature of the service 
purchased. The municipalities struggle to govern quality through contracts 
because contracts provide ‘hard tools’ and elder care is a sector characterized 
by ‘soft values’ of quality, which are difficult to define as contract clauses, 
monitor properly, and enforce.  
Alongside the trend towards using and monitoring compliance with criteria in 
tenders and contracts there has been an increasing use of partnerships as tools 
516 Rose (n 196) 154. 
517 Winblad and others (n 224) 30. 
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for governing quality. If municipalities and providers are partners, then 
supporting the providers’ quality development initiatives – in the ways 
described earlier in this study – is seen to be in everyone’s best interests. My 
research shows that the municipalities assume part of the responsibility for 
carrying out the private providers’ quality development work. Local 
administrators generally claim that they feel they are able to improve quality 
in the private businesses, but this requires a team of administrators to offer 
training, dialogue, and guidance on quality development. This kind of soft 
governing fits well with the political ambition to promote small businesses. 
The existence of unscrupulous providers within the system was a problem 
repeatedly raised by the interviewees, and we might ask whether relying too 
heavily on self-regulating mechanisms to ensure quality is dangerous in a 
system where fraud is a constant threat. As Roger King points out, 
organizations confronting this problem will need to institutionalize ways of 
ensuring that certain processes are in place, through the appointment of 
personnel and groups focused on documenting and evaluating ‘to ensure the 
development of a “learning organization”’.518 In the municipalities I studied, 
these personnel seem to be located primarily in the municipal administrations 
themselves, providing training to private companies in matters of quality 
improvement. 
What conflicts might arise in the governing of quality through a care choice 
system? 
A central problem for municipalities is that they cannot exert the same level of 
control over private providers as they do over the in-house providers – hence 
the risk of fraud and exploitation. Just as it is hard for the municipalities to hold 
the private providers fully accountable for below-par services, so it is also hard 
for them to get rid of rogue companies. In analysing the problems confronted 
by municipal officials in this context, it becomes clear that the basic issue is 
that private providers have priorities other than delivering high-quality elder 
care: at least some of them are in the business to make a profit, and if high 
quality is not required, or quality requirements are not effectively enforced, it 
cannot be assumed that the aim of delivering high-quality services will always 
trump the profit motive. According to the interviewees’ testimonies, it is very 
difficult to use contracts to govern the more unspecifiable aspects of elder care. 
This means that the use of contracts tends to increase formalization and 
standardization, while failing to address the risks of fraud and poor quality. 
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This might in turn mean that individuals in need of care end up with poor-
quality services, that private providers still make profits through providing 
substandard care, and that all the while public resources are spent on ambitious 
monitoring and training programmes for private companies. 
The hybridized structure of care choice systems seems to create a variety of 
possibilities and loopholes for rogue companies. To avoid the possibility of 
such companies abusing the system, the municipalities will have to put a lot of 
effort into monitoring and collecting information from the private providers. 
The need to monitor also creates a need for standardized procedures and 
operations, as these are easier to control. The use of certain technical and 
digital systems, such as time measuring and documentation systems, which 
play an important role in day-to-day care work, is an example of this 
development.  
One reason for introducing care choice systems is to foster diversity and 
innovation. According to the evidence from the municipalities, however, there 
is not much space for diversity. One early study suggested that municipal care 
choice systems had not resulted in any significant developments of services or 
in the provision of new types of care services.519 The report of the government 
inquiry of 2014 similarly finds that the scope for innovation within care choice 
systems is limited because the regulation and monitoring of the sector is, and 
has to be, so extensive.520 And any further regulation might produce further 
obstacles to competition and innovation. As Julian Le Grand and Will Bartlett 
point out, ‘in the absence of good outcome measures, regulation of quality 
tends to concentrate on inputs or production technology, both of which 
discourage flexibility and innovation’.521 
Because of the amount of administrative work required and the degree of risk 
involved, care choice systems seem to benefit large companies more than small 
ones. Ole Hansen remarks that the uncertainty involved in the provision of 
home care services might create unusually large risks for private care 
companies. In combination with the significant demands on administrative 
capacity, legal capacity, and so on, this creates a situation which is less 
beneficial for small and medium-sized companies, which may only have a 
single municipal customer, and easier to navigate for larger companies 
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established in several municipalities.522 There is a conflict here between two 
very different kinds of market: one occupied by larger, more ‘professional’ 
care companies and one that is also home to smaller companies.  
The municipalities are saddled with a contradictory mission, and this 
fundamentally changes the nature of their role. The conflict is present at the 
level of the legislation and at the level of the stated goals of central government 
and the municipal administrations. It is also felt within the municipalities 
themselves. Home care activities cannot be regulated in detail, and this means 
that providers must be allowed room for manoeuvre. This is, of course, one 
reason for introducing care choice systems in the first place, but it can lead to 
profit-driven interests exploiting this space in unforeseen ways. But the 
regulation and control needed to counteract unscrupulous behaviour might 
create obstacles to the sorts of innovation that were supposed to have been 
created through the operation of private incentive. The administrations are thus 
constantly engaged in a balancing act. The aim of increasing diversity and 
specialization in order to better cater for the needs of users can be hard to 
combine with the need to regulate the sector properly, and with the kind of 
standardization that the increasingly detailed regulation and monitoring 
described earlier in this chapter produces. There is a tension between the 
political ambition of supporting smaller care companies and the need to ensure 
that the care provided is of an adequate standard. In some cases, the political 
ambition has the upper hand, and requirements are watered down, or providers 
who do not meet the requirements are accepted, and the message sent to the 
administration is that it should not allow excessive bureaucracy or overly 
stringent standards to get in the way of the operation of the market.  
In terms of related governing rationalities and techniques, care choice systems 
play into general tendencies associated with NPM ideas. When it comes to 
governing quality in particular, there has been a general trend away from 
trusting professional expertise and towards measurement and standardization, 
and the Act on Care Choice Systems is part of this development. Improving 
the quality of services becomes a matter of evaluating and measuring. As 
delivery moves from public to private, further increasing the distance between 
purchaser and provider, the need for control, evaluation, and measurement 
grows.  
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5 The use and function of legal 
tools and strategies 
5.1 Introduction 
The preparatory works to the Act on Care Choice Systems state that 
municipalities that contract out services to external providers retain their 
primary responsibility towards citizens under the Social Services Act.523 Since 
the public authority, in this case the municipality, is still accountable to users 
and citizens, it must be able to ensure that it can in turn hold the private 
providers accountable. This may be achieved using a variety of strategies and 
tools, for instance tenders and contracts, monitoring, sanctions, and more 
informal methods. 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the following question: how are public- 
and private-law tools and logics used in the governing of the public and private 
delivery of home care within care choice systems? This chapter intends to show 
how these different logics and instruments are used and to understand the 
implications of these usages. I have broken down this main question into the 
following subquestions, to be discussed in this chapter: 
- How is the relationship between public-law obligations and
contracted-out welfare services expressed in national legal sources,
policy documents, and doctrine?
- What strategies do municipalities with care choice systems adopt in
order to fulfil their public-law obligations?
- What issues and conflicts might arise when these strategies are used?
- How does the introduction of care choice systems affect the municipal
delivery of elder care?
523 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 115. 
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The chapter consists of cross-analyses of legal regulation, preparatory works, 
national policy documents, tenders, contracts, interviews, and the results of a 
questionnaire sent to the municipalities. The chapter begins with a description 
of how legislative works, government inquiries, and doctrinal sources have 
treated the question of the relationship between the public and the private in 
the contracting out of welfare services. I then describe the ways in which 
public-law obligations are expressed in contracts, before discussing sanctions 
and their use. I consider some of the issues experienced by the municipalities 
in trying to comply with their legal responsibilities and the strategies adopted 
in order to tackle these issues. Lastly, I analyse the question of how the use of 
private legal tools affects the governing of the public delivery of services. 
5.2 Public obligations for private services in policy 
discussion and in contracts 
5.2.1 A legal and policy perspective on public obligations in 
privatized welfare services 
The administration of social services, as a public function, is regulated by 
general public administrative law. This legal framework includes 
constitutional laws as well as statutes such as the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which contains provisions relating to values such as legality, objectivity, 
and proportionality. The Auditor General’s report of 2008 (preceding the Act 
on Care Choice Systems), which examined contracts between the 
municipalities and private providers of elder care services, pointed out a series 
of problems with the way public administrative law principles were expressed 
in tender dossiers and contracts. The report stated, for instance, that the 
contracts rarely required the private providers to provide information, 
guidance, and advice to individuals and that requirements for transparency and 
protection for whistle-blowing staff were lacking. These requirements are seen 
as central principles of Swedish public administrative law. The Auditor 
General stated that quality and transparency requirements had to be set out 
more explicitly by the municipalities in the governing documents. The report 
also discussed the ways in which discrepancies between public- and private-
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law functions could be handled by the municipalities so as to ensure 
accountability.524  
The report of the government inquiry preceding the Act on Care Choice 
Systems emphasizes that the private delivery of services has to be conducted 
in a way that respects the overarching goals and fundamental values expressed 
in the Social Services Act and that services have to meet requirements relating 
to quality and quality-ensuring processes.525 The preparatory works to the Act 
on Care Choice Systems furthermore state that ‘providers have to comply with 
conditions set in Swedish legislation, e.g. the Health and Medical Services Act 
(HMSA), the Social Services Act, tax law and labour law’.526 These statements 
do not explain whether these statutes are directly binding on private providers 
or whether they are only binding if transformed into contractual clauses by the 
municipalities. They do not state, either, whether private providers’ 
compliance with these statutes could be enforced by courts. Since the 
municipality maintains the principal responsibility, the situation is not 
comparable to, for example, the school sector, where the School Act states that 
private schools are themselves primarily responsible in relation to the law. 
There are two things worth noting before proceeding. First, there exist no 
specific regulations in Swedish law that govern public contracts. Contracts 
between public and private entities are, in principle, considered as transactions 
governed by private law.527 This differs from the situation in, for instance, 
French and German law.528 The situation in Sweden also contrasts with that in 
Denmark, where the Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and 
Administration in Social Matters (Retssikkerhetsloven) stipulates that, in some 
outsourced public services, such as social services, public and administrative 
law apply directly to the private entities.529 Second, there are no clear 
definitions of the concepts of public law, public administration, public 
administrative duties, etc., in Swedish legislation or doctrine. Public 
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administration in Sweden is generally thought to consist of a) public authority 
decisions and b) the actual administration and services which follow from 
those decisions. According to Swedish constitutional law, while the actual 
administration and provision of public services may be contracted out, the 
public decision-making process can only be transferred to private subjects if 
this is provided for in legislation, and this is explicitly not the case with the 
Social Services Act.530 In the case of home care for older people, it is only the 
actual service provision, not the public decision-making process, that is 
transferred to private subjects – and this only in the municipalities which have 
chosen to implement a care choice system under the Act on Care Choice 
Systems or to procure through the Public Procurement Act.  
Several recent government inquiries and policy documents have discussed the 
position of public law in relation to contracted-out services, although there is 
little consensus regarding the issue. The preparatory works for the 1996/1997 
changes to the Social Services Act state that the quality requirements contained 
in the act should apply to both the public and private delivery of services.531 
This is also repeated in the preparatory works to the Act on Care Choice 
Systems.532 The report of the official inquiry preceding the Act on Care Choice 
Systems states, as noted at the outset of this chapter, that the municipality 
retains the primary legal responsibility towards the users of the services.533 The 
inquiry report also states that the transition to market-oriented service 
provision implies that private law will have more of a role in the regulation of 
the sector, but it does not clarify the nature of this role. According to the report, 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s rules on services and cooperation 
requirements should apply not to the external supplier but only to public 
authorities, and the private supplier should be bound only by the terms of the 
contract.534 However, the report also states that the municipality should include 
in the contract a requirement that the supplier must act in accordance with 
current regulations.535  
530 However, it should be noted that the distinction between public decision-making processes 
and the provision of services is not clear cut. There are also exceptions to this rule – that is, 
instances in which activities connected to decision-making may be contracted out. See e.g. 
Titti Mattsson, ‘Socialtjänstens Barnavårdsutredningar i Privat Regi’, Festskrift till Wiweka 
Warnling Conradson (Jure 2019). 
531 Prop. 1996/97:124 Ändring i socialtjänstlagen (n 104) 51–55. 
532 Prop. 2008/09:29 Lag om valfrihetssystem (n 13) 73. 
533 SOU 2008:15 LOV att välja - Lag Om Valfrihetssystem (n 178) 67. 
534 SOU 2008:15 LOV att välja - Lag Om Valfrihetssystem (n 178) 81-82. 
535 SOU 2008:15 LOV att välja - Lag Om Valfrihetssystem (n 178) 152. 
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Three more recent government inquiries have also touched upon this question, 
expressing somewhat different views on how (and whether) responsibility 
should be formally transferred to private providers delivering public services. 
The report of the inquiry into changes to the Local Government Act argues that 
all providers who conduct social services operations regulated by the Social 
Services Act have to comply with the quality requirements set out in the act,536 
which would mean that this public-law responsibility would apply directly to 
private providers, regardless of the terms of their contract. The report of the 
inquiry into ownership assessment, on the other hand, argues that, because the 
starting point is that the municipality bears the primary responsibility, the 
municipality must ensure that the private producers are able to comply, and 
actually do comply, with the applicable rules, and this should be achieved by 
the municipalities through the use of tenders, specified requirements, and 
contracts.537 The third report, on quality in the welfare sector, states that the 
ability of citizens to hold private actors accountable for substandard services 
is only indirect – through the municipalities’ contracts with the businesses – 
and that these companies may be governed only on the basis of what is agreed 
in the contract.538 In other words, this report argues that public provisions are 
not applicable directly to private providers. Thus, despite the fact that these 
three inquiries were carried out around the same time, during the period from 
2013 to 2017, they came to very different conclusions. This underlines the 
confusion regarding how public obligations apply to private providers within 
care choice systems. Municipalities seeking to govern the private delivery of 
services are operating in a legal grey zone. 
In a similar vein, Ann-Charlotte Landelius identifies a lack of research, 
political direction, and public debate in the Nordic countries on the legal 
consequences of contracting out.539 To the extent that there has been a doctrinal 
discussion, it has been clearly divided over the question of whether public law 
directly binds private actors that are carrying out tasks on behalf of a public 
administration. I do not intend to enter into this debate in any more detail; I 
introduce it here merely to highlight the different views of the matter and to 
make clear the lack of consensus in this area.540  
                                                 
536 SOU 2013:53 Privata utförare - kontroll och insyn (n 127) 152. 
537 SOU 2015:7 Krav på privata aktörer i välfärden (n 129) 119. 
538 SOU 2017:38 Kvalitet i välfärden – bättre upphandling och uppföljning (n 123) 161. 
539 Landelius (n 62) 13. 
540 For further discussion, see e.g. Hollander (n 62); Anders Thunved, Privatisering Av 
Socialtjänsten: Om Rättssäkerheten För Den Enskilde (Publica 1993); Gunnar Bramstång, 
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The interest in defining the differences between public and private law in 
Swedish doctrine seems to be sparked precisely by those situations in which 
practices that are defined as public administration are carried out by subjects 
defined as private entities. An important source for much of the Swedish debate 
on this question is the influential legal scholar Håkan Strömberg, who argued 
in his 1949 dissertation that a public administrative task is defined as such in 
terms of whether it is in the public interest: guided by the public good rather 
than by private profit.541 Tom Madell points out that private-law instruments 
have long existed within the public sphere and that public regulation affects 
many areas of private law. However, he concludes that there still are important 
distinctions between the two. Public authorities are subject to a number of 
obligations and restrictions that follow from public law; they must attend to 
and be governed by norms which do not apply to the private sector. That this 
distinction exists is, according to Madell, especially apparent in fields where 
public operations are very similar to private actors’ operations (such as in 
welfare services).542 Similarly, Lena Marcusson claims that whether an activity 
is private or public depends on the nature of the activity. According to this type 
of functional analysis, certain activities are by their nature public or private, 
irrespective of who is entrusted with carrying out the activity; therefore there 
is a legitimate demand from citizens for the type of control and transparency 
usually associated with public-law regulations.543 
The debate in Swedish legal studies on the question of the efficacy of public 
law in contracted-out welfare services has produced a similar lack of 
consensus. Håkan Strömberg and Bengt Lundell argue that it is a general rule 
of law that public regulation only binds public bodies. If a task is handed over 
to a private entity, this entity’s activities will not be bound by the public law 
applicable to the corresponding public activities unless otherwise stipulated.544 
Marcusson, by contrast, believes that constitutional values and the general 
principles of public administration should apply to all activities that are of a 
‘public nature’, regardless of whether the body carrying them out is public or 
                                                 
Förvaltningsrättens Begreppsbildning Och Grundläggande Principer i Konkret Belysning 
(Juristförlaget 1993). 
541 Strömberg (n 62) 12–13. 
542 Tom Madell, Avtal Mellan Kommuner Och Enskilda : Avtalsslut Och Rättsverkningar 
(Norstedts juridik 2000) 17. 
543 Marcusson (n 62) 61. 
544 Håkan Strömberg and Bengt Lundell, Allmän Förvaltningsrätt (23rd edn, Liber 2006) 30–
31. 
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private.545 Landelius offers additional support for Marcusson’s view. She 
argues that there are several reasons to believe that the rights protection and 
public-law regulation of constitutional law should follow the public task when 
it is transferred to the private sector. Since publicly regulated care work is an 
example of an exercise of public power, private subjects contracted to carry 
out this work should be subject to such requirements.546 Landelius points out 
that the dependent and vulnerable position of the individual in need of social 
services does not depend on whether these services are provided privately or 
publicly. It is therefore not reasonable, she argues, for the protection offered 
by public-law regulation to be dependent on whether the care is provided by a 
public- or private-law subject – especially not when the activities are publicly 
funded.547 The ambiguity of the legal principles makes them hard to apply 
properly, which in itself spells problems for legal certainty and transparency, 
she states; given the large-scale transfer of service delivery to private bodies in 
recent years, the legislature therefore has a responsibility to clarify the legal 
situation.548 Landelius states that the current uncertainty, for both the citizens 
and the private entities involved in welfare services, raises questions of liability 
and accountability within the system.549 
This question has also been approached from a private-law perspective. 
Madell’s assessment is that, where contracts are used by public actors in fields 
which are otherwise publicly regulated, the ground rule is that private law 
should apply to the interpretation of contracts, although public law may be 
drawn upon to fill in gaps in the agreement.550 On this issue, Hansen states that 
it is assumed in Nordic legal theory that a private party to a contract with a 
public authority must accept, to a greater extent than would be the case with 
other commercial contracts, requests for variations of contract terms during the 
contract period. However, he states, this is a position which is disputed in the 
literature and has only been established with reference to a few cases. There 
must also be limits on the extent to which the public contracting party can 
demand such adjustments, even on the basis of changes in regulations, if the 
rights and duties of the parties are not to be unbalanced.551 Another question in 
                                                 
545 Marcusson (n 62) 401. 
546 Landelius (n 20) 40–43. 
547 Landelius (n 62) 139. 
548 Landelius (n 62) 68. 
549 Landelius (n 62) 13. 
550 Madell (n 542) 13. 
551 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 628. 
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this area is what happens to liability issues when public activities are carried 
out by private subjects. Vibe Ulfbeck and Marta Andrecka note that there have 
been different answers put forward to this question, even within the Nordic 
countries. Since there is no legal relationship between user and provider, 
liability can, for instance, be organized through general tort-law rules rather 
than through contract. However, they also suggest that this is an unsatisfactory 
solution, as it may be difficult in practice for the individual to hold the private 
party liable.552 When it comes to outsourcing, there still remains a basic 
concern about whether it diminishes the degree to which the users or citizens 
can hold authorities accountable. Ulfbeck and Andrecka argue that contracting 
out welfare services may bring about a ‘liability gap’ in which the citizen ends 
up in a less favourable position than would have been the case had these 
services not been outsourced.553 There seems to be a similar liability and 
accountability ‘gap’ within the policy field, which leaves the municipalities 
without clear guidance on their legal obligations or on which legal strategies 
they should adopt. This is an interesting area for further study. 
5.2.2 Contracting out the municipalities’ political aims and legal 
obligations 
With respect to the delivery of social services in general and the delivery of 
home care specifically, municipalities have a range of public-law obligations 
with which they must comply. Besides national obligations, there are also 
municipal goals and policies that an administration must take into account. 
When contracting out, the municipality has to use different legal strategies in 
order to discharge these responsibilities. 
Almost all of the tender documents mention that the private provider must keep 
up to date with and follow ‘all applicable regulations’, referring to a number 
of laws and provisions applicable to the home care service sector. These are 
sometimes detailed in a list, but sometimes they are referred to with a more 
general phrase. The influential guidelines from the National Board on Health 
and Welfare are also often directly referred to or cited in the contracts. City L, 
for example, stipulates that  
552 Vibe Ulfbeck and Marta Andrecka, ‘Contracting Out of the Provision of Welfare Services 
to Private Actors and Liability Issues’ (2017) 8 Journal of European Tort Law 88–90. 
553 Ulfbeck and Andrecka (n 552) 98. 
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the performer is responsible for ensuring that the activities are carried out in 
accordance with the goals and guidelines that follow from the Social Services 
Act, the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act, the Work Environment 
Act and all other laws and regulations applicable at any particular time. 
Furthermore, the business must be conducted in accordance with the general 
advice and provisions from the National Board on Health and Welfare.554  
City M’s document states that ‘the performer should have knowledge of and 
comply with all applicable laws, ordinances, regulations and general guidelines 
applicable to the service that the service provider applies for’.555 Similar 
phrases are found in most tender documents and in the contracts connected to 
them. The municipalities’ strategy seems to be to ensure adherence to public-
law norms by referring to them in the contracts, although different 
municipalities provide different levels of detail about the regulations the 
private provider is actually expected to comply with. 
The criteria mentioned above follow the legislation and the preparatory works 
closely. But there are also other requirements that are commonly mentioned 
but are less closely connected to the operation and organization of the 
businesses. These requirements may relate, for instance, to the  company’s 
independence from party politics or religious organizations. Social and 
environmental considerations may also be mentioned, as may requirements 
that the company comply with certain international conventions, such as the 
UN Convention on Human Rights or the International Labour Organization’s 
core conventions.556 Documents also often refer to the municipality’s own 
policies, such as political goals set by the elder board. A municipal goal is a 
statement of something the municipality, as a public actor, wants to achieve 
rather than of how it intends to achieve it. Some of these may be more clearly 
applicable to the activities of a private home care provider than others, but they 
tend to be vaguely formulated requirements about, for example, ‘security’, 
‘good quality, ‘good treatment’, etc., which largely depend on interpretation 
and are rarely defined in the documents. 
Tender documents usually specify what types of marketing the providers may 
engage in and set out rules on public transparency and staff whistle-blowing, 
although these provisions are not present in all documents. When transparency 
and whistle-blowing are regulated, the document also qualifies these 
                                                 
554 City L Tender Document 1.3.14. 
555 City M Model Contract, 1.12 and 8. 
556 E.g. City M Tender Document 4.5. 
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provisions with reference to the right to business confidentiality.557 Regulation 
of terms of employment for the providers’ staff is common, and often makes 
reference to the terms of the applicable collective agreement (although EU 
public procurement regulations place limits on the application of collective 
agreements to tenders).558 Other frequently mentioned requirements are those 
relating to facilities and technical standards, such as access to IT systems and 
phones. It is quite common for municipalities to require that private providers 
use the municipality’s own IT system for documentation, deviation reports, 
timekeeping, etc.559 The private providers are furthermore required to 
cooperate with the municipality and other relevant actors in various ways, such 
as attending meetings and training sessions and participating in statistical 
inquiries. The documents sometimes mention the requirement to participate in 
national quality registers. Some municipalities, such as City M, have regular 
‘branch meetings’, which representatives of the private providers are supposed 
to attend.560 The close cooperation and interaction with the municipal 
administration is thus also regulated through contract. 
It is worth noting that the regulations that the private provider must comply 
with are not arranged in any hierarchy. The reference to the regulations is often 
broad and unspecific, as in the examples cited above. The expectations placed 
upon the private providers are far-reaching, approaching the level of rigour 
with which the municipalities’ own operations are governed. In some cases, 
the contracts or lists of requirements state which laws and regulations must be 
complied with, and, in many cases, certain provisions of laws or regulations 
also appear as separate contractual terms. Because compliance with applicable 
laws is included as a contractual requirement, any non-compliance with these 
laws becomes a breach of contract.  
  
                                                 
557 E.g. City M Tender Document 7.0 and Model Contract 1.2.3. 
558 For further discussion of this topic, see Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Regulatory Substitution 
between Labour and Public Procurement Law: The EU’s Shifting Approach to Enforcing 
Labour Standards in Public Contracts’ (2018) 24 European Public Law 229. 
559 E.g. City S Tender Document 2.14. 
560 E.g. City M Tender Document 4.0. 
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5.3 The use and function of sanctions in contracts 
5.3.1 The regulation of sanctions 
An important technique used by municipalities seeking to ensure compliance 
with the requirements laid down in tenders and contracts is the use of sanctions 
and termination clauses. Sanctions regimes are included in contracts for a 
variety of reasons. First, sanctions are the only way a municipality can get rid 
of providers which are not meeting the requirements and are thereby placing 
the municipality in breach of its own legal responsibilities. Second, the 
existence of sanctions has a deterrent effect, making the companies more likely 
to adhere to the terms of the contract and thus reinforcing the standards set out 
in the tender documents. Third, the imposition of sanctions may compensate 
the municipality for the costs it may incur as a result of the breach of contract.  
The contracts used in the care choice system are supposed to be more flexible 
than those used in traditional procurement. My examination of clauses 
regarding amendment and termination of contract shows that, in general, 
contracts are designed to apply until further notice, although there are also 
examples of fixed-term contracts, often stipulating a renegotiation after two or 
three years. The municipalities often reserve the right to make amendments to 
the agreed terms unilaterally. In such a situation, the private provider can either 
accept the new terms or terminate the contract. Contracts can be terminated by 
either party, most commonly after serving a notice period of three or six 
months. Most contracts provide for a longer notice period, usually a year or 
longer, in the case of a municipal decision to abolish the care choice system. 
These clauses may have significant implications in situations in which 
circumstances and needs change rapidly. The municipalities can only change 
the criteria for the private delivery of services in the ways provided for in the 
contract. Only a few municipalities have emergency clauses in their contracts 
with the private providers.561 
                                                 
561 An obvious example of a case in which circumstances change rapidly is the ongoing 
coronavirus pandemic, during which much stricter hygiene control in elder care has 
become necessary. Contract amendments take time to be implemented, and in the case of a 
pandemic an amendment clause which gives the private provider three months to accept 
may be of limited usefulness. I have pointed out these difficulties in relation to care choice 
systems in elder care in the following article: Mirjam Katzin, ‘Valfrihetssystemet skapar 
betydande kvalitetsskillnader’ Dagens Samhälle (4 May 2020) 
<https://www.dagenssamhalle.se/debatt/valfrihetssystemet-skapar-betydande-
kvalitetsskillnader-32446> accessed 7 July 2020. 
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For the municipalities to be able to hold providers accountable, the tools for 
sanctioning them must be regulated in the contract. The sanctions in the 
municipal contracts vary greatly, although there are some general patterns in 
the documents. The most common types of sanction are warnings, freezes on 
new customers, suspensions or reductions of payment, fines, and termination 
of contract. The Swedish Competition Authority’s guide on monitoring 
recommends that contracts provide for an eight-step ladder of possible 
sanctions. These steps may be used either sequentially, in response to a 
continued failure to address a problem, or individually, where a defect of a 
certain level of seriousness merits a particular sanction. The steps are: 
1. dialogue
2. demand for rectification
3. suspension of pay-for-performance
4. fee reduction
5. fines
6. decision not to renew the contract
7. cancellation of contract with notice
8. immediate termination of contract.562
The list above seems to indicate that ending the contractual relationship 
altogether should be a last resort for municipalities unsatisfied with the services 
of the private providers. It also seems that the providers should be given many 
chances to rectify their mistakes before being asked or forced to leave the care 
choice system. It is not uncommon to find such ladders of sanctions in the 
contracts. These are often similar to the one recommended by the Swedish 
Competition Authority but with fewer steps: dialogue, the drawing up of an 
action plan, financial penalties, the termination of the contract. The choice of 
sanction is also related to the seriousness of the defect in a particular case. 
Interestingly, a third of the contracts contain no direct sanctions other than the 
possibility of terminating the contract.  
562 Swedish Competition Authority (n 347) 19. 
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Table 7 Regulation of different sanctions 
TYPE OF SANCTION NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITITES % 
N=106 
Termination 102 96 
Warning 37 35 
Suspension/reduction of payment 35 33 
Fine 26 25 
Freeze on new users 13 12 
Table 7 presents the different types of sanctions in the municipal contracts. The 
possibility of financial penalties such as fines or payment reductions is 
provided for in approximately half of the contracts. The size of the fines varies 
a great deal. The most common sum is one price basic amount563 per week. 
Another common fine is the withholding of 5 or 10 per cent of the provider’s 
weekly payment until the defect is remedied. However, the fines range from 
1,500 SEK per identified deficiency up to 100,000 SEK per serious deficit, the 
latter being found in only two municipal contracts. It is interesting to note that 
only 12 per cent of the municipalities provide for the possibility of a freeze on 
new users while the provider is under investigation for defects or while 
termination of the contract is being considered. There are also only a few 
examples of the contract providing for the possibility of the business being 
suspended and activities taken over by the municipality during such times. And 
there are also many examples of municipalities that have only a few sanctions 
in their ‘toolbox’. City S is one such example. Its contract does not provide for 
any direct financial sanctions. Instead, providers must respond to complaints 
or reports of defects within 10 days.564 But if these responses are 
unsatisfactory, the only measure available to the municipality is dialogue 
through the monthly meetings with the company.565 
What counts as a defect in the service provided differs from contract to 
contract, although there are some patterns in the wordings used. There is often 
a list of formal requirements which can be breached, accompanied by a general 
description of services that do not meet quality requirements. The contracts 
563 The price basic amount is calculated based on changes in the general price level, in 
accordance with the National Insurance Act (2010:110). Calculations are based on the 
change in the Consumer Price Index and are fixed for the entire calendar year. For 2019, 
the price basic amount was 46,500 SEK. Statistics Sweden https://www.scb.se/en/finding-
statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-consumption/consumer-price-
index/consumer-price-index-cpi/pong/tables-and-graphs/price-basic-amount/price-basic-
amount accessed 25 November 2019.
564 S5. 
565 S2. 
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normally state that for the municipality to be able to terminate the contract the 
defects or breaches of contract have to be either numerous and unrectified or 
of a serious nature. As the following examples show, these provisions may be 
more or less detailed and precise. In City M’s contract, the agreement can be 
terminated immediately 
- in case of bankruptcy, insolvency, or composition
- if the provider is disqualified from business activities by a court
- if the provider is found to have submitted incorrect information of
importance in the application
- in case of serious defects, such as repeated breaches of contract,
abusive treatment, or criminal acts directed against users or their
property.566
City S’s contract, by contrast, contains a longer list of situations in which an 
immediate termination may be appropriate. The municipality can terminate the 
contract 
- if the formal requirements in the Act on Care Choice Systems, Ch. 7 §
1 are unfulfilled
- if the provider refuses to take on a user, or refuses to execute the
ordered activities, within its given capacity and geographic area
- if the provider charges the user for services that are to be paid by the
municipality
- if obligatory documentation is lacking
- if the provider does not provide approved personnel
- if the provider implements healthcare services without necessary
delegation from the municipality’s licensed healthcare professionals
- if the provider appoints a new manager who does not meet the relevant
competence and experience requirements
- if the provider lacks adequate procedures or systems for quality
assurance
- if the provider violates provisions on confidentiality
566 City M model contract, clauses 1.1.3. 
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- if the provider does not take action after being instructed to do so by
the appropriate authorities
- if the provider is bankrupt or found to be insolvent such that they
cannot be expected to fulfil their obligations
- if the provider does not make obligatory payments for taxes, social
security fees, or other payments which are required by law or
collective agreements
- if the contract is transferred to another entity without the consent of
the municipality
- if the provider assigns subcontractors without the consent of the city.567
As these lists show, the grounds for termination are left quite open and vary 
significantly from municipality to municipality, but the focus still seems 
generally to be on formal defects and financial problems.  
The contracts also regulate financial liabilities for damages. Eight out of 10 of 
the contracts studied explicitly state that the provider is responsible for paying 
damages to the municipality or a third party for losses that result from defects 
in the provision of services, although, again, these provisions vary in their level 
of detail across different municipal contracts. Almost all municipalities require 
the contractors to have valid liability insurance. The aim of this division of 
responsibility in the contracts is to ensure that the entity that controls the daily 
operations of service delivery is responsibility for paying any damages. One 
interviewee referred to the damages that would have to be paid if, for example, 
a care worker broke an expensive China vase in the user’s home, or even 
‘dropped a customer on the ground’ and accidentally killed them. In these 
cases, however, the liability insurance that the service provider has to have as 
a condition of its contract would cover the damages, and no liability process 
would be needed.568  
5.3.2 How municipalities make use of sanctions  
The evidence presented above shows that contracts generally allow for the use 
of sanctions in response to defects in service provision. But how are the 
contracts’ ladders of sanctions actually used? What kinds of failings most often 
lead to sanctions? When are contracts terminated? The interviews with the 
567 City S Tender Document point 6.18. 
568 L1. 
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municipal officials provide insights into how these legal tools are used in 
practice in care choice systems.  
The administrations find it difficult to make claims of defects related to the 
quality of services. This difficulty relates to the problem of defining and 
measuring quality in ways that can be translated into contract clauses, and to 
the fact that municipal officials are aware that they need to have a decent case 
if the issue ends up in court. As one official put it: ‘There could be flaws which 
one, on a purely personal level, feels are very serious but that it is hard to tie 
to anything really concrete in the contract.’569 
As a consequence, in cases where officials believe that the quality of the 
service is substandard, they try to find formal flaws in order to justify the 
sanction or termination.570 One official said that ‘it could be that there are a lot 
of quality defects, but it is easier to point to formal flaws – accounting 
mistakes, for example’.571 As long as poorly performing companies are not in 
severe breach of any of the formal requirements in the contract, therefore, it is 
hard to get rid of them. The officials indicated that, by the same token, 
generally well-functioning providers might be sanctioned for some formal 
defect, even though this failing would not have presented any serious risk for 
users or had serious consequences for the quality of the services. In this way, 
the use of monitoring reports and sanctions may not actually reflect the true 
quality of a service.572  
For these reasons, it is often the case that sanctions are based on concrete, 
formal grounds that can be objectively demonstrated. As examples of the sorts 
of failings that have been used as grounds for direct termination, officials 
mentioned serious invoicing errors, tax evasion, mistakes in documentation, 
issues with working conditions, and other formal and financial requirements.573 
The formal grounds most often used when municipalities want to terminate a 
contract seem to be failings relating to formal or financial requirements rather 
than requirements relating to the quality or content of the service. Officials 
consciously try to find formal failings of this type when they are seeking to 
terminate a contract.  
569 M3. 
570 M3, L1, L5. 
571 M3. 
572 M3, L2. 
573 M1, M3, L1, L6. 
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The interviews also made clear that both sanctions and termination are often 
used as measures of last resort. A central point that came across in many of the 
interviews was that, in most cases of termination, it happens only after a long 
process in which the municipality first enters into a dialogue with the provider 
and the provider gets the chance to set out an action plan to rectify its mistakes. 
There are then typically more follow-ups and dialogue before, if the requested 
improvements have not been made, the political board or a senior official 
makes the final decision on termination.574 One official said that providers 
should get the chance to rectify mistakes unless the problems are of a very 
serious nature: ‘you can never terminate [directly] unless it’s crisis and 
disaster’.575 One reason this process is so drawn out is that the municipal 
officials are aware that their decisions may be appealed and so want to ensure 
that any possible action they may take has a sound legal basis.576 The following 
exchange explains this dynamic: 
Interviewer: But sometimes you terminate the contracts quite directly? 
L6: Terminate without an action plan – we have done that a few times, but it is 
– there should always be the possibility of rectification, because otherwise the 
municipality could risk having to pay a lot of damages and so on for a wrongful 
termination. So they should be given the opportunity to rectify, but sometimes 
things are such that this just does not work. 
Interviewer: What kind of things do you mean? 
L6: If there are very, very many flaws then you cannot meet – cannot at all meet 
the individual’s needs, for example. 
Interviewer: Do you want to develop what that can – what have you found in 
that case? 
L6: We have terminated – so, we have terminated if you do not, for example – 
if you cannot ensure the individual’s needs are met, for example because the 
time registration shows that the wrong person was there, you do not know who 
was there or if anyone was there at all. There are many – there is no ongoing 
social documentation, the staff is not trained, that is, there is – so, all these 
things that you follow up, they are really very serious. They have only made 
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575 L2. 
576 L6. 
188 
manual registrations, they have not paid taxes and fees as they should have, so, 
very –  
Interviewer: Things that are very – which can be linked to a clear contractual 
clause? 
L6: Yes, exactly.577 
This exchange also shows that the actions of the administrations are framed by 
the legal situation in which they are operating, and specifically that they are 
concerned about the risk of having to pay damages and the difficulty of proving 
breaches of contract. The following passage sums up the difficulties that 
officials face in trying to regulate providers’ operations through contracts: 
It is so legally difficult, so everything is delayed. It takes a long time before you 
can remedy mistakes. What is easy is if they commit any financial crime, or 
make accounting errors, or do not pay taxes, and so on. Then we can just – 
whoop – kick them out. But problems with the quality for the individual, then 
it becomes much more difficult. … However, here we have been, I think, legally 
speaking, a little too cautious. We, kind of, do not dare to – and it may have to 
do with the courts: that it is thought that we wouldn’t win something like that, 
because it is difficult to put your foot down when it comes to the ‘soft’, 
subjective experience.578 
In City M, a thorough assessment of all providers led to the termination of six 
contracts with private home care providers. A leading official explained that in 
these cases ‘there were really serious shortcomings when it came to things such 
as work environment, documentation, the hiring of [relatives as] employees 
against regulations, and serious breaches of policy’. In one case, the city 
reported the provider to the police for fraud relating to 7 million SEK of 
payments, but at the time of the interview this had as yet not led to any 
charges.579 A majority of these terminations were justified on the basis of 
financial irregularities.580 
What happens to care users when the municipality is investigating a provider 
or demanding that it take action to rectify the failings in its operations? As was 
shown in section 5.3.1 (table 7), only a few municipalities allow for the intake 
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of new users to be frozen, and all municipalities allow the providers to carry 
on serving their current users. One official commented that, ultimately, it is 
seen as the duty of the individual care user and the responsible care manager 
to ensure that the care given to the individual under these circumstances is of 
an adequate standard, even if, as this official accepted, this is an undesirable 
situation for both users and administrations.581 Another interviewee described 
the challenging situation that administrations find themselves in when a 
provider that is the subject of a drawn-out sanctions process still has users to 
care for. 
Interviewer: What happens to the quality of the service for the older user during 
that process? 
L1: No, that is what we are thinking – if we do not think that this company is 
up to the mark, they should not really have customers. It is irresponsible of us 
to let it be that way, but it is a bit difficult. It is legally difficult.582 
In summary, the risk of ‘legal difficulties’ arising seems to be the primary 
reason why sanctions, the contracts’ ‘hard tools’, are seldom used. Two 
officials responsible for monitoring the contracts told me that sanctions could 
and should be used more often in order to ensure that providers abide by the 
terms of the contracts. They claimed that both less important and highly 
important contractual requirements were often not met, without the providers 
facing any consequences. According to the officials, as economic incentives 
are effective tools for governing the private providers, the use of financial 
penalties or threats of termination would make the providers ‘get their act 
together’.583 
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5.4 Municipalities’ strategies for complying with 
their legal responsibilities 
5.4.1 Municipal administrations’ views of different legal tools  
The municipal officials expressed some confusion about whether the laws and 
provisions governing elder care are automatically binding on the care 
companies. One administrator claimed, for instance, that there is ‘no 
difference’ between the municipality and the private provider in this regard 
and that a private provider bears the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for older 
persons.584 The phrase comes from the Social Services Act, which, however, 
states that the municipalities have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 
the needs of individuals are met. Another official said, by contrast, that 
‘ultimately, it is still the municipality that is responsible’.585 A third claimed 
that the companies have to understand that, when providing care, they are 
actually representing the municipality, meaning that, for example, they have a 
responsibility to provide information to older persons about individual rights 
and the different services provided by the municipality,586 which seems to 
describe, rather, the demands placed on the municipality under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. One leading official argued that it is misguided 
to regulate through contract what is already in the law and so already binding 
on the companies. If they want to be part of the sector, ‘[t]he company should 
know the law by heart’, she stated, adding that it should not be left to the 
municipality to teach them, as is the case now. This official also thought it 
important for monitoring to pay closer attention to companies’ adherence to 
legislation.587 To other officials, however, it was less clear how monitoring 
should take legal regulations into account. Some monitors claimed to make 
reference to the regulations in monitoring the companies,588 whilst others said 
that the contract was the focus of monitoring and the legislation only an 
indirect tool.589 The same confusion regarding the applicability of public law 
to private welfare providers that was found in the policy documents and 
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doctrinal debate is reflected here in these differing views from the 
municipalities. 
Many officials explicitly stated that they wanted the criteria and requirements 
placed on the private providers through tenders and contracts to be stricter. They 
often referred in this connection to the struggle to meet the objectives of the Social 
Services Act, especially those on good quality, something that they said was made 
more difficult by the fact that contractual requirements were not strict enough.590 
As this demonstrates, they see the tenders and contracts as preconditions for their 
quality assurance work. This remark from an official in the City S administration 
shows how central the contract is in their everyday work: ‘If the contract is well 
written, which we think it is, pretty well written on our part, then there are quite 
concrete things to follow up on. So it is sort of our bible.’591 
How do officials account for the fact that the requirements are not stricter? One 
significant barrier to tightening up the requirements seems to be the municipal 
lawyers, who insist, with reference to EU regulations on public procurement 
and the proportionality principle, that there are limits on the kinds of 
requirements that can be included within the contracts. In City L, which has its 
own legal department within the administration, this discussion about the 
permissibility and impermissibility of certain contractual criteria is much more 
developed than in the other municipalities. Several of the officials mentioned 
these legal constraints as a problem,592 as did the municipal councillor at one 
of the regular meetings that the municipality has with sector representatives. 
She said there was a political ambition to reduce the number of providers but 
that the ability of politicians and administrators to impose stricter tender 
requirements was limited by legal considerations.593  
One leading official from City L (L6) stated that the legislators who passed the 
Act on Care Choice Systems had been naïve in not imposing higher standards 
on businesses. The lack of tough criteria, she claimed, allowed for less serious 
and incompetent applicants to be accepted into the system. She claimed that 
legislators seem not to have understood the implications of the legislation and 
said the municipalities were not given enough support and guidance on how to 
avoid companies exploiting and finding loopholes in the system.594 A colleague 
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(L3) said she had hoped that the politicians would have learned from the earlier 
mistakes made in introducing public procurement without sufficient 
regulation. Instead, she said, the attitude was ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’ – 
an attitude which, she stressed, might be good for small companies but was 
neither careful nor responsible behaviour on the part of the public purchaser.595 
L6 stated that, while the system had become better over time, when the Act on 
Care Choice Systems was introduced, many had applied for contracts, without 
really knowing what was required, in the hope of earning big money. As she 
put it, ‘they applied to be in a tax-financed sector’, explaining that such 
companies were often be active in several other sectors where public financing 
was the common denominator. She stated that the problem of under-regulation 
in her municipality (City L) was not as acute as it had been initially, but she 
said it still existed.596 The administration still experienced problems when 
seeking to make use of the tools at their disposal to get rid of poor providers. 
Another colleague complained that 
with the care choice system it is supposed to be that it should be easy to get in 
[to the system as a provider], but it should also be easy to get kicked out. But it 
has not really been that way. If they get in, they are stuck there.597 
As this official saw it, this generosity towards providers has led to the creation 
of companies that provide severely flawed services.  
L3 offered some detailed reflections on how the purchaser’s perspective had 
developed over time. She claimed that public purchasers used to be overly 
focused on using public procurement and privatization with the aim of cutting 
costs and that a more serious approach was to analyse what resources were 
actually needed in order to ensure that quality services were delivered. The 
move from price competition to quality competition in public procurement – 
that is, the move from traditional public procurement to care choice systems – 
she saw as a missed opportunity for developing this more serious approach. 
She was still of the view that, in order to be better purchasers, municipalities 
have to be more knowledgeable about how businesses function, as in this way 
they will be better at governing them and at avoiding certain pitfalls. She 
thought that, for the system to work, the purchasing authorities overall have to 
shape up: 
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What is a bit unfortunate, I find, having been through the whole process, is that 
so few lessons have been learned from this experience. Instead there is a lot of 
political jousting and blame games and ‘it is all those venture capitalists’. But 
it is not their fault! They are operating on a market that allows for this. Yes, so 
why are we allowing for this, then? And if we can’t put an end to the abuse, 
then we shouldn’t have this whole thing. But that would be very devastating 
and sad for elder care, because then it would fall back to what it was again.598  
From these different reflections from the interviewees one gets an image of the 
legal situation surrounding care choice systems as unclear and somewhat 
frustrating for municipal officials, who seem to believe that the contract is 
central to, but not sufficient for, the governing of private providers and 
avoiding the problem of fraud. 
5.4.2 The use of informal techniques in governing providers 
As I have stressed, the contract is seen as providing the essential framework 
within which the private providers are governed. However, when officials were 
asked whether the contract was more important than dialogue and the 
relationship between municipalities and providers, the answer was ‘no’. The 
same City S official who described the contract as the officials’ ‘bible’ (see 
above) went on to state that they had never experienced any tension between 
the formal and informal aspects of governing because their provider was 
always willing to cooperate and do as the administration wished. ‘So it is 
difficult to say whether the one is more important than the other.’599 Another 
City S official described the basis for the municipality’s relationship with the 
provider in the following way: ‘Sure, the contract must be followed, but it is, 
after all – it is just the starting point. We should be able to have a good 
relationship: that is the most important.’600 Her colleague agreed that a soft 
relationship and good dialogue are central to how the administration governs 
the private providers, but also emphasized that this would be much harder to 
achieve if they had more than one private provider.601 The other interviewees 
from City S unanimously agreed that the relationship is ‘absolutely’ based on 
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trust and cooperation.602 These remarks underline the need to see the contract 
in the context in which it is used. 
This point is also connected to the use of sanctions, as discussed in section 
5.3.2. A leading official from City M said that, in seeking to handle defects, 
the starting point is a good and trusting relationship between the municipality 
and the provider:  
and when that is not present anymore, or what to say, then you have been aware 
of that in advance, as a provider. You know why it is a serious situation. And 
these follow-ups, they have always – that is, there will have been long 
processes. Many attempts will have been made to debug. There will have been 
much dialogue. It will have been very much like, yes, trying to remedy – it is 
not as if we just strike!603 
However, while trust is a central component of the relationship between all the 
municipalities and their providers, it has its limits. This was more clearly 
expressed by the officials from City M and City L, both of which have had 
cases involving fraudulent providers. When it comes to monitoring, it is a 
balancing act between trust in the providers’ intentions and self-monitoring 
systems and public control over the providers by means of the instruments in 
the contract. The monitors believe that there has to be an effective control 
function in order to keep the providers alert to the risk of being scrutinized.604 
Interviewer: Would you say that the relationship is more characterized by trust 
than by control? How do you balance them? 
L6: I wish that we could govern more by trust. I feel like home care is – some 
are, of course – home care you cannot really govern by trust alone. If you 
compare with nursing homes, there has been a longer period of private 
provision, and you can govern more through trust. But in home care, a level of 
control is needed, absolutely.605 
In City S, which has only one private provider, trust seems unproblematic. If 
the provider did something which violated the terms of the contract, the starting 
point would be to address this in cooperation with the provider, rather than 
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seeking to ‘throw the book’ at them, as one official put it.606 To officials in City 
S, using the hard tools provided in the contract seems, as one said, ‘far from 
our reality today, absolutely’.607  
That having a good relationship with the private providers is so important to 
the officials may seem surprising given the parallel distrust in the motives of 
some of these companies and the ever-present concern about fraud in the 
system. The most explicit description of this was provided by one of the 
officials who had worked the longest within a care choice system: 
It has to do with how you view having different private providers. My position 
and we - it is that if you decide to have such a system – like we in [City M] 
have chosen to have a purchaser–provider model – or something like that, then 
you at the same time enter into a kind of partnership between equal partners. 
Then you cannot – at the same time, we want our providers to have quality 
management systems; we want them to report discrepancies and deficiencies. 
We don’t want to establish a culture where things are obfuscated; we want it 
out in the open! So we work to create a good dialogue with the providers, to 
meet them in good times and in bad.608 
Another leading official put it this way: 
We often discuss this: what is our responsibility? But, really, our common 
interest is everyone’s interest, really: I mean, that the operations should 
improve. I should say that this is the goal we are working towards, so to speak, 
so I don’t want to – we are really very, very supportive when they call and ask 
or when we follow up on things, in these communications and so on. I think 
that the spirit is that we are working towards the development of all the services, 
because this is beneficial for everyone. It benefits us. It benefits the individual. 
It benefits society at large. It benefits everyone. Then again, of course, we 
cannot –  it’s a fine line. We cannot do everything. We cannot recommend 
exactly what they should – 609  
Another official, seeking to explain the importance of the relationship, said that 
the end goal is not to have to terminate the contract. As she saw it, the aim is 
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to help the provider improve their operations, and this is more effectively 
achieved through dialogue and support.610 
5.4.3 Developments over time 
Administrations are constantly changing and developing the ways that they 
govern through contracts. A statement frequently heard in the interviews was 
that it takes time to develop a well-functioning care choice system. The 
requirements in the tender documents and the system of monitoring are 
important pieces of the puzzle that must be fitted together. This may explain 
one of the findings of the Winblad et al. study: that the tender documents vary 
depending on the amount of time a municipality has had a care choice system. 
Municipalities with more experience of having a care choice system tend to 
have contracts with requirements that are more monitorable and with more 
effective sanctions structures.611  
My interviewees highlighted time and the balance between different interests 
as important aspects in the development of care choice systems. One official 
described her experience of developing the care choice system in the following 
way: 
It takes time for a care choice system to be put in place. It takes several years; 
it might take 10 years! Before it is in balance and we know what we need to 
look at –  I think we have come pretty far down that road. But then there are 
demands that you would like to set that you’re not allowed to – 612 
Several officials agreed with the suggestion that the reason care choice systems 
take so long to put in place is that the right balance must be struck between 
different aspects of the system. One interviewee indicated that she thought it 
was possible to handle the conflict between meeting the legal requirements of 
the Social Services Act and creating good market conditions (a conflict 
discussed in section 4.5), but she said that striking such a balance took time. 
That has been difficult, and it has taken a very long period of development to 
get there: like, to understand how detailed can you be, how much confidence 
can you have, and to actually make sure that we can follow up on the right 
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things and that we are sure that they deliver good quality, without 
micromanaging. That is a long journey.613 
In City M, the process of changing the balance of interests – the requirements 
are now more stringent than they used to be – led to an increase in the number 
of rejected applications. This is reported to have upset certain providers who 
had been accepted in other municipalities with lower or different requirements 
in their tenders but now found themselves being rejected. Requirements 
relating to management, professional knowledge, and business structure were 
strengthened in response to the administration’s experiences with poor-quality 
providers.614 City L has also made its requirements stricter in recent years, and 
the officials welcomed this development. The requirements that were 
strengthened in City L relate to the qualifications of the head of operations and 
the staff, the conditions of employment, the geographical connection, and the 
location of the business premises.615 The number of active private providers 
fell from 128 to 98 after the new list of requirements was brought in.616 Those 
that left the system tended to be the smaller providers. This was seen positively 
by one official, who thought the task of monitoring very small providers an 
unnecessary administrative burden.617 When the municipality changed its 
tender, all providers had to reapply. A lot of providers said that, because of the 
higher standards, they were not going to. ‘[A]nd that was exactly the point. 
That’s what the politicians wanted. So we do not feel sorry about that!’618 But 
one official, pointing to one very successful and well-regarded company, 
which had started out as a small business, claimed that that company would 
have had a hard time meeting the new requirements.619  
Why does it take such a long time to develop a care choice system? Several 
long-serving officials described the implementation of the system as a long 
learning experience for the administration as a whole: it must determine which 
requirements to impose, learn how to train the private providers, and learn how 
to supervise and monitor effectively. As these officials saw it, a care choice 
system has to develop over a long time if the administration is to avoid the 
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pitfalls associated with the system.620 Officials from City S said that, in the 
earlier stages of the care choice system, the contract had been less central to 
governing and less well understood by the administration than it was now. 
Officials had consciously tried to make the contract into more of a living 
document, something more relevant to the relationship with the private 
provider. The lack of legal expertise, not only within the elder care unit but 
within the municipality as a whole, was cited as an explanation of why the 
contract had had a limited role in governing.621 In City M, too, there are no 
lawyers working in the unit responsible for elder care, although the most senior 
official stated that there was still a good deal of public procurement expertise 
within the municipality thanks to its years of experience with contracting out 
elder care services.622 
It also becomes clear, when studying the evidence from the three 
municipalities, that different political priorities lead to different strategies for 
handling the sorts of conflicts described earlier in this chapter. In City S, the 
requirements for entering the sector have over the years been strengthened, 
weakened, and strengthened again, depending on the directions from, and the 
political affiliations of, the politicians in charge. The municipality used to have 
more companies in the sector but now has only one private provider (alongside 
the municipal one). According to S2, the stricter requirements and changes to 
the compensation system explain the reduction in the number of providers.623 
In City M, too, there is a political angle to the changes in strategies.624  
It is also connected to the fact that we now have, for the last two years, a 
coalition with the Social Democrats and the Green Party and the Liberals, where 
entrepreneurship is very toned down [laughter], so there is also a political 
dimension to it. In an office like this we’re working very closely with the 
politicians, and there is, for example, no interest now in measuring the number 
of small businesses that we have, which we used to measure quarterly: then, we 
always measured how many companies with less than 15 employees we had. 
That is just not on with these people, so there are differences. But, yes, the bar 
is higher now.625 
620 M1, M5, L1, L2, L6. 
621 S1, S2. 
622 M1. 
623 S2. 
624 M1. 
625 M1. 
199 
In City L, changes in the tender came after a shift in the political leadership of 
the municipality from a liberal–conservative alliance to a green–left coalition, 
with the Left Party given responsibility for elder care issues. The responsible 
councillor for elder care is also from the Left Party, and she did not mince her 
words when talking to the providers at the branch meeting about the stricter 
requirements. In remarks that sum up many of the broader conflicts faced by 
municipalities in governing care choice systems, she said: 
CL: If we find that this does not have the intended effect, then we will sharpen 
even more. I will have no hesitation when it comes to that. I am after the desired 
outcome, and we need to get rid of the rogue companies. Look, my goal is a 
trust-based system. We should have a home care service in which we can 
cooperate, but it is partly – well, you cannot have too many companies if you’re 
going to cooperate. It does not work for the care managers, nor for the rest of 
the chain. So I want us to achieve a functioning collaboration and build trust so 
that we can govern more on the basis of trust than we do today. And we are not 
there yet. We cannot be naïve and abolish the time registration systems and the 
like before we have reached that trust and that cooperation. … I don’t think we 
will get to the point of cancelling all the contracts again, but we will see! 
Everything is, after all, driven by the desired outcome, which is collaboration, 
trust, good quality for the elderly, and fair working conditions for the staff.626 
It is interesting to note that she was not completely opposed to the care choice 
system, nor to the idea of governing the private providers on the basis of trust. 
The conflict between strict requirements and room for innovation, or, in other 
words, public control versus private profit-making, in the welfare sector is in 
the end a political question that must be contested within the loosely defined 
framework of the Social Services Act. 
The way the care choice systems have developed over time is the outcome of 
officials and politicians seeking to strike the right balance between the different 
aims and aspects of the system and to find workable legal and political 
strategies for solving the problems within the system. Care choice systems 
change and develop over time because their implementation implies a 
significant learning phase for the administration, because there may be a lack 
of legal expertise within the administration, at least at the beginning, and 
because shifts in political leadership bring about different political priorities. 
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5.5 Governing with and without a care choice system 
This dissertation focuses on governing with care choice systems rather than on 
comparing this form of governing with other ways of governing. However, 
because an analysis of the differences between the governing structures of 
municipalities with and without care choice systems can throw light on the 
different ways in which public and private bodies are governed, a questionnaire 
I produced was also sent to municipalities without care choice systems. The 
purpose of the questionnaire was to understand how the use of the tender 
documents and contracts, with their lists of specific requirements regulating 
the relationships between municipalities and providers, has affected the 
internal governing models of municipalities with care choice systems.627 The 
questionnaire focused on the overarching governing structures relating to elder 
care within the municipalities, with a particular focus on whether and how 
contracts or contract-like arrangements were being used. The municipalities 
were asked whether they governed their municipal provider through a contract-
like agreement with a specific list of requirements (as private providers are 
governed in municipalities with care choice systems). If the answer was ‘no’, 
they were asked to provide a description of the model that was used instead. 
The municipalities with care choice systems were asked whether the list of 
requirements that governs the municipal provider, if they used such a list, was 
the same as that used in the case of the private providers. They were also asked 
whether the monitoring process was the same for the municipal and the private 
providers. Table 8 sums up the responses provided by the municipalities. 
Table 8 Governing municipal provider through contract-like agreements628 
ANSWER GROUP OF MUNICIPALITY 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Yes 53 66 2 18 2 3 57 33 
Connected 16 20 1 6 - 0 17 10 
No 11 14 14 82 74 97 99 57 
Sum 80 100 17 100 76 100 173 100 
627 Described in chapter 2.3.3. 
628 Excluded from the table are those municipalities which do not have any municipal 
provision at all, and instead have only private providers, contracted either through the Act 
on Care Choice Systems or through the Public Procurement Act. Among the respondents, 
there were five such municipalities. 
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Group 1 in table 8 includes those municipalities that have care choice systems 
both for services (such as washing, cleaning, shopping) and for personal care 
(support with hygiene, dressing, food, and basic medical care). In this group, 
two out of three govern their municipal provider with the same tools used to 
govern the private provider(s). The ‘connected’ row refers to responses that 
suggest that the governing and monitoring of the municipal provider resembles 
and is influenced by, but is not exactly the same as, the governing of the private 
providers. Among the municipalities with care choice systems for both services 
and personal care, one out of five govern their municipal provider in this way. 
Only 14 per cent of this group do not govern the municipal provider through a 
contract-like agreement. There is thus a strong tendency within municipalities 
with care choice systems for services and personal care to govern their 
municipal provider as they govern their private providers. Group 2 consists of 
municipalities that have a care choice system for services but not for personal 
care. This group is smaller, but here the effect of the care choice system on the 
relationship with the municipal provider is not at all as significant, with 82 per 
cent of these municipalities responding that they do not have a contract-like 
agreement with their municipal provider. Group 3 consists of municipalities 
that do not use a care choice system to provide elder care home services. In 
this group, almost all municipalities responded that they do not govern their 
municipal provider through a contract or contract-like agreement. Further, the 
two municipalities in this group that answered ‘yes’ to this question explained 
that they used to have a care choice system and that, when they got rid of the 
system, they had chosen to continue governing their internal provider through 
a contract-like agreement. There are, however, several municipalities in this 
group which have abolished their care choice system but have not chosen to 
continue governing their municipal provider in this way. It is clear, from the 
results of the questionnaire, that the introduction of a care choice system affects 
the governing of the internal delivery of services in the home care sector. 
Among those municipalities which answered ‘no’ to the question in table 3, a 
large majority said that their alternative governing structure was a purchaser–
provider model. In this model, the decision-making unit sends a basis for 
decision to the execution unit, which reports performed time back to the 
decision-making unit and is compensated accordingly. A general trend made 
clear by the results of the questionnaire is that the models used to govern home 
care in the smaller municipalities tend to be less developed.  
All three municipalities in my interview study have contract-like agreements 
with the internal organization that are the same as or closely resemble the 
contract used for the private provider(s). Of the three, City M has the most 
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level playing field for the municipal provider and the private providers: they 
are supposed to ‘compete on the same terms’, and in some parts of the city (the 
care choice system is geographically divided in the city), the municipal 
provider has even been squeezed out by private providers.629 It has also on 
occasion been fined for providing poor-quality services, demonstrating the fact 
that the municipality is expected to follow the same rules as the private 
providers.630 In City L, the administration’s agreements with the municipal and 
with the private providers look the same, but the central office does not monitor 
the municipal providers in the different districts of the city, as they do with the 
private providers, and instead the districts are responsible for monitoring the 
public providers (as well as private providers).631 There are also a few districts 
which have not yet entered into the central agreement for their public 
provider.632 Municipal providers are not subject to sanctions, and 
accountability is based on the traditional model, where the municipality is 
directly responsible to its citizens for the service provision.633 From the 
descriptions offered by City S officials, it seems that there are more differences 
between the governing of the municipal provider and that of the private in that 
municipality than in City M and City L, although these officials also claimed 
that they were actively working to harmonize the governing and monitoring of 
the municipal and private provider.634 City S is also distinguished by the fact 
that the relationship between the administration and the management of the 
municipal provider is much closer, and the contact more frequent, than in the 
other cities, as all the officials work in the same building. Communication 
regarding issues of quality development runs up and down the hierarchy 
between the administration, the management, and workers on the ground. By 
contrast, the meetings with the private provider are on a monthly basis and 
more formal, and officials have decided to introduce these monthly meetings 
for the municipal provider too.635 The administration also currently provides 
training sessions for municipal staff to which the staff of the private provider 
are not invited, but this too is planned to change in the future.636 
629 M1. 
630 M3. 
631 L1. 
632 L2. 
633 L3. 
634 S2, S6. 
635 S5. 
636 S2. 
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5.6 Results 
The most important finding of this chapter is that care choice systems change 
the tools that are used in governing, bringing about a growth in the importance 
of the contract: the contractualization of governing. However, alongside the 
use of tenders and contracts in governing is also an extensive informal 
governing process, which takes place through monitoring and dialogue. 
Further, this contractualization process also affects the municipalities’ own 
operations. From the purchasers’ perspective, the differences between public 
and private providers of services do not seem significant. The move away from 
a public-law framework and the public delivery of services should therefore be 
seen not as deregulation but rather as a new form of regulation. The 
introduction of the care choice system does not mean that the municipalities 
govern or regulate less, but it does mean that they govern and regulate with 
different tools. That said, this shift does leave less room for political 
intervention and more room for the operation of private, profit-driven interests. 
How is the relationship between public-law obligations and contracted-out 
welfare services expressed in national legal sources, policy documents, and 
doctrine? 
There seems to be no clear legal guidance on the extent to which public-law 
regulations are transferred to private-law subjects carrying out public activities 
or on the role of the contract in regulating public-law obligations in contracted-
out services. Even though the legal sources that deal with this issue do not 
explicitly contradict one another, there is no clarity about the legal 
responsibilities of private providers operating in the welfare sector. Legislators 
seem to have been unwilling or unable to make explicit what is expected of 
private providers in the welfare sector from a public-law perspective.  
It is also unclear just to what extent the municipalities look to the debates in 
national policy documents and doctrinal sources when trying to understand 
how to regulate the private providers. The municipalities seem to have handled 
this lack of clarity primarily by including broad references to public law in 
their contracts. The overall impression one gets from the statements from the 
interviewees is that there is a certain amount of confusion and disagreement 
about how the principles expressed through public law, regulation, and policy 
relate to private providers offering welfare services. The interviews suggest 
that some officials see the private providers, or believe the private providers 
should be seen, as an extension of the public services. This lack of clarity 
creates a grey zone in which lines of accountability might become obscured. 
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This could, however, also be seen as connected to the trend towards the more 
indirect regulation of public services, as in, for instance, the support given to 
private providers, described in the preceding chapter. 
What strategies do municipalities with care choice systems adopt in order to 
fulfil their public-law obligations?  
My empirical investigation reveals that the municipalities use a mixture of 
strategies to try to ensure that the private providers comply with the obligations 
surrounding the provision of home care in Sweden. To deepen the 
understanding of these strategies and their implications, it is helpful to turn to 
the international debate in the legal studies literature on the question of 
contracted-out welfare services. On one side of this debate, there are those who 
argue for increasing the use of private-law instruments within the public 
field.637 The other side is represented by those who believe that private 
companies cannot provide the accountability and compliance with 
fundamental public-law rules and principles that public authorities can, and 
therefore that core public services cannot, or rather should not, be transferred 
to private entities and governed through private law.638 Within the broader 
debate about how to understand and regulate this phenomenon, there are 
proposals for different legal strategies by which public authorities should 
handle the governing of contracted-out services. These may be grouped under 
the following four headings: strategies of securing public values, through 
regulation and/or contracts; strategies of publicization; strategies of 
strengthening the use of private law instruments, and strategies of relational 
contracting. It is worth mentioning at the outset that I have not found any 
explicit references to these strategies, or to the literature in which they are 
presented, in any of the legal, policy, or doctrinal sources I have studied, nor 
were they explicitly mentioned in the interviews. I thus cannot claim that any 
of these strategies are being consciously followed by public authorities. 
637 See e.g. Jody Freeman, ‘Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization’ (2003) 116 
Harvard Law Review 1285; Laura A Dickinson, ‘Public Values/Private Contract’ in Jody 
Freeman and Martha Minow (eds), Government by contract: outsourcing and American 
democracy (Harvard Univ Press 2009). 
638 See e.g. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals : Privatization and the Public Good (Beacon 
Press 2002); Jon Pierre and Martin Painter, ‘Why Legality Cannot Be Contracted Out: 
Exploring the Limits of New Public Management’ in M Ramesh, Eduardo Araral and Wu 
Xun (eds), Reasserting the public in public services : new public management reforms 
(Routledge 2010); Alfred C Aman, jr., ‘Privatization and Democracy: Resources in 
Administrative Law’ in Jody Freeman and Martha Minow (eds), Government by contract: 
outsourcing and American democracy (Harvard Univ Press 2009). 
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Nevertheless, examining the different positions taken up in the legal studies 
debate can illuminate the strategies used by the municipalities in practice. 
Proponents of the public values theory, such as Martha Minow, argue that the 
values that have emerged from legal and political traditions and sources should 
guide public–private partnerships. On this view, the responsibility should rest 
with the public authority, regardless of how a service is delivered.639 A central 
problem, however, is that providers enjoy considerable discretion when 
implementing policy through the delivery of services. Through this discretion, 
policies might be redefined or interpreted in a way unanticipated by the policy-
makers, thereby undermining democratic decision-making. This problem may 
arise in the case of public as well as private providers, but proponents of the 
‘public values’ school see public employees and organizations as imbued with 
a certain ethos that prevents them from infringing fundamental public norms. 
Minow adopts a traditional administrative-law view of accountability as the 
holding of authority to account through incentives and sanctions connected to 
obligations that are ultimately created through democratic decision-making. 
The ultimate authority in such a system is the people, that is, the voters. If 
public services are contracted out, government must continue to evaluate the 
service provision and must explain to the public how the public-law 
requirements are being met, and this process must be transparent.640  
In an article from 2003, Jody Freeman, responding in part to Martha Minow, 
introduced the term publicization.641 The goal of the publicization project is to 
extend public goals to the private providers of contracted-out services. On this 
view, rather than necessarily compromising public values, as critics such as 
Minow fear, privatization may thus be consistent with the goals and values of 
public authorities. Tools such as the accreditation of providers, budgeting 
requirements, regulations, contracts, and monitoring may all be used as means 
in the publicization process,642 but it also requires an inventive attitude towards 
legal solutions.643 Publicization is seen as a pragmatic position, combining the 
will to deliver high-quality and publicly regulated services with the need to do 
                                                 
639 Minow (n 638) 142. 
640 Martha Minow, ‘Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion’ (2003) 
116 Harvard Law Review 1229, 1260. 
641 Jody Freeman (n 637) 1327. 
642 Jody Freeman (n 637) 1315–1317. 
643 Jody Freeman (n 637) 1340. 
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so in cost-effective ways (which, on this view, means privately rather than 
publicly).644  
Some authors have argued that the changes that have taken place within the 
welfare state – the increasing private delivery of services, the implementation 
of austerity measures, and the increased emphasis on the private responsibility 
of the individual – should lead to an expansion of the role of private-law 
instruments within the welfare state. Thomas Wilhelmsson argues for the use 
of private law to carry out regulatory and supervisory functions within the 
welfare system, functions that were previously exercised by the state and that 
are important in preventing systematic abuses of power.645 The vacuum created 
in the governing of welfare services when the public hands over the delivery 
of services to private interests creates space for such private-law regulation, 
with the responsibility for failings in the services monitored and enforced 
through tort and contract.646 Emily Dickinson similarly argued for the 
development of public–private partnership contracts that would enhance 
accountability by including requirements relating to specific performance 
standards, benchmarks, graduated penalties, and reporting. These contracts 
could explicitly require that the contractors obey public-law regulations, and 
contractual terms could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant 
legal rules applicable to public actors. Contracts could also provide for ‘back-
end enforcement’, sanctions that would enhance accountability through, for 
example, the right of third parties to the contract to sue.647 The aim of this sort 
of project is to use private-law techniques to strengthen both incentives and 
penalties: rewarding good performance through standards or benchmarking 
and discouraging bad performance through the threat of penalties, 
terminations, and government takeover of contracts.648 In order for this strategy 
to function effectively, increased levels of monitoring would be necessary, and 
this would require clear benchmarks to be included in the contracts.649 
Nestor M Davidson seeks to add some nuance to the image of how contracts 
and contractual relationships in the private delivery of public services should 
look. He describes privatization as a relational phenomenon. For many public 
644 Jody Freeman (n 637) 1295. 
645 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Senmodern Ansvarsrätt : Privaträtt Som Redskap För Mikropolitik 
(Iustus 2001) 19. 
646 Wilhelmsson (n 645) 61. 
647 Dickinson (n 637) 338. 
648 Dickinson (n 637) 352. 
649 Dickinson (n 637) 347. 
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authorities, he claims, the solution to the problems created by the use of 
contracts, for instance the principal–agent problem,650 is sought in increasingly 
detailed contracts, more specificity in contract design, and increased attention 
to contract monitoring by public officials. This solution is sought because 
policy-makers want to retain the advantages of privatization, which they 
believe come from increases in efficiency, while at the same time keeping 
enough control over the process to ensure that public goals are met. Davidson, 
however, spots a problem with this logic: it assumes that public service terms 
of engagement can be reduced to clear contractual clauses which capture the 
essence of the desired output. Given the nature of welfare services, however, 
many aspects of the services provided are difficult to specify in terms of clear 
outputs and will ‘elude detailed specification, no matter how prescient or 
creative the drafter of the contract’.651 In response, the traditional ‘discrete’ 
contracting approach calls for more contractual specificity and vigilant 
monitoring. Davidson’s relational approach, by contrast, recognizes that 
public-law norms are inherently difficult to capture in contractual terms. This 
approach seeks to inculcate public values in private providers, not only through 
contractual specificities but also through ‘informally encouraging reciprocity 
and private-party solidarity to public values’.652 In the process of selecting 
providers, in the contracts, and in subsequent interactions, public 
administrators should make fidelity to public values central to their approach. 
The private provider should not be kept at arm’s length; instead, public 
authorities should make a long-term investment in the relationship. A relational 
strategy plays out over a number of exchanges, which bring the parties into 
repeated contact, creating a superstructure of formal and informal interactions 
through which any gaps in the initial contracts can be filled and any potential 
conflicts avoided.653 Although the possibility of termination and other hard 
sanctions can still exist, and may be used if cooperation has broken down, this 
                                                 
650 An agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. The ‘problem’ arises since both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, which means that there are good reasons 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. Michael C 
Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 310. 
651 Nestor M Davidson, ‘Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case 
of Housing’ (2006) 24 Yale Law & Policy Review 278. 
652 Davidson (n 651) 306. 
653 Davidson (n 651) 299. 
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approach affords public authorities discretion in the significant grey areas that 
often surround welfare services.654 
Looking at the results of the study through the lens of these strategies, a variety 
of tendencies can be discerned in the municipalities’ practices, but some 
patterns also become clear. I discuss the different strategies in turn below in 
relation to the evidence from the municipalities. 
Regulation to secure public values 
The debate about the importance of securing public values is prominent in 
Swedish doctrinal sources through the work of authors such as Landelius and 
Marcusson. However, as I mentioned above, this has not translated into a 
similar prominence in policy documents and inquiries by the government and 
governmental agencies. In the municipalities’ tender documents, however, this 
strategy is more noticeable, in particular in the use of references to values and 
overarching principles. Interviewees also discussed the challenge  of ensuring 
that providers comply with public values and live up to the high standards of 
care quality contained in national legislation. Public procurement law, 
however, sets limits on how far public authorities can go in trying to regulate 
the private providers. Here there is a conflict between two aims: the 
municipalities’ wish to guarantee quality and the public procurement 
regulations’ aim to limit state intervention. One sign of an increasing desire to 
exert public control over contracted-out services is the growth of detailed 
regulation in the form of non-binding national policy documents and the 
increasing involvement of government agencies, as this study has documented. 
As the last chapter showed, the provision of elder care has become more 
regulated in recent years, especially through the standards and provisions 
issued by the National Board on Health and Welfare. These are generally 
applicable to the private providers, either directly or through their inclusion in 
contracts. It cannot be conclusively proven that the increase in standards is a 
direct effect of the introduction of care choice systems, but, as I discussed in 
section 4.6, there seems to be a connection between marketization and 
standardization. If that is right, then it seems that the entrance of private 
providers into markets for public services brings with it an increase in public-
law regulation. 
654 Davidson (n 651) 312. 
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Publicization 
The list of requirements set through tenders and contracts achieves a highly 
detailed form of governing, covering organizations, processes, procedures, and 
systems. Even though there are limits to this kind of regulation set by EU 
public procurement rules and the way these are interpreted, there is still a great 
deal of detail in contractual criteria. For instance, requirements relating to 
involvement in the municipality’s emergency preparedness system, references 
to international conventions on human rights, and sweeping statements on 
broad values regarding environmental and social responsibility indicate a level 
of governing which seems to suggest that private providers are seen as 
extensions of the public authority. The same goes for the widespread 
requirement that the private providers use the same technical systems (for 
complaints, time measuring, etc.) as the municipality. A tension arises from 
the fact that elder care is a sector that is subject to a lot of regulation, especially 
through the provisions issued by the National Board on Health and Welfare, 
and that elder care is a service defined not in relation to a ‘customer’ but by 
the municipal administration’s decision concerning the needs of the individual. 
This is found to be problematic by at least some of the private providers. This 
tension is dealt with in part through the training and education the 
administrations offer to the private providers. As we have seen, because the 
matter of whether public law applies directly to private providers is unclear, 
the municipality must ensure compliance with these rules through other 
techniques. 
Using private-law tools 
It is clear that the municipalities view the tender documents and contracts as 
tools that are essential if they are to be able to govern the quality of services 
and thereby comply with their legal responsibilities. The municipalities have a 
responsibility to interpret and follow the law, but their tools for actually 
realizing this obligation to the citizen lie in the contracts and sanctions and how 
these are actually used. If the contractual clauses are not sufficient to capture 
central requirements, the municipality’s ability to have influence over and 
govern the outcome may be weakened. However, my empirical investigations 
reveal that the municipalities actually make limited use of sanctions. The 
possible explanations for this are several: the difficulty in defining quality in 
monitorable terms, the ambition to create good relationships and a trusting 
environment, and the risk of legal and financial repercussions for the 
municipalities themselves. In practice, then, the legal structure protects not 
only, or even primarily, individual users but individual providers. The structure 
of a sanctions regime also affects the effectiveness of the sanctions in 
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structuring behaviour. If, for instance, the fines are too small, providers may 
see it as cost effective to simply pay the fine rather than to remedy the defect.  
The construction and use of the tender documents and contracts define the 
administrative process of dealing with the private providers, from formulating 
requirements and processing applications to monitoring, tackling problems, 
and getting rid of companies providing substandard services. How this process 
is carried out differs across the municipalities, with lists of requirements of 
varying length and detail in the tender documents and differing sanctions 
regimes in the contracts. These differences seem to be explained in part by the 
degree of legal expertise available within the municipality, which mostly 
relates, in turn, to the size of the municipality, and by the length of time the 
municipality has had a care choice system in place. As officials pointed out, 
the contract creates the framework for the relationship, although, as they also 
claimed, the contract is not sufficient to guarantee the level of quality required 
by law. The contract is also a difficult tool to work with, especially when it 
comes to defining and controlling quality. However, without a workable 
contract the municipality might end up in a situation in which it has the 
responsibility for a service over which it has limited influence. 
Relational strategies 
The function of the contract must be seen in context. Since public-law 
regulations, including the Social Services Act, are built on values, principles, 
and frameworks of norms, rather than detailed lists of requirements, they are 
often hard to regulate and monitor through contracts. In all three municipalities 
studied, the informal relationship with the provider has therefore come to be 
an important complement to the contractual one. The limitations of governing 
through contracts entail that other ways of governing the providers, through 
dialogue, coaching, etc., have to be used in parallel, as part of a wider relational 
context. This context is shaped by the logic of the instruments, of course, but 
also by the political aim of establishing a functioning market while at the same 
time ensuring that the services provided are high quality. The municipal 
administrations have developed complex contractual relationship strategies for 
dealing with the private providers. The providers are not simply seen as 
exchange partners, but instead they come to be intertwined with the municipal 
administration. The relationship is built on dialogue rather than on the hard 
tools of the contract. Still, there are some differences between the 
municipalities in this regard, and these seem to have been the product of the 
different experiences municipalities have had with different providers. In the 
municipal administrations I studied, the idea of ‘partnership’ is central, and 
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trust is an important aspect of these partnerships. However, in City M and City 
L, the recurring problems of fraud in the systems have made the 
administrations increasingly wary, concerned about loopholes, trust, and 
discretionary power, and strategies have been set up to keep a watchful eye on 
the private providers. These concerns also explain why the administrations 
have sought to impose tougher requirements for providers trying to get into the 
system. Another important factor in this context is the political ambition of 
supporting the creation of a care market within which small businesses can 
flourish. The municipalities’ use of relational strategies, alongside their general 
unwillingness to use the tougher sanctions in the contracts, may be connected 
to this wish to support private providers. The partnership model is thus 
complicated by the need and wish to be heavily involved with the private 
providers in different ways, both through monitoring and through support.  
To sum up: as the municipalities see it, the way that they govern the private 
providers, their governing model, seems to a large extent to rest on 
collaboration and self-regulation, but with limited discretionary powers for the 
private providers – a somewhat ambiguous and complex system. There seems 
to be a tension within the system between the desire to create partnerships and 
the need to exert control over the quality of the services. In order to navigate 
this tension, they adopt a number of strategies, as this study has shown: 
relationships and dialogue, coaching and monitoring, and regulating private 
providers ‘as if’ they were the municipality. From my case studies, it is clear 
that municipalities frequently adopt a relational strategy, becoming closely 
involved with the operations of the private providers. However, there are also 
elements of publicization here: public-law regulations are a significant element 
in the relationships between the municipalities and the providers. 
These observations corroborate findings from some other studies in the field. 
In their study of the legal framework governing the contracting out of 
education and elder care in the Nordic countries, Signe Bock Segaard and Jo 
Saglie find that even though municipalities are urged to find ‘freedom within 
the form’, national policy documents seem overall to encourage a partnership 
and collaboration model rather than a hierarchical purchaser–provider 
relationship.655 They also conclude that national governing tends to focus more 
on processes than on content and results, a conclusion also borne out by my 
own study, particularly in the discussion above about the construction of 
contractual requirements.656 Hansen has studied the design of the tenders and 
                                                 
655 Segaard and Saglie (n 28) 96–97. 
656 Segaard and Saglie (n 28) 98. 
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contracts used in privatized welfare services in the Nordic countries. He finds 
that they are generally of a long-term type, designed to promote reliability and 
commitment.657 He also identifies a variety of strategies used, often in 
combination, by the municipalities, remarking that there is ‘a remarkable 
inconsistency in the strategies chosen’.658  
Just as in my study, the outsourcing contracts Hansen studied typically 
contained very detailed descriptions of the services required of the private 
providers, as well as extensive legal specifications and requirements. Hansen 
observes that references to legal requirements are often placed in the first 
section of the contracts, underlining the importance of services being delivered 
in accordance with public-law rules. This effect is also sometimes achieved by 
the public authority defining the service in the contract with explicit reference 
to the public-law regulations by which the public authority itself is bound.659 
Echoing the way several of my interviewees described their view of the private 
providers’ responsibilities, Hansen notes that the idea seems to be that the 
contractor should act towards the citizen as though it were the municipality 
itself, in accordance with the legal requirements placed on the municipalities, 
almost as if the contract were more like a licence.660  
In another article, Hansen states that the outsourcing contracts for social 
services can often be described as concessions. In this strategy, the private 
provider is in many ways seen as taking the place of the public authority, 
providing a service that is seen as a public resource which should benefit the 
public, and the contract requires the provider to follow the same rules and 
regulations to which the municipality is subject through public law. One such 
regulation is a general requirement of legal security and conformity, something 
to which private parties would not otherwise be subject. In fact, Hansen states, 
it may be hard to tell the difference between the terms of such concession 
contracts and administrative provisions.661 In other words, the strong 
tendencies towards publicization strategies seen in my evidence from the 
municipalities was also identified by Hansen. Moreover, Hansen also found 
evidence of the same sort of relational strategies as I described above. He finds 
that relational strategies are often used when contracting out services which 
657 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 631. 
658 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 635. 
659 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 635–636. 
660 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 637. 
661 Hansen, ‘Strategier for Længerevarende Kontrakter Om Udlicitering Af Kommunal 
Service’ (n 63) 62. 
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are seen as more complex and as involving care. These services are more 
difficult to describe in contractual terms and are seen as involving public 
interests of a type which are foreign to private market actors. The private 
providers thus have to comply with a detailed body of rules and legal standards, 
such as standards for staff competence, hygiene, etc.662 
What issues and conflicts might arise when these strategies are used? 
The effect of the translation of public-law provisions into contractual clauses 
is uncertain, but my empirical investigations, analysed with the help of relevant 
literature in this area, provides some clues as to its implications. From a 
private-law perspective, it creates a complexity in the relationship between the 
parties, which underlines the fact that the delivery of social services is not a 
straightforward action which can easily be regulated via contract. Interpretive 
difficulties may arise when public-law regulations are included as vague 
contractual terms of a more or less general character. Principles of equality, 
objectivity, and transparency are often included in the contracts even in 
relation to situations in which the provider is only completing practical tasks 
and has no decision-making responsibility.663 The very use of a ladder of 
sanctions might be seen as being in conflict with a public-law perspective, in 
which the individual right to receive good-quality services is non-negotiable. 
One issue here is that, when services are substandard, the person who suffers 
the loss is not party to the contract. That person’s rights are constructed in 
accordance with another, non-economic logic.  
The contract is a technology of a certain rationality. The rationality legitimizes 
as well as uses the technology, but the technology also limits and structures the 
rationality. Tender documents and contracts have a certain significance as 
governing mechanisms, at least insofar as they provide a framework for the 
relationship between the public authorities and the private providers. This has 
several implications for the governing of quality: for instance, it constrains 
how quality can be governed and monitored, and it leads to a focus on 
measurable and monitorable features of quality, as this study has shown. It is 
much easier to respond to formal deficiencies, like tax avoidance or structural 
defects, than it is to respond to deficiencies in the ‘softer’ aspects of quality, a 
fact that seems to follow from the form of the contract. It is also not possible 
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663 Lisa Donlau, ‘Studie Av Avtal Mellan Kommuner Och Privata Utförare Av Hemtjänst’ 
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for the municipalities to ask the private providers to do more than they are 
required to do under the terms of the contract.664 
This chapter provides further insight into why the contracting out of services 
leads to a weakening of accountability. The chief reason is that it seems to be 
difficult both to terminate contracts and to use quality requirements to sanction 
companies that are providing substandard services. Many of the requirements 
in the tender documents are unclear, vague, and therefore difficult to monitor. 
It is hard to hold private providers accountable for breaches of clauses that 
refer to more abstract standards of quality. Contractual tools, such as the threat 
or actual use of warnings, fines, and other financial penalties, are used to 
regulate quality and other aspects of services in care choice systems. From one 
perspective, it might seem as though, when contracts are used to enforce public 
standards relating to certain aspects of quality, quality and accountability could 
be enhanced. In theory, if horizontal accountability is more effective than 
vertical accountability, private parties should comply with public regulations 
even more scrupulously than the public provider itself, at least in cases where 
the standards are well defined, monitoring is effective, and remedies are used 
(at least as a deterrent).665 In order for there to be effective accountability 
between the municipality and the private provider, however, there have first to 
be monitorable clauses in the contracts, and, second, these must be connected 
to sanctions which are actually used. Even though monitoring has become an 
increasingly large part of the municipal administration of elder care, it is very 
difficult actually to monitor the providers to the extent that is necessary to 
exclude the more unscrupulous providers from the system. The municipality 
also confronts legal difficulties if it wants to terminate a contract with a 
company providing substandard services. In order to be able to terminate a 
provider, the municipality must be able to specify the precise way in which the 
provider has violated the quality requirements stated in the contract. This 
means that the extent to which municipalities can hold private providers 
accountable is limited and that, as a consequence, the quality of services may 
664 One implication of this can be seen in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, which has 
hit the elder care sector hard and has meant that new measures have had to be 
implemented. If the contract does not allow for rapid amendment in emergency situations, 
then it is not possible for the municipality to require changes to working conditions (e.g. to 
ensure that staff with symptoms do not have to go to work) or changes in the organization 
of care (e.g. procedures for isolation and cohort care for infected patients). Mirjam Katzin, 
‘Skärp kraven på den privata hemtjänsten, kommuner’ Dagens Samhälle (21 April 2020) 
<https://www.dagenssamhalle.se/debatt/skarp-kraven-pa-den-privata-hemtjansten-
kommuner-32282> accessed 7 July 2020. See further footnote 561. 
665 King (n 518) 85. 
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be compromised by unscrupulous providers coming on to the market. As my 
interviewees made clear, the process of rectifying inadequacies or terminating 
contracts is often long, and in the meantime the quality of the services provided 
to individual users might be compromised. Monitoring work is also used in 
part as a way of supporting the providers, and when the providers fail in their 
mission they are given opportunities and time to rectify their mistakes, even 
when they have not met basic requirements.  
The public-law regulation seems to act as an argument in the relationships with 
the private providers when trying to regulate them by other means, such as 
through contract, monitoring, and dialogue. Because of the hybridization of 
public and private interests that comes about through care choice systems, the 
companies are at the same time representatives of the public authorities and 
are – directly or indirectly – expected to comply with public-law regulations. 
On the other hand, these public-law regulations seem to be viewed rather 
differently by municipal administrations and care companies, according to my 
interviewees, underlining the fact that these actors operate according to 
different logics. Municipal officials therefore feel a responsibility to explain 
the rules to the private companies, so as to ensure that quality standards in the 
sector are upheld. The conflict between these different logics arises especially 
in relation to small businesses.   
The international debate on the contracting out of welfare services provides 
some points of orientation that can deepen our understanding of my empirical 
results. The publicization project is a conscious strategy of hybridization in 
which the public authority becomes heavily involved in the operations of the 
private actors through detailed regulation and extensive monitoring. One 
reason for pursuing this project is that the responsibility for the user’s situation 
stays with the municipality, both in a public-law sense and in the view of the 
public. Segaard and Saglie go as far as to say that a very detailed list of 
requirements, combined with extensive supervision by the public authorities, 
could actually be described as an extended form of in-house service delivery.666 
Hansen’s main finding, which my study echoes, is that municipalities ‘seem to 
want competitive and efficient markets for social services, but at the same time 
stay in complete control with the quantity and content of private contractors’ 
performance in the full length of the contract period’.667 Hansen states that the 
public’s desire for far-reaching control over providers and service provision 
may at times seem to contradict the very rationale for creating a quasi-market 
                                                 
666 Segaard and Saglie (n 28) 99. 
667 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 621. 
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for social services in the first place: to allow the operation of private incentive 
to improve service provision.668 Jon Pierre and Martin Painter recognize the 
importance of the publicization narrative, while, like Hansen, criticizing some 
of its basic claims:  
To become agents of ‘publicization’ private contractors would have to make 
significant investments in staff training and be willing to, as Freeman suggests, 
become quasi-agents of the state. … At the end of the day, Freeman’s analysis 
of ‘publicization’ begs the question of the rationale of contracting out in the 
first place. The costs for the public sector associated with ‘publicization’ – 
designing and managing by contracts, careful evaluation of potential 
contractors, evaluation of the performance of the final contractor, and so on – 
raise the issue of how much money is actually saved by contracting out services 
where adhering to public norms is paramount. The market logic is not in favour 
of ‘publicization’; a related question is whether the public sector logic would 
support such an arrangement.669 
The same criticism could apply to the relational strategy: if private interests 
are governed by a logic of profit-making rather than public values, close 
cooperation might not necessarily be worthwile for the public, but more so for 
the private interests. This is also recognized by Davidson, who admits that the 
underlying goal of parties in a commercial context is ‘relatively clear and 
translatable (in some form) into financial terms’, and that the need to be 
sensitive to public values in welfare services might make the goals of the 
parties ‘incommensurate’.670 To get the private parties to commit to solidarity 
and the achievement of public values, economic incentive structures are 
needed. Another impediment to public–private partnerships is the potential for 
the capture and abuse of the public commitment to collaboration. The absence 
of standards often present in welfare services might undermine the ability to 
detect and defer fraud.671 
The relational strategy raises issues of trust between the administrations and 
the providers. To cast some light on these issues, it is worth considering the 
results of two Swedish studies of contracted-out elder care, one by Malin 
Tillmar, the other by Helene Brodin and Elin Peterson, which both deal with 
this issue. In Tillmar’s study, she found a high level of mutual distrust between 
668 Hansen, ‘Public Law by Contract’ (n 63) 642. 
669 Pierre and Painter (n 638) 59. 
670 Davidson (n 651) 313. 
671 Davidson (n 651) 310–311. 
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care providers and municipal employees. She connects this lack of trust with 
the system’s lack of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. The legitimacy of the 
system could be strengthened through more effective contracting and public 
procurement, but this might then have negative effects on the relationship 
between public authority and provider.672 Brodin and Peterson reach similar 
conclusions in their study of the relationship between private providers and 
municipal authorities in the care choice system for home care in Stockholm. 
They say that the large number of providers makes close cooperation 
impossible, a situation which creates a vicious circle of distrust in which 
municipal officials suspect the private providers of malpractice and the private 
providers suspect the administration of not being competition neutral.673 The 
representatives from the providers interviewed expressed distrust towards 
other providers, which they suspected of being unscrupulous, and believed the 
market was full of ‘dirty dealing’.674 The providers accepted that there was 
detailed regulation in place, partly to prevent such market abuse, but this 
regulation was seen as a significant problem for small businesses, where care 
staff had to spend a lot of their working time doing administrative work in 
order to comply with the municipality’s demands for documentation.675 The 
authors conclude that the distrust in the system affects practices around 
remuneration, monitoring, and follow-up. This image corresponds with the 
findings of my own study and may be especially true of those municipalities 
with many care providers within the quasi-market and/or with many cases of 
fraud in the system. This passage captures the picture well: 
To combat the cheating companies, the City of Stockholm has developed a 
complicated control system. But when the control system regulates the 
operations and thus also the care work in detail, it becomes rigid. The control 
system thus makes it impossible for providers and their staff to be flexible and 
responsive to variations in the needs of older persons. The distrust also makes 
the essential cooperation on particular issues and the exchange of information 
about changes in users’ needs difficult.676 
The evidence from my interviews reveals a more sincere ambition to create 
partnerships and build trust than these studies have found. That said, officials 
                                                 
672 Malin Tillmar, ‘No Longer So Strange? (Dis)Trust in Municipality—Small Business 
Relationships’ (2009) 30 Economic and Industrial Democracy 418–419. 
673 Brodin and Peterson (n 56) 121. 
674 Brodin and Peterson (n 56) 127. 
675 Brodin and Peterson (n 56) 130. 
676 Brodin and Peterson (n 56) 133. The translation is my own. 
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from all three municipalities emphasized the constant conflict between 
combatting cheating in the system and building partnerships. Taken together, 
the studies also suggest that relational, trust-based contracting strategies 
become much more difficult in systems with many providers. 
The municipal administrations spend a great deal of time handling the risks 
and loopholes that seem to arise frequently within care choice systems. All the 
municipalities in my study have had care choice systems for a long time, and 
officials from each city described a gradual development in which, in response 
to experiences of fraud and substandard services, the balance between trust and 
control had shifted towards the latter. What this suggests is that the 
development of well-functioning structures takes time and requires legal 
knowledge; in the early years after the introduction of a care choice system, 
there may be more loopholes and defects within the system that are gradually 
closed and ironed out over time. Smaller municipalities with more limited legal 
expertise within the administration may also face bigger obstacles in seeking 
to develop better ways of governing this new mode of service provision. This 
also means that the actual outcomes of care choice systems can differ 
significantly from municipality to municipality.  
How does the introduction of care choice systems affect the municipal 
delivery of elder care? 
The introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems has changed the way 
home care is governed by the municipalities. This may be seen not only in the 
entrance of private providers into the sector but also, in many cases, in changes 
in the municipalities’ relationships towards their own in-house providers. In a 
majority of the municipalities with care choice systems, the municipal provider 
is still the largest provider. Yet municipal providers increasingly tend to be 
governed as though they were private providers. There is a clear connection 
between the implementation of the care choice system and changes to the way 
the municipal administration governs the municipal provider. On the other 
hand, the introduction of the Act on Care Choice Systems does not seem to 
have affected internal governing structures in municipalities without care 
choice systems. 
The municipalities with care choice systems tend to govern their municipal 
providers with the same private-law tools as they use to govern the private 
providers Thus, the contractualization of service provision brings about certain 
changes in municipal organization, increasing the distance between policy 
input and output. With the introduction of care choice systems, the division 
already created under the purchaser–provider model is taken one step further, 
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with the distance between those responsible for governing and the units being 
governed increasing. This means that the differences between the municipal 
and private providers are lessened. In this way, it can start to seem as though 
the municipalities’ own services are being governed as though they were 
private entities, partly outside of the structures of the municipalities 
themselves. On the other hand, the support given to the private providers 
suggests that they are not seen as being fully external to the municipality either, 
an attitude which, as we have seen, is also reflected in the highly detailed 
requirements included in the tenders and in the remarks of the municipal 
officials.  
The general tendency this chapter has revealed is that, within care choice 
systems, the contract comes to be an increasingly important tool for governing 
the provision of elder care. The shift from governing on the basis of public law 
and policies to governing on the basis of tenders, contracts, and sanctions 
amounts not to deregulation but to a new form of regulation. This shift has 
various implications. As this chapter has shown, the municipalities find that 
they have to complement the contract with a significant degree of informal 
governing, which is used alongside the contract in order to ensure that the 
municipalities comply with their legal responsibilities. These strategies reduce 
the distance between the public authority and the private providers of services. 
In this way, one outcome of governing through care choice systems is a 
blurring of the boundaries between public and private bodies and public and 
private legal tools. 
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6 Why are municipal 
administrations taking care of 
business? 
6.1 Introduction 
A central purpose of this thesis is to understand how the private providers in 
care choice systems are actually governed – to identify the logics, rationalities, 
and technologies through which they are governed – and to understand what 
role public and private law play in this governing. To describe the shifts in 
governing structures that have occurred as deregulation seems, however, to be 
misleading. This is rather a situation of reregulation: the use of different 
techniques of governing. Where the line between different forms of governing 
should be drawn is a matter of political dispute, but behind the goal of ‘rolling 
back the state’ is actually a wish to govern not less, but differently. By drawing 
on the work of various theorists, this chapter will elaborate these claims and, 
in doing so, explain the results of the empirical chapters. I will also use the 
chapter to summarize my findings and to discuss the lessons that can be learned 
from the example of home care for older persons in Sweden for broader 
discussions about contracted-out welfare services. 
As I have stressed throughout this dissertation, quasi-marketization leads not 
to deregulation but rather to a reconfiguration of the relationship between state 
and capital. This entails new ways of governing, such as contractualization and 
standardization, and a new role for public administration and bureaucracy. This 
chapter will discuss how the state creates and secures markets and how 
neoliberalization extends markets and commodification into new spheres. In 
these discussions, Polanyi’s theories about the construction of markets in The 
Great Transformation, and the literature these theories have inspired, are an 
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important starting point.677 Central to the mythology of capitalism is the idea 
of the self-regulating market, but in reality capitalism requires a state in order 
to create and regulate markets. Polanyi points out that there is nothing ‘natural’ 
about laissez-faire capitalism. The growth of public administration is therefore 
a necessary consequence of the expansion of markets and commodification, as 
a significant apparatus is needed to support the market and to meet the 
constantly increasing need for control, regulation, and intervention in the 
market.678 Polanyi historically reconstructs how the market economy built on 
previously introduced price and competition mechanisms, as well as how it 
commodified things that are were commodities in themselves. By being 
converted into tradable goods, factors such as land and labour became 
commodities, albeit ‘fictitious’ ones. Commodification, however, is a fiction 
with real consequences.679 At the same time, Polanyi says, there is a ‘double 
movement’ in society, as the tendency towards market liberalization creates a 
reaction against the exploitation and vulnerability that this liberalization 
entails. From this point of view, the state plays an ambivalent role in the 
relationship between economy and politics, creating and expanding markets as 
well as creating legislation to protect workers and citizens.680 
As I will show in this chapter, the changes that have been depicted in this study 
are part of a legal-historical development towards new modes of governing and 
new uses of public and private law. The results of this study can be interpreted 
in the light of theorizations of the contemporary legal paradigm. Especially 
useful for understanding the tendencies analysed in this study are the concepts 
of ‘neofunctionalism’ and ‘neoformalism’, originally derived from Duncan 
Kennedy’s article ‘Three Globalizations’.681 Neoformalism leads to the 
strengthening of rights and formal law, neofunctionalism to law being used to 
construct markets. These concepts relate to the question of the use and function 
677 In recent decades, Polanyi’s thought has inspired a neo-Polanyian literature. These authors 
have focused on the financialization of the economy and economic crisis, as well as on the 
commodification of care. Nancy Fraser, ‘Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of 
History’, Fortunes of feminism: from state-managed capitalism to neoliberal crisis (Verso 
2013); David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005); 
Brigitte Aulenbacher, Fabienne Décieux and Birgit Riegraf, ‘Capitalism Goes Care: Elder 
and Child Care between Market, State, Profession, and Family and Questions of Justice 
and Inequality’ (2018) 37 Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal. 
678 Polanyi (n 45) 146–147. 
679 Polanyi (n 45) 76. 
680 Polanyi (n 45) 185. 
681 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000’ (2006) 19 
The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal. 
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of public- and private-law logics and tools, and they may help us deepen our 
understanding of the changes in the relationship between these two logics and 
the implications of these changes. I would like to argue that the new governing 
rationality, which has replaced the command-and-control model of the welfare 
state, is connected to a new mode of capitalism and a new form of state, the 
neoliberal state.682 I will also argue that the results of this study imply a need 
to rethink the divide between public law and private law. 
This chapter will also seek to illuminate the empirical results of this study with 
the help of theories of neoliberalism and feminist critiques of the 
commodification of care. Fifteen years ago, David Harvey described Sweden 
as a case of ‘circumscribed neoliberalism’,683 characterized by a combination 
of neoliberal reform and high-quality public services. This chapter will 
consider this description in the light of developments in the governing logic of 
neoliberalism and changes in the Swedish welfare state. Central to this 
discussion is an understanding of the increasing commodification of care.  
However, I will also argue that the results of this study are complex and reveal, 
in a manner that fits well with my Foucauldian-inspired critical empiricism, 
how different conflicting or contradictory rationalities can operate at the same 
time. These results might in turn inform and nuance the theories that purport 
to explain the results. The results of this study may deepen our understanding 
of the how of neoliberal reforms, and thereby of the implications of these 
reforms. I have also aimed to portray and analyse the conflicts inherent in a 
system of outsourced public services and how these conflicts play out in the 
legal system. As I mentioned in chapter 1, one idea underlying this thesis is 
that the legal regulation of welfare activities is a battleground where conflicts 
between different modes of governing and ways of organizing social 
reproduction are played out. Care choice systems are in the middle of such a 
conflict. 
Lastly, I discuss why Sweden is such an interesting case in this debate. The 
Swedish example can enrich our understanding of a global phenomenon, but it 
also has specific aspects which must be understood as part of a specific 
historical trajectory. Privatizations are configurations that are both 
                                                 
682 For similar arguments see Fenner L Stewart, ‘The Corporation, New Governance, and the 
Power of the Publicization Narrative’ (2014) 21 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; 
Béatrice Hibou, The Bureaucratization of the World in the Neoliberal Era : An 
International and Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 2015); Hila Shamir, ‘The 
Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of Privatization and of the Regulatory 
State’ (2014) 15 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, amongst others. 
683 Harvey (n 677) 115. 
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‘commonplace in principle and specific in their arrangements – in the 
dispositions of relations between public and private, economic and 
political’.684 Understanding these specificities makes it possible to see how 
they help to shape various concrete modes of governing, which are as much 
parts of a global trend as they are the results of a specific historical context in 
a local setting.  
It is worth mentioning that, despite being of different sizes, the three 
municipalities in my case study produced generally similar findings. Some 
differences between them were more obviously directly related to the size of 
the municipality, such as differences in the number of providers or the size of 
the administration (and thereby the available resources and expertise). The 
larger municipalities, which have had many more providers pass through their 
systems, have also had much more experience of fraud than the small 
municipality, but these different experiences are not necessarily related to the 
sizes of the municipalities. Apart from these differences, the municipalities 
have had generally similar experiences. Any remaining differences have 
mostly to do with the closer personal relationships between the administrations 
and the providers in City S and City M, relationships made possible by their 
limited numbers of providers, and with the larger and more complex 
monitoring systems implemented in City M and especially in City L. From the 
available tender documents, it is clear that there is a tendency for smaller 
municipalities, at least in parts of the country not geographically close to other 
larger cities with a long history of care choice systems, to have tender 
documents and contracts that are less well developed. 
684 Béatrice Hibou, ‘From Privatising the Economy to Privatising the State: An Analysis of the 
Continual Formation of the State’ in Béatrice Hibou (ed), Privatising the state (Hurst & 
Company 2004) 25. 
225 
6.2 A reconfiguration of public administration 
6.2.1 The enterprisation of the state, the governmentalization of 
the enterprise 
This thesis has shown that the implementation of care choice systems changes 
the role of the municipal administrations. The need to administer a quasi-
market such as the care choice system creates a new and different role for 
public bureaucracy. Where the Social Services Act and its preparatory works 
focus on issues of equality, social security, and a holistic perspective on the 
individual, the municipal administrations now need to devote themselves to 
administering public procurement processes, monitoring contracts, and 
supporting private providers. Welfare services are now delivered by atomized 
agents which are governed indirectly, but strictly, through contracts, targets, 
performance measures, auditing, and the use of technical time and activity 
reporting systems. What is thus created is a bureaucracy focused on 
management, measurement, and monitoring.  
The municipal administrations govern the private providers very actively 
through a number of different tools – ranging from detailed regulations set out 
in a contract to the physical presence of municipal representatives in the 
providers’ operations. This study has shown that the municipal administration 
effectively functions as a kind of quality consultancy for the private providers 
and that private providers are sometimes in effect created by the entrepreneur 
together with the municipal administration. In a similar way, the monitoring of 
the quality of services comes to be intertwined with the municipalities’ support 
for private providers and their internal learning processes. The contract is 
supplemented with a high level of informal contact between the public 
authorities and the private providers, and governing through these 
relationships, through systems of trust, must be understood as an important part 
of the governing of the sector. The private providers are, in other words, not 
governed at arm’s length, nor is the sector left to govern itself, in a laissez-faire 
fashion. Rather, the providers are treated as though they were an extension of 
the public services. At the same time, in those municipalities with care choice 
systems, the governing of the municipal delivery of services also changes, with 
the use of contract-like arrangements supplanting traditional public-sector 
governing methods.  
The care choice system creates a new, more complex, intertwined relationship 
between public and private, in which municipal administrations govern private 
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providers almost as though they were part of the public sector, and municipal 
services begin to be governed with the instruments of private law. This double-
sided development may be understood with reference to Mitchell Dean’s 
analysis of the two competing imperatives of neoliberal programmes of public 
management. The first he calls ‘the enterprisation of the state’: that is, the shift 
towards governing public services as though they were private enterprises. The 
second is ‘the governmentalization of enterprise’: the detailed regulation of 
autonomous bodies by public authorities.685 As my study has shown, the 
subjectivity of the civil servants – the administrator and the bureaucrat – is 
transformed in the course of these developments. Civil servants come to adopt 
a new way of seeing their responsibility and the aims of public services. The 
very way in which public authorities are organized is transformed. As Rose 
puts it, their ethos moves ‘from one of bureaucracy to one of business, from 
one of planning to one of competition, from one dictated by the logics of the 
system to one dictated by the logics of the market’.686 The upshot of this 
transformation is that we have a situation in which private providers are 
making profits from public money while being supported in developing their 
operations by public administrators. 
In care choice systems, governing takes place through systems of self-
monitoring, benchmarks, and standards, which are ways of governing that are 
premised upon the ‘freedom’ of the individual providers. However, they are 
combined with more classical disciplining measures such as regulation, 
monitoring, and sanctions – tools of governing more associated with the 
command-and-control logic of the traditional welfare state. The use of each 
logic’s associated tools seems to have increased, with standards proliferating 
and monitoring operations expanding. One reason there is a need for active 
governing is that service provision has become fragmented and decentralized. 
While responsibility and accountability remain central, direct control is 
limited. The municipalities remain legally responsible, and national politicians 
are also expected to be politically accountable, as is clear from the national 
debate regarding this municipally regulated area. In response to cases of fraud, 
and with the aim of avoiding future scandals, national and local authorities 
seek to intensify their governing and monitoring of the sector. At the same 
685 Mitchell Dean, ‘Risk, Calculable and Incalculable’ in Deborah Lupton (ed), Risk and 
sociocultural theory: new directions and perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2000) 
149. 
686 Rose (n 198) 150. 
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time, because of the lack of direct control, there is a need to find alternative 
tools. A new logic of governing prevails. 
6.2.2 An increase in public bureaucracy 
The study has shown that practices of quality assessment have become 
increasingly important in home care services. These practices have become 
more explicit, more central, and increasingly focused on measurement. As we 
have seen, the Act on Care Choice Systems requires municipalities to sign 
contracts with any provider that meets the criteria in the act and in the tender 
documents. In this way, the criteria in the tender documents become the focus 
of the municipalities’ attempts to ensure that services provided are of high 
quality. Trying to define quality becomes central, and in that process quality 
becomes more specified, detailed, and standardized. The contractualization 
and specification of tasks have also given rise to a form of detailed technical 
monitoring. A broad range of monitoring measures is seen as necessary to 
ensure quality, and in turn this monitoring activity creates an increase in 
bureaucracy and in the use of data. This study has shown how information-
gathering systems are employed with a view to gauging and improving the 
performance of the services. These systems include monitoring, 
benchmarking, and different forms of mapping and judging, which enable 
comparison and competition, spurring constant organizational change. The 
introduction and expansion of care choice systems has thus entailed the 
creation of increasingly complex systems of quality assessment and 
management at different levels, both in the public procurement process and in 
the monitoring of services. 
This increased use of quality assessment and standards and the increasing 
standardization of service provision are, however, parts of a larger trend, which 
has been described in both the theoretical and empirical literature.687 This 
development in the neoliberal governing of the public sector has been 
                                                 
687 For theoretical accounts, see e.g. Dean, ‘Risk, Calculable and Incalculable’ (n 9); Roger 
King, The Regulatory State in an Age of Governance : Soft Words and Big Sticks (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007); Peter Triantafillou, New Forms of Governing : A Foucauldian Inspired 
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Villkor Och Vardag (Arkiv förlag 2019) and Teres Hjärpe, Mätning Och Motstånd : 
Sifferstyrning i Socialtjänstens Vardag (Samhällsvetenskapliga institutionen, 
Socialhögskolan, Lunds universitet 2020). 
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described by Dean using the concept of performance technologies688 and by 
Triantafillou using that of performance-measuring regimes.689 These authors 
suggest that performance targets and monitoring are intrinsic components of, 
and preconditions for, the contracting out of public services. Even though there 
is existing knowledge and information about how public services have been 
traditionally delivered, these performance measurements produce a particular 
kind of knowledge in which quality is quantified and measured. This means 
practices must be measurable, and thus the result is that performance 
measurement changes what is being measured. Performance technologies are 
presented as a way to restore confidence in public services and other 
institutions, but they are based on an assumption of mistrust of these very 
institutions, and as a result they produce even more mistrust. The introduction 
of performance technologies can be seen as an attempt to unite two competing 
imperatives of neoliberal governing: the aim of transferring public tasks to 
private subjects on the one hand, and the aim of increasing public control over 
how these tasks are completed on the other. 
Alongside this development is a proliferation of rules and regulations issued 
by non-legislative bodies. These rules do not have the same status as law, but 
they are developed and enforced by dedicated agencies, such as, in this case, 
the National Board on Health and Welfare and the Health and Care 
Inspectorate. Detailed governing and strict control through standards and other 
regulations become salient parts of the governing model in this field. King 
points out that in what he calls ‘the regulatory state’ a new system of rules is 
often introduced to marry private sector ownership with the protection of 
public interests.690 The guidelines and provisions from the National Board on 
Health and Welfare may be understood as, in King’s term, ‘meta-regulation’, 
since these guidelines often focus on the monitoring of the organizations’ own 
regulatory procedures. Soft regulation, self-regulation, and the involvement of 
clients/users in regulation are forms of regulation that are more selective and 
less burdensome than the more legalistic forms.691 In terms of the specific ways 
in which quality is regulated, there also seems to be a significant focus on the 
regulation of processes and routines and less of a focus on outputs or factors 
that would imply significant costs for businesses (such as the hiring of a skilled 
workforce). 
688 Dean, ‘Risk, Calculable and Incalculable’ (n 685) 148–149. 
689 Triantafillou (n 20) 60. 
690 King (n 518) 18. 
691 King (n 518) 74. 
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The municipal authorities’ governing is indirect, through contracts, 
monitoring, and partnerships: a form of ‘meta-regulation’. It moves away from 
direct command-and-control towards the regulation of organizations’ internal 
control systems. However, the systems municipalities set up to monitor the 
providers’ self-monitoring systems are still extensive, as we have seen. The 
need to control the private providers, ensure quality, and close contractual 
loopholes seems to have led to a marked expansion of public bureaucracy, 
particularly in the number of actors involved in monitoring, evaluating, and 
maintaining a constant dialogue with private providers.  
This significant expansion of public administration underlines the point, made 
above, that the state is essential to the construction and administration of the 
(quasi-)market. The way in which neoliberal rationality leads to an expansion 
of public bureaucracy has been discussed in the literature. David Graeber, in 
his persuasive 2015 work The Utopia of Rules, traces what he calls ‘the age of 
total bureaucratization’ to the intertwining of public and private: 
This apparent paradox – that government policies intending to reduce 
government interference in the economy actually end up producing more 
regulations, more bureaucrats, and more police – can be observed so regularly 
that I think we are justified in treating it as a general sociological law … [which] 
states that any market reform, any government initiative intended to reduce red 
tape and promote market forces will have the ultimate effect of increasing the 
total number of regulations, the total amount of paperwork, and the total number 
of bureaucrats the government employs.692 
This ‘law’ of increased bureaucratization seems to be relevant to the results of 
this study. Bureaucratization takes the form of complicated procedures 
involving many actors, standardization, monitoring, evaluation, and data 
collection, and as this study has shown this sort of bureaucratization follows 
from the use of tenders, contracts, and private-law instruments in the governing 
of the elder care sector. Also relevant in this context is the conflict between the 
increasing distance between political input and service delivery and the need 
to retain control over services. Public bureaucracy and legal regulation are thus 
not set aside but instrumentalized for the purpose of constructing and 
supporting the market. Paradoxically, this all takes place under the discursive 
flag of ‘less bureaucracy’ and ‘more laissez-faire’. But the state still occupies 
a central role. As Béatrice Hibou puts it: ‘In this sense privatisation can be 
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considered as a new form of state interventionism.’693 This accords with the 
Polanyian analysis of how liberalism triggers a growth in legislation and 
administration. 
6.2.3 Conflicting rationalities for public administration 
This thesis has focused on how the role of public authorities changes with the 
introduction of care choice systems. Governing through a quasi-market also 
entails different governing goals. Most importantly, governing comes to 
include the public responsibility to create and maintain markets. The public 
authority is not merely an impartial umpire maintaining the rules of the game. 
It plays an active role in supporting and coaching market actors, as well as 
itself participating in the market through its own delivery organization. My 
study makes clear that these changes in governing models do not diminish the 
role of the state; rather, they create a different role for the state, one that focuses 
on enabling the market and private providers to operate. The objectives of 
public administration are thus reconfigured. The market comes to be seen as 
the driving force, and while the state remains a decisive actor, its work is 
focused on supporting market actors. This sort of analysis challenges the 
traditional conception of the public as something inherently opposed to the 
private,694 a conception which is not borne out by the reality depicted in this 
study. 
However, this study has also revealed that public administration contains a 
mixture of rationalities which combine and conflict with each other. This mode 
of indirect government seems to be characterized by an ongoing negotiation 
between aims and actors and a constant redrawing of the boundaries and 
balances between delegation and control.695 Governing that focuses both on 
creating markets and on upholding standards of quality in service provision has 
to deploy ‘an increasingly complex apparatus of governing institutions and 
techniques’.696 What we witness here is a confrontation between bureaucratic 
practices that have developed over decades, through the institutionalization of 
the Social Services Act, and the practices made necessary by the introduction 
of quasi-markets. The complex apparatus thus created implies somewhat 
693 Hibou (n 684) 17. 
694 Hibou (n 684) 46. 
695 Hibou (n 684) 15. 
696 Triantafillou (n 20) 85. 
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contradictory and sometimes even obscure networks of administrative rules, 
roles, and processes. 
As we saw in the empirical chapters of this study, there is an inherent conflict 
between the aim of supporting private providers and the aim of securing high-
quality services. This could be described as an unresolved tension between the 
aim of increasing the diversity of service providers and that of ensuring that 
loopholes are closed through stricter regulation, where the pursuit of the latter 
aim leads to overly formalized requirements, standardization, and ultimately a 
lack of diversity. As the regulation of quality primarily focuses on processes 
and production technology, flexibility and innovation are systematically 
discouraged. Thus while the ambition is to create diversity, the logics of 
standardization and streamlining prevail. One reason for this is that an 
important rationality at play in the governing of care choice systems is that of 
risk management, and the operation of this logic entails an expansion of 
bureaucracy and active monitoring, measuring, and quality regulation through 
whatever methods are available. Performance technologies, such as the 
measurements, user surveys, and monitoring reports presented on municipal 
and national websites, are supposed to serve as ways of restoring confidence 
in public services. These developments have taken place alongside and within 
care choice systems, as responses to the risks of fraud and scandal that the 
openness and profit-driven nature of these systems create. 
According to the governing rationality behind the Act on Care Choice Systems, 
quality is also supposed to be maintained through the operation of market 
forces. Through the effects of the aggregated choices of individuals, bad 
providers should be forced to leave the system. However, as this and other 
studies have shown, in care choice systems, market mechanisms are not in 
play, since users rarely make active choices or change providers. The two other 
ways that private providers may be forced to leave care choice systems are a 
decision by the Health and Care Inspectorate to withdrawing their 
authorization or prohibit them from operating, or a decision by a municipality 
to terminate their contract. However, as we have seen in this study, the 
monitoring work undertaken by the Health and Care Inspectorate is limited,697 
and terminations of contracts by the municipalities are rare. The rarity of 
terminations may be explained, as I have suggested, in terms of the fact that 
                                                 
697 As the legislation that makes the Health and Care Inspectorate responsible for authorizing 
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municipalities generally adopt relational rather than discrete contractual 
strategies in their dealings with private providers. Further, municipalities find 
it difficult to prove that the quality of a service is substandard.  
The result is that the municipalities implement increasingly sophisticated 
monitoring systems and try to improve the private providers’ operations 
through support systems. These systems are demanding and difficult to 
maintain for the municipal authorities, especially for those with many 
providers. This is a possible explanation of the many cases of fraud and the 
high-profile scandals in care choice systems. The determining logic of the 
system involves a combination of public responsibility and private interest. 
The for-profit businesses are interested in making profits, and, if it is necessary 
to cut corners and exploit loopholes in order to do so, then they may well do 
just that. As a result, public authorities need to keep checking for mistakes and 
defects in service provision in order to uphold the public values for which they 
are responsible, even though this monitoring work is of questionable 
effectiveness. Even if the monitoring tools can be sharpened, there is a 
fundamental and unavoidable conflict at the bottom of the care choice system. 
Hence, despite all the descriptions of relationships of ‘partnership’ and ‘trust’ 
and the support given to the private providers, there is a conflict between the 
interests of the actors – the municipal interest in control and the private interest 
in making profit – and this conflict also plays out in the relationships within 
the care choice system. Hibou captures this paradox neatly: 
[T]he use of intermediaries and collusion between public and private interests
are not synonymous with harmonious and symbiotic relations: they do not
prevent tense and conflictual relations among the parties. …  [S]uch conflictual
relations and uncertainties are at the very heart of these arrangements.
Everywhere there are slip-ups and spaces where freedom can slip in, and if there 
are none of these, for astute actors it is always possible to invent ways of
circumventing.698
This passage describes the different motives and driving forces behind the 
different interests at play. This can be seen, for instance, in the municipalities’ 
attempts to close loopholes and find more efficient ways of monitoring the 
private providers. 
698 Hibou (n 684) 17. 
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6.3 New modes of governing through public and 
private law 
6.3.1 A new matrix of public and private 
The different logics we find in the governing of contracted-out welfare services 
can be ambivalent. As we have seen in this study, political forces may grant 
private service providers considerable leeway while at the same time 
intervening in them in significant ways. Public authorities may implement 
rigorous structures to manage and measure outcomes while at the same time 
trying to create environments of innovation and freedom. This conflict could 
be described in many different ways, but one way to deepen the understanding 
of it is to view it as an unresolved tension between different legal paradigms: 
a more traditional public-law rationality, focused on bureaucratic procedures 
and professional expertise, and a market-oriented rationality, focused on 
establishing and maintaining a market with conditions favourable to private 
providers. 
The public–private dichotomy plays a significant role in legal discourse. The 
division between public and private in legal terms derives from the Savignian 
system, which drew a line between the family and the market and between 
family law and patrimonial law.699 Hila Shamir argues that this doctrine sought 
to separate law from politics by establishing an (imaginary) apolitical legal 
system for the private sphere. On this view, within a certain sphere, individuals 
and companies should be allowed to operate freely in accordance with their 
desires and, for the most part, should be shielded from political intervention.700 
The public–private distinction is thus a product of the rise of capitalism in the 
nineteenth century. On the other side of this separation is the public sphere, 
defined as the sphere of issues connected to ‘a public interest’. At its centre is 
a professional administrative apparatus and public-law regulations bound by 
principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability.701  
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However, the state and the market cannot be separated in this way, and the 
concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the dichotomy between them, are 
contingent constructions. The state affects social power relations in the 
‘private’ sphere, and in some sense all law is ‘public’.702 The dichotomy 
between the two logics is, however, not arbitrary or meaningless. The choice 
between these logics is a political choice. Some of the conflicts between 
different rationalities that have emerged in the course of this study may be 
explained in terms of a confrontation between different legal rationalities and 
paradigms. This study has revealed structures that operate on the micro level, 
and here the intersection of the two rationalities becomes more complex. This 
may entail a better understanding of how differences in legal techniques 
produce certain outcomes. However, the major overarching tension arises from 
the different logics that govern the Social Services Act and the Act on Care 
Choice Systems. 
The Social Services Act is a typical product of twentieth-century social 
regulation and engineering. Kennedy characterizes the dominant paradigm 
during this period as ‘the Social School’.703 Within this paradigm, law is 
viewed as an instrument for achieving political aims and objectives, including 
distributive outcomes.704 In this paradigm, a central area of law is 
administrative law; central actors are the legislature, government officials, and 
public administrators; and the central principle is the ‘public interest’. Central 
to this paradigm are social rights, which, despite their vague legal status, 
played an important role in legal argument in the period during which this legal 
paradigm was dominant. Social rights are simultaneously legal and not legally 
enforceable; above all, they serve as goals for the welfare bureaucracy. The 
newly created profession of ‘social work’ used them to frame the goals of the 
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welfare state.705 The Social Services Act is very much a product of this 
rationality: it expresses social policy goals and (weak) social rights within a 
framework law which is intended to govern officials within the welfare 
bureaucracy. It is as such marked by instrumentalism rather than by formalism. 
The Act on Care Choice Systems, however, is essentially a public procurement 
regulation, founded on a different set of premises and making use of a different 
set of tools. I want to argue that the act and the regulations surrounding it are 
best understood as products of a neoliberal legal paradigm. As such, they are 
characterized by a dissolution of public and private and may be described with 
reference to the concepts of neoformalism and neofunctionalism, concepts 
which will be discussed below. 
The neoliberal legal paradigm is distinct from the liberal paradigm, which has 
a governing structure in which there is a relative autonomy between ‘the state’ 
and ‘the market’ and a presumed tension between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ 
systems.706 As Hibou explains, at the core of neoliberal bureaucratization there 
is a mixing of public and private, as well as an expansion of private instruments 
of governing and public–private partnership models.707 All of these aspects of 
neoliberal bureaucratization are present within the care choice systems. It is 
the homothetic relationship between public and private that constitutes what is 
new and specific about neoliberalism. Instead of a fundamental distinction 
between public and private, traceable to a belief in the opposition between the 
general interest and private interests, neoliberal governmentality is founded on 
the postulate of the priority of economic and financial logic, which is seen as 
the appropriate governing logic for both the private sphere and the public 
sphere.708  
According to Kennedy, our current legal paradigm is characterized by this 
dissolution of the division between private and public law. But he also 
highlights how the extension of the scope for legal intervention means that 
public authorities are able to govern actively and extensively in favour of the 
free market in a ‘neofunctionalist’ manner. This paradigm is also characterized 
by its ‘neoformalism’: the development of proportionality assessments, the 
centrality of courts and legal proceedings, and the new role for human rights.709 
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While the efforts to strengthen private interests in and through law can be 
described as neofunctionalist, the creation of frameworks that constrain 
political intervention in the market can be characterized as neoformalist. The 
neofunctionalist legal ideology emphasizes the value of market freedom and 
competition, while neoformalist ideas emphasize the importance, on the 
grounds of ‘efficiency’ or ‘market expectations’, of limiting the right of 
government to intervene. As Peer Zumbansen points out, there is a paradoxical 
alliance here between a notion of the market and the state as two separate fields 
and a policy that advocates governing through the privatization of the public 
sector. Active governing by public authorities through contractual 
relationships can thus be viewed as a new instrumentalization of the public 
function.710  
As this study has documented, the municipal administrations are very active in 
using legal and other tools to construct their quasi-markets and support market 
actors. This is an example of neofunctionalism: tools belonging to both public 
and private law become instruments with which administrations create 
markets, which in turn are expected to deliver quality services. The governing 
rationality of care choice systems puts the interests of the private providers 
highly, with the public authorities playing a supporting role. In the creation of 
a care choice system, these interests are the starting point, and the municipal 
authorities later have to struggle to regulate the system to ensure that standards 
of quality are upheld for the users. The ways in which political influence over 
private actors is constrained may be understood with reference to the concept 
of neoformalism. For example, when municipal officials seek to impose 
stricter requirements on providers, they find that they are blocked by municipal 
lawyers citing public procurement legislation. Because the Act on Care Choice 
Systems refers to EU public procurement regulations, officials must ensure 
their interventions are proportional: social and political goals must not be 
disproportionate in light of the business interests of the companies 
participating in the public procurement process. Because the municipalities 
have to act within this legal framework when developing their tender 
documents, and must take the legal principle of proportionality into account, 
they have to seek to balance public and private interests. Other constraints on 
public authorities have been imposed by politicians seeking to create legal 
conditions favourable to small companies. This is, again, an example of the 
neofunctionalism of the law and the state: the harnessing of the power of public 
authorities and its use in constructing and maintaining markets and supporting 
710 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic 
Turn of Reflexive Law’ (2008) 56 The American Journal of Comparative Law 775–780. 
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market actors. The goals of care choice systems are set in relation to market 
and economic interests. 
Zumbansen describes the contemporary combination of neoformalism and 
neofunctionalism as an aggressive backlash against the welfare state. At the 
same time, this combination conceals the fact that privatization is a political 
project. ‘This combination is ideological because both of these fields of 
expertise are considered a-political, when in fact in all these references to 
“law”, the “market”, and “experts”, the choice takes place within political, 
economic and other normative frameworks.’711 In this legal paradigm, legal 
thinking is a supplement to economic policy-making, and law and 
administration are used instrumentally to enhance market competition. The 
public is not simply subordinated but rather integrated in an economic 
rationality. This explains the fact that law comes to be reorganized around the 
market and market behaviour, that reforms take the market economy as a given, 
and that the premise of legal thinking is the preservation of the capitalist market 
economy.712 As a consequence, law in the neoliberal era becomes both a 
medium of government intervention and a language in which the constraints 
on such interventions are inscribed. It is deployed to promote efficiency and to 
defend institutions such as property and freedom of contract.713 
However, as the empirical chapters of this study have also shown, there still 
remain transformed elements of the welfare rationality within the mixture of 
rationalities that govern care choice systems. The belief in the virtues of 
privatization and the market logic in public spheres is, in this case as in many 
others, coupled with the demand that this privatization be governed by social 
values through the application of public regulations to private entities 
providing outsourced services. Tendencies towards privatization and the use 
of private-law instruments in regulation may be seen as ways in which the 
public has been colonized by private interests, diminishing the power of the 
state in relation to the market. However, the picture is complex, ever-changing, 
and dynamic.714 Techniques of governing may be put to new and different uses, 
such as when a contract is used to govern the provision of public services or 
when personal and informal contacts are used to supplement the contractual 
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relationships between public authorities and private providers. In a similar 
way, this study has shown how monitoring can be used not only to secure 
adherence to laws and contract terms but also as a tool for learning, and how 
the contractual regulation of liability can be put to use in governing complex 
issues of quality in care. Through these processes, the rationalities and tools of 
both public and private law change. 
6.3.2 Challenging the understanding of the public–private divide 
The governing structures of care choice systems could be described as a 
hybridized form of welfare in which traditional public-law relationships are 
intertwined with private-law contract relations. This is a complex, layered 
system in which various governing logics operate at the same time and in 
which governing principles associated with the public sector and the market 
are mixed together and combined. As the preceding chapter concluded, 
municipalities adopt a mixture of publicization and relational contracting 
strategies in order to uphold public values in care choice systems. And, as that 
chapter also showed, it is not clear from regulations and preparatory works just 
to what extent public-law regulations and values are applicable to and binding 
on the private companies operating in the sector.715 In a situation where private 
entities provide services which are publicly funded, highly regulated, and 
closely monitored by public authorities, and where, at the same time, public 
authorities work to construct and support the market and the language and 
concepts of business are injected into the discourse of welfare delivery, the 
conceptual line between public and private bodies has become blurred. This 
has implications for the relationship between public and private interests, and 
it creates new lines of accountability. Understanding this new legal landscape 
is important for legal scholars attempting to understand both public law and 
private law in the hybridized welfare state. 
Within a neoliberal ideological framework, and within a neoliberal state, law 
is deployed in new ways, creating new formations of ‘public law’ and ‘private 
law’. Within this framework, the contract plays a new role, bridging public and 
private law in complex, conflictual ways. The empirical data presented in this 
study suggest that the changes in the ways welfare services are delivered 
require us to rethink the distinction between public- and private-law tools and 
logics. Formerly distinct categories have become muddled. This ‘muddle’ in 
the contemporary relationship between public and private is sometimes 
715 See section 5.6. 
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described as ‘governance’ in the literature. ‘Governance’ refers to ways of 
governing that involve a ‘blurring’ of public and private functions within areas 
of regulation.716 There is no settled definition of the concept, and scholars 
differ significantly in the ways in which they understand and use it. However, 
the idea that governance signifies a transformation from hierarchical 
command-and-control governing to governing through networks, cooperation, 
partnership, and self-monitoring seems to be agreed upon by most scholars.717 
Another frequently mentioned aspect of governance is the transposition of the 
language and instruments of the business world into public administration, for 
instance through the concepts of ‘benchmarks’ and ‘best practices’.718 
The concept of governance seems relevant to the results of this study, but the 
concept itself does not explain why this ‘blurring’ of the lines between public 
and private came about or what its implications might be. Could the problems 
described above be solved by clarifying the relationship between public and 
private, pursuing the ‘publicization’ of contractual relationships, or finding 
better ways of monitoring private providers? Or are they of a more fundamental 
nature? The empirical results show that the ambitious work of public 
authorities in supporting the quasi-market and the private providers – what I 
described above as a form of neofunctionalism – must be understood as 
implying more than just a ‘blurring’ of the boundary between public and 
private. It is an active management whose aim is to support the private 
providers. The market logic prevails over the logic of public administration, 
and the interests of private market actors are given priority over the public, as 
they are believed to deliver the sought-after qualities within the welfare sector. 
This reasoning carries over to the question of law’s relationship to the 
construction of markets. The dichotomy between state and market, which lies 
at the bottom of the public–private distinction, has always been problematic, 
for it implies that government is ‘exogenous’ to the market; in truth, states 
create markets by formulating the ‘rules of the game’ which structure and 
define markets and market actors from within.719 Markets are always 
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constructed by law, as Alain Supiot, among many others, has pointed out. A 
market requires the existence of contracting entities, actors who have decision-
making power and may be held liable – competences given to them through 
law. Both public law and private law are thus prerequisites for the operation of 
the market.720 Neoliberalism brings about a growth in the power of market 
actors and an expansion of the laws of the market into what were previously 
purely public areas.721  
To the user, the private provider might seem to be an extension of the public, 
and it is understandable that the distinction between public- and private-law 
subjects is unclear in a situation in which the operations of the private entities 
are so extensively financed, regulated, monitored, and supported by public 
authorities with which the private companies have close working relationships. 
However, I will argue that there are fundamental differences between public 
and private providers. These can be demonstrated both with reference to the 
results of the empirical part of this study and with the help of theory. Drawing 
on the empirical results, I want to provide three arguments to show that there 
are qualitative differences between the public and private delivery of services 
and that the establishment of quasi-markets in the welfare sector might have 
unwanted side effects for citizens.  
The first argument has to do with the problem of translating public-law 
principles, or principles central to the provision of welfare services, into 
contract clauses, a difficulty that came up frequently in my investigation. A 
related problem is that, from a classic public-law perspective, individual rights 
to receive high-quality care are supposed to be non-negotiable, but this 
conflicts with the some of the ways in which private law is used in the welfare 
sector. One example of this from the municipalities is the way in which 
monitoring is used to support the private providers’ internal learning 
procedures rather than to secure the rights of older persons. Similarly, the use 
of ladders of sanctions and the many opportunities that providers are given to 
rectify their mistakes – all the while continuing to provide services to users – 
may be at odds with the user’s right to receive high-quality care on equal terms 
with other users. Another important issue in this context is the fact that the 
monitoring work undertaken by the municipalities, although ambitious and 
resource intensive, cannot keep track of all of the activities of the private 
                                                 
720 Alain Supiot, ‘The Dogmatic Foundations of the Market (Comments Illustrated by Some 
Examples from Labour Law and Social Security Law)’ (2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal 
323. 
721 Shamir (n 682) 25. 
241 
providers, and thus it cannot hope to exclude from the system all fraudulent 
providers and companies providing poor-quality services. This means that it is 
difficult for the municipalities to ensure that important quality standards, such 
as those relating to working conditions and the competence of staff, continuity 
of care, and infection control – all essential aspects of home care, as the 
coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated – are actually upheld in the operations 
of the private providers. 
A second fundamental difference between publicly and privately delivered 
services has to do with accountability. In a care choice system, although the 
legal responsibility remains with the municipality, contracting out means that 
the distance between democratically made decisions (the input side of the 
political system) and the provision of services (the output side of the political 
system) increases, which makes the lines of political accountability for the 
quality of the services more obscure. The use of relational contracting 
strategies obfuscates the connection between input and output further. As 
Wendy Brown argues, a system of network governing, such as this, changes 
power’s visibility for those who are governed.722 Rendering more obscure the 
ways in which citizens can hold responsible actors accountable for substandard 
tax-financed services might create problems of legitimacy for the welfare 
system. This is potentially a problem with governing through standards, 
benchmarking, networks, and non-transparent partnerships. As Triantafillou 
puts it: ‘a wide array of technical and calculative standards has supplemented, 
if not supplanted, the laws and regulations making up the normative framework 
informing acts of accountability’.723 The connections between democratic 
input and output – via tenders, monitoring, and dialogue between the public 
and the private providers – become quite complex and obscure. There is thus 
a risk that this model creates a ‘liability gap’: a situation in which it is not clear 
which actor is responsible for problems with the service. In terms of the 
strategies adopted by the municipalities, their detailed regulation of the private 
delivery of services may be viewed as an attempt to transfer their public 
obligations to the private contractor. As Hansen points out, this can scarcely 
succeed, since public responsibility is tied to the fundamental rule of legality 
while contractual liability is fixed through the contract.724 This lack of 
accountability is likely to be even more acute in a quasi-market such as a care 
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choice system than it is in situations involving traditional public procurement, 
since the range of actors involved is broader in a quasi-market.  
A third, and particularly important, distinction between publicly and privately 
delivered services has to do with incentives. The problem with strategies such 
as publicization and relational contracting is that they do not sufficiently take 
into account the underlying logic driving private, for-profit companies: namely 
that they are profit-driven and will not adhere to public values and regulations 
unless they are given economic incentives to do so. For-profit providers, which 
provide a vast majority of the private elder care sector in Sweden, are of course 
driven by the profit motive, and this constitutes a distinctive difference from 
public providers of welfare. As King says: ‘Private companies can never 
discharge public interest accountability against their inevitable pursuit of 
commercial gain.’725 Their actions are motivated in a different way, and this 
influences the way in which governing can shape the overall outcome.  
The evidence from the municipalities, complemented by theoretical tools, thus 
shows that a quasi-market reform such as the care choice system entails more 
than a ‘blurring’ of the line between public and private. It is an active choice 
to govern in a way that supports private interests. At the same time, we have 
seen that this is not the only rationality in play. The reforms also emphasize 
the values of diversity and freedom of choice for the individual, and these 
claims must be taken at face value. Further, the rationality that governs the 
Social Services Act aims at securing high-quality services for all older users 
on an equal basis. The meeting of these different rationalities and different, 
sometimes opposed, driving forces and logics can create tension. They are kept 
in balance through the different strategies employed by the municipal 
administrations, although this balance is constantly shifting as a result of 
political choices. This situation could also be described as an ongoing conflict, 
in a political-legal setting, about the nature of welfare.  
Even if the distinction between private and public law is, as I said above, a 
contingent construction, there are still relevant differences between the legal 
techniques and rationalities that belong to each sphere. As we have seen, when 
one of these legal governing rationalities increases its influence over a certain 
sphere at the expense of the other, there are consequences. Public law is based 
on a normative project of protecting individual citizens from public power and 
structuring the institutions of parliamentary democracy, the political decision-
making process, and the relationship between the popular will (as expressed 
through parliament) and the rule of law. The public-law logic has, in the 
725 King (n 518) 88. 
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context of the welfare state, instrumentalized democratic gains as means to 
protect individuals and limit the influence of economic interests within certain 
spheres. The primary normative logic underlying private law, on the other 
hand, aims at structuring relationships of trade and ownership and protecting 
the interests of contracting parties. It thus has a different normative ground 
from that underlying public law.  
The question is whether Jody Freeman’s claim, now almost two decades old, 
that many public-law scholars are ‘badly out of synch’ with the reality of the 
public–private dichotomy, which has been fundamentally changed through the 
widespread use of public–private partnerships,726 still holds true for parts of 
the discipline. There is an idea among public-law scholars – for some, it might 
even be a hope – that public-law governing instruments, with their principles 
of transparency, political accountability, equality, etc., are robust enough to 
withstand neoliberal reform. Public law has not, however, gone unaffected by 
the far-reaching privatization programmes that have affected public services in 
so many countries. The hybridization brought about by these reforms of the 
welfare state has transformed the post-war model of public law. This study has 
shown how this hybridization plays out in practice, on the ground, and how it 
relates to the neoliberal project and its fundamental restructuring of public law. 
This means that those wishing to uphold public-law principles may have to 
reformulate their political demands in light of the changes which the system 
has already undergone. For those who want to see increased democratic 
influence and a public sphere that does not work for, but as a counterpart to, 
business interests, a new formulation of  political programme is needed. This 
new formulation must take into account how different privatization reforms in 
the welfare sector have fundamentally changed not just the ways services are 
delivered but also models of governing and regulation. 
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6.4 Care choice systems in the context of 
neoliberalism and the commodification of care 
6.4.1 A new organization of social reproduction 
The shifts in the responsibilities and forms of organization of reproductive 
work may also be understood with reference to feminist theories about social 
reproduction. Feminist theorists have long been interested in care and the 
organization of reproductive work, which were traditionally seen as existing in 
a separate sphere, such that analyses of labour and capitalism excluded from 
their scope reproductive work taking place within the household. Experiences 
of care work have been regarded, within feminist standpoint theory, as a 
‘potential source of alternative epistemologies and ontologies’.727 According 
to Tithi Bhattacharya, an advocate of social reproduction theory, care and 
reproductive work must be understood within the framework of capitalism, and 
any understanding of capitalism must include an account of the organization 
of reproductive work. Social reproduction theory takes as its point of departure 
the idea that the reproduction of society – all the care work that needs to get 
done in order for society to exist and function – is an integral, but often 
overlooked, part of any economic system.728 Thus, changes in the way welfare 
services are organized may be fruitfully analysed through the combined lenses 
of a feminist understanding of the importance of reproductive work and an 
analysis of the evolution of capitalism. 
Writing within a Marxist tradition, Silvia Federici points out that the question of 
older people and elder care has traditionally been left out of analyses of labour, 
including analyses of reproductive labour.729 Federici observes that, at a certain 
stage of capitalist development, all social relations become relations of 
production, subsumed under capital.730 Salar Mohandesi and Emma Teitelman 
develop this point, arguing that capitalism has expanded by gradually 
commodifying objects and services which were previously produced within the 
727 Kathi Weeks, ‘Life within and against Work: Affective Labor, Feminist Critique, and Post-
Fordist Politics’ (2007) 7 Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization 236–237. 
728 Tithi Bhattacharya (ed), Social Reproduction Theory : Remapping Class, Recentering 
Oppression (Pluto Press 2017) 3. 
729 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero : Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist 
Struggle (PM Press 2012) 120. 
730 Federici (n 729) 7. 
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home.731 Social reproduction thus changes, with more of its technologies and 
activities becoming commodified and integrated within capitalist relations of 
production.732 Contemporary financialized capitalism is well placed to exploit 
the sources of social reproduction, as it is now possible to invest and speculate 
in services such as publicly funded welfare. Investing in welfare and social 
services seems to produce good returns.733 In this way, care work, or 
reproductive work, which at one point would have been seen as existing in a 
separate sphere, is now more fully integrated into the capitalist logic.734 
Brigitte Aulenbacher, Fabienne Décieux, and Birgit Riegraf describe a new 
stage of capitalist societalization which extends to care. These authors claim 
that the commodification of care is the result of three factors: 1) an ideological 
market fundamentalism, 2) an erosion of other forms of care, and 3) the need 
for capitalism to expand.735 Capital approaches social reproduction as a source 
of valorization and profit, which means that care and care work become 
commodified, become factors of production like other commodities, or 
‘fictitious commodities’ (to use Polanyi’s term). The new stage of the capitalist 
societalization of social reproduction builds on the subordination of the 
political to the economic seen in the marketization and quasi-marketization 
reforms that extended the economic logic to new societal spheres. However, 
Aulenbacher, Décieux, and Riegraf argue that commodification is not the only 
tendency in play in the organization of care and care work. 
Such forms of marketisation and quasi-marketisation of social reproduction 
cannot be understood sufficiently if they are only interpreted in the frame of the 
ongoing capitalist commodification of nature and labour and the relations of 
class. They also refer to the relations of gender and ethnicity underlying the 
societal separation of spheres.736 
Capitalism always needs to expand, and this is made possible through processes 
that transform activities into work and various assets into commodities. The 
marketization of elder care, in other words, is the transformation of the activity 
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of care into care work, which can in turn be turned into a source of profit. 
However, Federici argues that technological innovation and professionalization 
will never completely replace the ‘care’ in elder care. According to her, there is 
a limit to the commodification of reproductive labour. Care work inherently 
involves the complete engagement of the worker; it is work of a holistic 
character. If it were totally commodified, this would lead to the radical alienation 
of the social relations of care.737 One question in this context is whether it is 
possible to draw a line between care activities and other activities. Whether care 
work is something qualitatively different from other services is in part a 
normative debate, but an answer to this question might enable an explanation of 
some of the difficulties that arise in regulating care through the market. However, 
this is beyond the scope of this study.  
The changes in the definition of care described in this study, from relational 
and professional to standardized and marketized, may also be seen as a change 
in the status of care from an activity within a separate, gendered sphere to a 
commodity on the market. One of the main motivations behind the introduction 
of a generous system of social services, including elder care, in Sweden was 
the aim of emancipating women from the care burdens of the family through a 
collectivization of caring responsibilities.738 While this rationality is still 
present, it is clear from this study that elder care is still a gendered sector, as 
the majority of employees, care managers, and users are women. This implies 
that any transformation of the elder care system will affect women more than 
men.739 The introduction of care choice systems implies the increased 
commodification of home care services and the creation of new spheres of 
capital accumulation. The feminist theories presented above can help to 
explain some of the difficulties that arise in this process. The standardization 
of elder care that this study has revealed may be understood as a product of the 
commodification of care work, for commodities must be defined and 
measurable to be able to be bought and sold. This commodification is in turn a 
way for capital to expand and find new markets and ways to secure profits. 
Moreover, the difficulties municipalities experience in attempting to find ways 
of measuring care work arise because of the specific relational features of 
reproductive work and the limits these place on the extent to which these 
activities can be commodified. Here there is clearly the potential for further 
research.  
737 Federici (n 729) 122–123. 
738 See section 1.3.2. 
739 Andersson and Kvist (n 60) 3. 
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6.4.2 The state activated on behalf of the economy 
A main finding of this study is that care choice systems produce a situation in 
which public authorities actively support private providers yet at the same time 
find themselves constrained in the extent to which they are able to politically 
intervene in or exert control over these providers. While the topic of study here 
has been home care services for older people in Sweden, a similar dynamic is 
present in other domains. These changes should be understood in the context 
of a global development, as part of a neoliberal reconfiguration of public 
administration and its relationship with private interests. 
The concept of neoliberalism provides a deeper understanding of the ways in 
which the relationship between state and capital has been reorganized in recent 
decades. Academics have argued about whether to understand the concept as 
denoting ‘an order of normative reason’740 which is present in many spheres – 
not only in the economic and political spheres but also in the workplace, 
education, and culture – or rather as referring to a political project aimed at re-
establishing the preconditions for capital accumulation and the dominance of 
the capital-owning class.741 Even though both of these positions have 
explanatory value, I find the ‘thick’ sociological conception of neoliberalism 
presented by Wacquant, which incorporates parts of both of the 
aforementioned perspectives, to be most useful in discussing the findings of 
this study. This conception is ‘thick’ because it does not reduce neoliberalism 
to a merely economic phenomenon, but it is also not all-encompassing in the 
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way that governmentality conceptions of neoliberalism can tend to be. 
According to Wacquant, neither governmentality studies nor Marxism fully 
captures what is new in neoliberalism, namely ‘the remaking and redeployment 
of the state as the core agency that actively fabricates the subjectivities, social 
relations and collective representations suited to making the fiction of markets 
real and consequential’.742 In other words, Wacquant wants to suggest a 
definition of neoliberalism centred around the state and the institutional 
machinery involved in the establishment of market dominance.743 There are 
three aspects of this analysis of the neoliberal state formation that I especially 
want to highlight in relation to my study. 
The first is a commonly held view of neoliberalism as an ideological project 
that aims to turn ever more spheres into markets and increasing numbers of 
interactions into market-like activities. The very idea of introducing a quasi-
market into social services, the view of users and providers as market actors, 
and the commodification of care are all suggestive of such a project. Neoliberal 
rationality, as Brown claims, ‘disseminates the model of the market to all 
domains and activities – even where money is not an issue – and configures 
human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as 
homo oeconomicus’.744 The operative political rationality here functions to 
commodify activities and aspects of society which were not hitherto viewed as 
commodities. Marketization and voucher systems may be understood as 
technologies which facilitate commodification and, at the same time, allow 
private enterprises into public spheres. By allowing such actors to exist within 
the welfare service sector, this sector is opened up for profit-making interests. 
Second, neoliberalism must be seen as a constructivist and political project. 
Even if it plays out in complex ways and exhibits a complicated relationship 
between structure and agency (the strategies lack strategists), it is undeniably 
a project which is fuelled by and serves certain interests. Harvey argues along 
these lines that the theories and ideology of neoliberalism serve mainly to 
legitimize and justify this political project. This produces a ‘creative tension’ 
between the power of the ideas advanced under the flag of neoliberalism and 
the actual practices of global capitalist interests.745 An important fact about this 
legitimizing ideology is that it has captured ideas of individual freedom and 
turned them against the practices of the state, which it depicts as bureaucratic 
742 Wacquant (n 50) 68. 
743 Wacquant (n 50) 71. 
744 Brown (n 47) 31. 
745 Harvey (n 677) 19. 
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and unnecessarily interventionist. The idea of consumer choice, including in 
relation to public services, has been a central tool in this ideological struggle.746 
The trend towards increased marketization and private influence over public 
spheres and the welfare state is an expression of a shift in the global balance 
of power towards a global financial capitalism constantly in search of new 
markets,747 and this development has come about thanks to the gradual 
delegitimization of direct public intervention and lobbying by private actors 
seeking to shape governing to their own advantage. This is a process fueled by 
the ideology of the market and enterprise.748 
Third, and most important for the analysis of the findings of this thesis, an 
essential aspect of this political project is the reconfiguration of the state, the 
activation of the state on behalf of the market. As Wacquant puts it in the 
passage quoted above, in the neoliberal state the public authorities’ role 
becomes that of making ‘the fiction of markets real and consequential’.749 This 
is precisely what has happened with the municipal administrations in Sweden: 
they have been remade such that they now function to produce market 
subjectivities, social relations, and institutional preconditions for the operation 
of businesses. In the neoliberal hegemony, entrepreneurship and private 
enterprise are seen as the keys to innovation and growth. This means that the 
traditional role of the state as the protector of social values is transformed. 
Since markets do not naturally appear, intervention is needed to create them.750 
Brown writes: 
Neoliberalism is not about the state leaving the economy alone. Rather, 
neoliberalism activates the state on behalf of the economy, not to undertake 
economic functions or to intervene in economic effects, but rather to facilitate 
economic competition and growth and to economize the social, or, as Foucault 
puts it, to ‘regulate society by the market’.751 [Emphasis added] 
This reasoning recalls the Polanyian point of departure for this chapter, and 
potentially goes some way to answering the question of why the municipal 
administrations go to such lengths to support private providers – to take care 
of business. A rationality in which the market is thought to be the superior way 
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of organizing human interaction, an ideology which supports and is driven by 
certain interests, reconfigures the municipal administrations into apparatuses 
whose purpose is to help the private providers, in the belief that, in doing so, 
the best for all concerned will be achieved. One of my interviewees summed 
this point up neatly when discussing the support offered to the private 
providers: ‘It benefits us. It benefits the individual. It benefits society at large. 
It benefits everyone.’752 
A strength of Wacquant’s ‘thick’ conceptualization of neoliberalism is that it 
leaves room for an analysis of the internal tensions that arise within public 
administration, tensions this study has documented. Lines of conflict emerge 
between policy-makers driven by neoliberal ideals and administrators 
attempting to advance the traditional missions of public bureaucracy, and 
between business-friendly politicians and bureaucrats seeking to control public 
spending and more socially minded politicians and bureaucrats seeking to 
protect and support welfare recipients. The fact that there has been what 
Wacquant identifies as a ‘rightward skewing of the structure and policies of 
the state’ should not be understood as the product of a systemic imperative or 
functional necessity. Rather, it is – and this is an important point – a 
‘structurally conditioned but historically contingent outcome of material and 
symbolic struggles, waged inside as well [as] from outside the bureaucratic 
field, over the responsibilities and modalities of [the] operation of public 
authority’.753 This sort of analysis makes visible the antagonisms between 
different interests which, according to Chantal Mouffe, are the basis of the 
political. The political is in this way an arena of constant renegotiations of 
balances and solutions in which any consensus reached can only ever be 
temporary and unstable. This furthermore means that what are perceived as 
political problems cannot ever be fully pinned down; they are always in motion 
and constantly being renegotiated.754 What is fruitful about Wacquant’s and 
Mouffe’s approaches is the way in which this ‘thicker’, sociological, non-
reductive understanding of historical developments makes it possible to 
comprehend the basis of these conflicts. It is important not to conceive of 
neoliberalism in a teleological or determinist way, as this closes the door to 
other political ways forward. This reasoning fits well with Polanyi’s view of 
the market economy as a contingent creation. Polanyi claims that the transition 
to a market economy was not a result of any inherent tendency in markets or 
752 L6. The quotation comes from a passage in section 5.4.2. 
753 Wacquant (n 50) 74. 
754 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community [1992]’ in James 
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human interaction but was the product of active political decision-making. 
Thus, the market and state intervention are not at all opposed phenomena: state 
intervention is constantly required in order to establish new markets and 
maintain the market system.755  
6.4.3 Is Sweden an example of ‘circumscribed’ neoliberalism? 
The contemporary Swedish social services system may be described as the 
product of a combination of neoliberalism and welfarism, a specific form of 
neoliberalization which makes Sweden an interesting case. Larsson, Letell, and 
Thörn use the term ‘social-democratic neoliberalism’756 and Johan Pries ‘social 
neoliberalism’757 to capture the sense in which the Swedish welfare regime and 
its underlying logics and driving forces have been reconfigured rather than 
replaced. The findings of my study corroborate this point. There is not a simple 
dichotomy between state and market, nor between social democracy and 
neoliberalism. The social democratic project was built on a consensus, a 
compromise between the state and important market actors. Accordingly, the 
shift in governing models that has taken place is not a shift from state to market 
as the organizing model, but a transformation from one compromise between 
interests to another.758 The neoliberalization of the Swedish welfare state 
should thus be understood as the striking of a new balance between the 
different logics inherent in the social democratic project.  
It has always been the case that this project has involved a balance between a 
vision of welfare for the working class and a regulated capitalism, between the 
political and the economic, where the former has served to mitigate the social 
problems created by the latter. However, the story of the Swedish welfare state 
has entered a new chapter in recent decades. What is left of the old rationality? 
What happens when it confronts the new governing logic? I agree with 
Wacquant’s important claim that there exist internal tensions between different 
parts of the state. Appreciating this point allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the findings of this study. This study has shown that multiple 
rationalities exist side by side within the same governing structure – in this 
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case, the aim of securing high-quality services for all and the ambition of 
supporting profit-making businesses (especially small ones). This combination 
of rationalities leads, in turn, to a reconfiguration of the role of public 
administration and a tendency towards standardization within the care sector, 
as, without detailed regulation and monitoring, the risk is that public money 
would go straight into the pockets of business owners. Thus, while care choice 
systems are an expression of a broader development in the relationship 
between state and capital, they are also shaped by the rather more mundane 
practices of municipal bureaucrats dealing with conflicting priorities. 
As I have mentioned, earlier versions of the Swedish welfare state can also be 
understood as products of a balance between conflicting interests. The social 
democratic model was always a compromise with capital. Neoliberalism, 
however, marks a new era, a new balance between conflicting interests and 
rationalities. One aspect of this new balance is that there is now less distance 
between what is seen as the market and what is seen as the public sphere. 
Following Harvey, we can say that this is a sign that capital has strengthened 
its power and established markets in new places. The development of quasi-
markets, under the banner of ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘efficiency’, proves to 
be favourable to large, well-established companies owned by venture 
capitalists. Even if the introduction of care choice systems in the Swedish elder 
care sector advances the economic interests of large care companies, this shift 
must also be understood as a political one. The emerging welfare market 
model, characterized by public governing and funding and private delivery, is 
not the product of a natural evolution. It is politically created, maintained, and 
reproduced. This study has shown that the establishment and the maintenance 
of this system of welfare services require considerable public intervention, 
public spending, and public regulation. This also tends to create more 
bureaucracy. I would dispute Harvey’s characterization of Sweden as a case of 
‘circumscribed’ neoliberalism. Instead, the Swedish system is a specific 
formulation of the conflict between state and capital in which public authorities 
provide far-reaching support for private businesses, one instance of which has 
been described in this study. 
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6.4.4 A reorganization of welfare and welfare law 
As the Swedish example shows, alongside its core function of protecting 
citizens against the economic and social risks of capitalism, the welfare state 
has always also indirectly supported capitalism by ensuring the reproduction 
of a well-functioning workforce and stabilizing consumer demand. However, 
neoliberalism also seems to involve welfare and social policy in a more direct 
supporting role through the processes of neofunctionalism and neoformalism 
in the legal paradigm.759 Kenneth Veitch refers to Bob Jessop as well as to 
Polanyi to suggest that social policy and welfare institutions have been 
redesigned in order to support capital. Because, as I have said, state 
intervention is needed to establish and maintain markets, state intervention also 
creates the conditions for capital accumulation. Veitch argues, with reference 
to Wacquant, that this should be seen as a political project, not something 
which is a logical consequence of an economic order.760 Legal structures and 
specific acts created in order to introduce market logics and profit opportunities 
into the publicly financed sector, such as the Act on Care Choice Systems, are 
examples of precisely these kinds of political decisions.  
Another aspect of the privatization of welfare services is that the public 
contracts with the private sector increasingly make the well-being of care 
recipients, and to some extent the economic fate of the taxpayer, dependent on 
the operations of private businesses and market mechanisms. Public and 
private interests thus become interwoven. Competition law and contract law 
become crucial tools for realizing the political project of privatization. Basic 
principles of social welfare law are often kept intact alongside newly 
introduced elements of formal law. These new systems, competition law and 
contracts, introduce principles of formal equality and formal processes into a 
legal system that has traditionally been an instrument for the achievement of 
certain ends, in particular equality of outcomes. What Veitch calls ‘formal 
rational law’ is an institutional mechanism that functions to introduce markets 
and private interests into the welfare sector. It is therefore constitutive of how 
these markets operate. In this way, law and legal structures have an integral 
role to play in these market constructions.761 Here I want to cite the 
municipalities’ compliance with the perceived limits imposed on them by EU 
regulations and the proportionality principle. According to the rationality of 
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EU competition law, the role of government should be to uphold the rules of 
the game, to support and complement the market,762 and the competition 
thereby facilitated will create a spontaneous order.763 Other examples of this 
neoformalist rationality are the use of sanctions to regulate behaviour and the 
rules that limit the kind of information municipal administrators can provide 
to users in relation to their choice of provider. 
However, the changes in legal paradigms is not enough to explain this 
development. For formal rational law to function effectively in its creation of 
opportunities for capital accumulation and profit-making in the welfare sphere, 
a certain political and social environment is required. Most importantly, there 
must have been a political choice made to use public funds to create markets 
and to allow private profits to be made out of these public funds. When public 
funds are used to support private interests, the principle of solidarity is turned 
upside down. Instead of simply using publicly funded welfare as a support 
system to mitigate the inequalities of capitalism, it is also used to support 
private companies. In systems such as the Swedish one, where it would be 
politically impossible to dismantle the welfare system, capital instead exploits 
the generously funded services by seeking the commodification of this sphere. 
Veitch explains this eloquently: 
Given that, politically, it would be unfeasible simply to dismantle welfare 
institutions and move to a system of private insurance, the desire to use these 
institutions as sources of economic growth for the private sector requires the 
careful construction of a legal, political, and social system geared towards this 
end.764 
Care choice systems must be seen in the context of the discussion about profit-
making in the welfare sector. Otherwise, the fraudulence and substandard care 
within these systems are attributed to the moral motivations of those running 
the businesses, and one could be led to believe that the people who are in the 
system ‘for the wrong reasons’ could easily be removed with the right level of 
regulation. However, as long as it is possible to make a profit by providing 
welfare services, the profit motive will by definition override other motives, 
and there will be a never-ending search for the right level of regulation to 
prevent the misuse of public money. Here we should remind ourselves of the 
762 Nyberg (n 200) 198. 
763 Nyberg (n 200) 76. 
764 Veitch (n 759) 153. 
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unique extent to which Swedish welfare regulations allow private profit to be 
made from public funding. 
From the results of this study, it is clear that the Swedish tradition of 
instrumentalism in the regulation of welfare, and the large and active 
bureaucracy associated with welfare provision, have in a way been repurposed. 
As such, economic aims, rather than political ones, have come to function as a 
dominant rationality. Private companies are driven by the pursuit of profit and, 
following the care choice system reform, public authorities have come to be 
increasingly supportive of this pursuit. This is because, according to the 
dominant governing logic, the care companies are treated as trusted partners 
and thus afforded a great deal of discretion. The neoliberal transformation of 
public law is connected to a change in the social democratic project, which was 
formerly based on the idea of the public sphere as a counterbalance to the 
market. The weakening of this logic therefore might have implications. In the 
neoliberal era, the interests of capital have more political influence, and they 
work to institutionalize their victories through law, which, while it has its own 
inherent logic, can also be an instrument for external interests. Exactly how 
these interests have affected the development of the care choice systems, and 
the tools and strategies used within these systems, is an empirical question 
which has not been answered in this thesis but could be fruitfully studied 
elsewhere. 
To sum up: markets require law and bureaucracy to function, and neoliberalism 
means more markets and thus more regulation and bureaucracy. Crucially, law 
is used to construct and control markets, and law’s role is particularly 
important in the context of neoliberalism. Veitch’s claim that law is used as an 
institutional mechanism to allow private interests into the welfare sector gains 
some support from the findings of this study. The quasi-market is a legal 
construction and needs an advanced public apparatus to be sustained. This 
relates to Graeber’s law: that any marketization reform inevitably increases 
regulation and bureaucracy – an observation that is particularly relevant to this 
study. However, this is not a simple and straightforward development, but one 
filled with internal conflicts and contradictions, as my study of the 
municipalities has shown. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
Although this study has specifically focused on home care for older persons in 
Sweden, the tendencies it has identified are present in other areas of the 
privatized welfare services. Here, I want to underline the points made above 
about how quasi-marketization drives a growth in bureaucracy, monitoring, 
and standardization and how neoliberalism reconfigures public administration, 
turning it into a servant of business. These findings have a broad relevance. 
Changes in the use of public- and private-law tools and logics mean a 
redefinition of aspects of the public sector as a whole. 
Many of the developments traced in this study were already under way before 
the introduction of care choice systems. The fact that the Social Service Act is 
a framework law had allowed for a gradual transformation of the 
organizational structures of welfare services over time. Prior to the Act on Care 
Choice Systems, the use of traditional public procurement in the sector had 
also already introduced elements of contractualization and privatization, 
although not on as large a scale. The introduction of care choice systems 
catalysed this development, both on a state and a municipal level. The act 
shows how the enterprisation of the state and the privatization of public 
services go hand in hand. The implementation of New Public Management 
ideas brought about a focus on measurement, standardization, and market-
based tools in the governing of the public service sector. The purchaser–
provider model in use in many municipalities had already introduced the split 
between purchaser and provider and market competition among providers. 
These reforms, which separate the delivery unit from the governing body and 
create systems of measuring, are a precondition for the construction of quasi-
markets and competition between public and private. If New Public 
Management reforms had not been implemented, privatization, in the form of 
the care choice systems, would have been more difficult to pursue. 
The introduction of care choice systems has also created new and specific 
conflicts in the organization of home care for older people. The municipal 
responsibility for the quality of elder care, the need to ensure the system has 
political legitimacy, and a political will to support small businesses combine 
to produce a situation in which public spending on welfare is channelled into 
the support and monitoring of businesses within the sector. Because of the 
internal conflicts between different orders and interests, municipal 
administrations find themselves with a contradictory mission, and 
municipalities handle this by supporting the private providers. This also leads 
to a situation in which low-quality services and fraudulent behaviour cannot 
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properly be dealt with. It is clear that, despite the great amount of work that the 
public authorities put into constructing, supporting, and monitoring the quasi-
market, many apparent problems still remain. These problems have become 
topics of public debate in Sweden over the last decade. Many of the changes 
within the Swedish welfare system described in this thesis, however, take place 
on the level of administrative procedures, governing techniques, etc. – that is, 
on levels which are generally hidden from the public and therefore not matters 
of public debate.  
Another key point that I have emphasized in this thesis is that the market is not 
‘free’; marketization leads not to less bureaucracy but to more bureaucracy, a 
fact which is clearly borne out by the whole apparatus of control which seems 
to be required by a care choice system. The Trust Delegation, which was set 
up to find ways of solving the problems associated with the New Public 
Management reforms, has had a difficult time trying to find ways to foster trust 
alongside the existence of private interests in the welfare sector. The problem 
arises because public authorities have to trust not the profession, which is what 
is usually meant by the expression ‘governing through trust’, but the private 
providers, which at the same time have to be closely scrutinized so that they 
do not exploit loopholes in regulation in order to secure more profits for 
themselves. The operation of profit incentives must be controlled by means of 
the contract, but since, as we have seen, criteria regarding public values and 
quality standards are hard to formulate, two implications follow: 1) loopholes 
cannot be avoided and fraud becomes systemic, and 2) public values and 
quality standards become standardized, formalized, and reduced to measurable 
details. Even if the municipal officials believe that the tenders and contracts 
gradually improve over time as better balances between conflicting priorities 
are found, my study does not suggest that there is any way out of this quandary.  
The empirical chapters of this study have shown that government is, in this 
case, exercised beyond legislation, rules, and policies. Central to public power 
are the administrations which realize this power. The way administrations seek 
to handle the care choice reforms reveals that conflicting rationalities are in 
play. Administrations adopt strategies to solve the conflicts they confront, 
thereby creating new logics that were not necessarily intended by any actor. 
This study shows that the legal strategies adopted by the municipalities are 
complex and, in general, that they aim at regulating the private providers 
through the contract almost as if they were part of the municipality, while at 
the same time treating the municipal provider as if it were a private company. 
At the same time, the formal contractual relationships are supplemented by 
relational contracting strategies, that is, by informal contact, training, and 
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support. However, my findings do not allow us to say with any confidence 
which of these strategies is most effective in preventing the negative 
implications of the outsourcing of welfare services.  
In the law surrounding welfare services, different rationalities are in play 
alongside one another. As I have suggested, we should see law as a complex 
instrument that plays different and sometimes conflicting roles, an instrument 
which may be used to institutionalize the political achievements of different 
sides of political conflicts. Legal regulation is also not automatically put into 
play. This study has revealed that law is being used as an instrument with a 
function different from that of the functionalism of the twentieth-century legal 
paradigm. That functionalism was targeted at protecting society against the 
adverse effects of market forces, but the neofunctionalism of today’s legal 
paradigm works to support the market and market actors. Another aspect of 
this new paradigm is that it uses law to limit the scope of potential political 
influence over the regulation of the market and market actors, which is an 
expression of a broader neoliberal rationality that casts the economy as 
primary. This legal restrictiveness may be described as a kind of neoformalism. 
Further work in the area of administrative or public law could fruitfully 
continue this investigation into how a new legal paradigm and new forms of 
organizing public–private relations play out in law and in the legal strategies 
deployed by legislators and administrators.  
There is a final point that must be made here regarding the exceptionality of 
the Swedish case. The unique status of the Swedish welfare state as a whole is 
evident in its elder care system, which is characterized, on the one hand, by 
generous public funding and, on the other, by the presence of for-profit 
companies operating on a large scale with limited regulation of their ability to 
make profits. This study has shown that the traditional universalist (and 
feminist) aims of the Swedish welfare state are still present in this new 
configuration, but they now have to be achieved through large-scale 
interventions in private businesses by municipal administrations. The Swedish 
social democratic model has always been premised upon a compromise 
between state and capital, but the marketization of welfare systems entails a 
new version of this compromise. This version is not simple: it is complex and 
contradictory, as this study has shown. However, it deserves also to be 
regarded as a specific iteration of the neoliberal relationship between state and 
capital, one which, rather than being a lighter, ‘circumscribed’ version of 
neoliberalism, has increased the power of capital at the expense of the state. 
As we have seen, municipalities and municipal administrations are sites where 
this compromise between capital and state is realized. In this process, there is 
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space for difference, conflict, and resistance, and this means that the struggle 
over the regulation of welfare can never be over. To see neoliberalism as a 
political project gives us a choice: which way do we want to go? 
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